Israel just released its own version of a national intelligence estimate, it is a post-mortem of last year’s war with Hezbollah. First the good news:
It is clear that Hizbollah’s balance statement at the end of the fighting was mixed. Politically, despite its efforts to portray the campaign as a “divine victory,†the organization incurred severe criticism at home. Furthermore, much of its military infrastructure was damaged. Its system of underground tunnels in the border area was exposed and in part destroyed. The organization’s array of defensive outposts on the border and its grip on the area were almost completely eradicated. A large portion of its medium range rocket system (Fadjr rockets and 220 mm and 320 mm rockets) was also destroyed. Above all, the Dahiya quarter in Beirut, the organization’s organizational, military, and political nerve center, was razed. As if that were not enough, Hizbollah’s mass of supporters, most of whom are concentrated in southern Lebanon, suffered heavy losses in property and personnel. It is likely that elements in the Iranian leadership also criticized Hizbollah once it was dragged into a premature violent confrontation with Israel that exposed its strategic capabilities, particularly with regard to rocket launches deep into Israel.
This seems largely consistent with what Gen Yaacov Amidror wrote at the beginning of this year.
* Hizballah casualties were not less than 500 and may have reached 700 – a figure greater than all the casualties Hizballah has suffered during the last twenty years. It will take Hizballah at least two years to rebuild its capabilities and to recruit and train new people.* Israel also developed a system which made Hizballah’s long-range rocket launchers good for one use only. Within less than five minutes of launch they were destroyed by Israel’s air force, an unprecedented achievement in modern warfare.
* The determination of Israel’s government to respond and to retaliate is a very important factor in restoring deterrence. Now those around Israel understand that Israel has certain red lines, and that if these lines are crossed, Israel’s retaliation will be intentionally disproportionate. As a small country, we cannot allow ourselves the luxury of reacting proportionally.
* Middle East leaders understand that Israel is prepared to use military force, and that in the future we are not going to be as tolerant of attempts to act against us.
* Nasrallah said at the beginning of the war that there would be no international forces and no Lebanese army in south Lebanon. The entry of these forces is, from the Israeli point of view, the greatest success of the war.
* What is the real mood of the Israeli people after the war? It is that we are not suckers and we are not going to make the same mistake again. We are not going to put ourselves in danger if it is not necessary. We unilaterally retreated from Lebanon and didn’t retaliate for six years, and in the end we found Hizballah in a stronger position to fight against us. When Israel retreated from Gaza what was the result? More Kassam rockets on Sderot and Ashkelon.
(The last two items are clearly disputable at this point, though.)
Meryl Yourish emphasized the positive aspects of the report.
It’s good to read some hopeful news for a change. But the next year or two is fraught with potential existential threats for Israel. It would be much better to see some of the dictatorships in the region replaced with democracies. Too bad that won’t happen in my lifetime.
However, there is a “however” in the report.
On the other hand, the organization can claim success for its operational doctrine. Its forces inflicted many losses on the IDF in local combat, and above all, Hizbollah never ceased its bombardment of the Israeli home front, even in the face of massive air activity. The organization’s logistical forecasts also proved correct, given its success in preserving a large inventory of ammunition, thereby enabling Hizbollah soldiers to hit Israel with large numbers of rockets during every stage of the fighting (an average of 150-200 rockets per day were fired). From the organization’s perspective, these actions both brought about an end to the fighting and severely shook the “Zionist entity.†From this vantage, the operational balance was positive.
Noah Pollak emphasizes the negative and adds some points of his own.
First, the report misses one of the central, and most successful, pillars of Hizballah’s strategy, which was to use civilian casualties in Lebanon and the sensational media images resulting from them as a means of undermining the Israeli war effort. And second, Israeli strategists must think about a rather unconventional way to respond to Hizballah in the next outbreak of hostilities, which is to bypass fighting in Lebanon and go directly to Hizballah’s local source of weaponry, money, and support: Syria.
There is little doubt that Israel scored was successful in degrading Hezbollah’s offensive capabilities last summer. However it failed to strike a knockout blow against the organization. If Pollak is correct, then the next time a threat from Hezbollah appears imminent, Israel must strike, not at the puppet, but at its masters in Iran and Syria.
Crossposted at Soccer Dad.
