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Will Adopting the Palestinian Starting Point of the 1967 Borders Bring Peace?

Exhibit A: In June, 1999, shortly after Ehud Barak had defeated Benjamin Netanyahu to become Israel’s new prime minister, Charles Krauthammer wrote a column title, Clinton Should Have Targeted Arafat Instead. Krauthammer noted that Arafat was going around the world to lobby support for accepting UN General Assembly resolution 181 as a basis for any peace deal.

What is that? An obsolete, defunct resolution passed by the General Assembly (unlike 242 and 338, not by the Security Council, and thus not even binding) . . . in 1947! It partitioned British Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state. At the time, every single Arab state and the Palestinian Arab Higher Committee totally rejected 181. In fact, they invaded the area given to the Jews with the express purpose of wiping it off the map.

They failed. And now 50 years later, the Palestinians are converts to 181.

What’s wrong with that? In the course of that ’48-’49 war, Israel fought back. The armistice lines of 1949 ending it created the current internationally recognized (pre-’67) Israel–an area larger than that outlined in 181. Hence Arafat’s 181 ploy. Under 181, Israel would have to give up not just the ’67 conquests (all of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza) but large chunks of pre-’67 Israel proper in the Galilee and the Negev. Indeed, 181 would take not only East Jerusalem away from Israel, but West Jerusalem–entirely Jewish and always under Israeli control–as well.

Arafat had, as Krauthammer put it, “moved the goal posts.” Krauthammer pointed out further that the Clinton administration was silent about this deal killer.

Exhibit B: Nearly three years ago President Obama blindsided Netanyahu with a speech in which the President endorsed Israel’s 1967 borders as the starting point for negotiations. Charles Krauthammer wrote at the time:

Nor is this merely a theoretical proposition. Three times the Palestinians have been offered exactly that formula, 1967 plus swaps – at Camp David 2000, Taba 2001 and the 2008 Olmert-Abbas negotiations. Every time, the Palestinians said no and walked away.

And that remains their position today: The 1967 lines. Period. Indeed, in September the Palestinians are going to the UN to get the world to ratify precisely that – a Palestinian state on the ’67 lines. No swaps.

Note how Obama has undermined Israel’s negotiating position. He is demanding that Israel go into peace talks having already forfeited its claim to the territory won in the ’67 war – its only bargaining chip. Remember: That ’67 line runs right through Jerusalem. Thus the starting point of negotiations would be that the Western Wall and even Jerusalem’s Jewish Quarter are Palestinian – alien territory for which Israel must now bargain.

This time it was the United States moving the goal posts for the Palestinians. The New York Times reported that the speech marked a “subtle but significant shift” in American policy.

It’s also interesting to see how the Washington Post’s Glenn Kessler treated the speech. Kessler acknowledged that the American position had “evolved.” Here’s how he portrayed the starting point:

From an Israeli perspective, the de facto borders that existed before 1967 were not really borders, but an unsatisfactory, indefensible and temporary arrangement that even Arabs had not accepted. So Israeli officials do not want to be bound by those lines in any talks.

From a Palestinian perspective, the pre-1967 division was a border between Israel and neighboring states and thus must be the starting point for negotiations involving land swaps. This way, they believe, the size of a future Palestinian state would end up to be — to the square foot — the exact size of the non-Israeli territories before the 1967 conflict. Palestinians would argue that even this is a major concession, since they believe all of the current state of Israel should belong to the Palestinians.

Notice what the “Israeli perspective” is. Kessler’s taking what everyone believed after the Six Day War (and he even acknowledges this later) in the article and making it strictly Israel’s position. Furthermore he describes the Palestinian position in great detail crediting them with a “major concession” for even allowing Israel to exist.

In contrast, (though he wasn’t officially wearing his “fact checker” hat at the time) when Kessler earlier dealt with “settlements,” he treated a one time opinion by State Department bureaucrat as law.

Thirty years ago, the State Department legal adviser issued an opinion in response to an inquiry from Congress: The establishment of Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territories “is inconsistent with international law.”

The opinion cited Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which states that an occupying power “shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.” Israel has insisted that the Geneva Convention does not apply to settlers and broadly contests assertions of the settlements’ illegality.

Despite the passage of time, the legal opinion, issued during the Carter administration, has never been revoked or revised. President Ronald Reagan said he disagreed with it — he called the settlements “not illegal” — but his State Department did not seek to issue a new opinion.

Kessler treats the 1979 opinion by Herbert Hansel as authoritative even though Morris Abram, who helped draft the Fourth Geneva Protocol stated that the intent was strictly to prevent the sort of brutal policies that the Nazis carried out.

I bring Kessler an example of a mindset in the media and the diplomatic corps which treats most Palestinian claims as valid and most Israeli claims as something only Israel believes.

Exhibit C: Jackson Diehl from last week:

Israelis and Palestinians have signed on to U.S.-sponsored frameworks before, most recently the “road map” of George W. Bush. But Kerry’s aim is to produce one that would cover more substance. Most likely it would include Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, the stationing of Israeli troops near the Jordanian border and language that excludes a mass “return” of Palestinian refugees to Israel. In exchange, Netanyahu would be expected to swallow the principles that the territory of Palestine would be based on Israel’s 1967 borders and that its capital would be in Jerusalem.

Again in exchange for “givens” – acknowledging Israel as a Jewish state shouldn’t be negotiable, but the Palestinians never accepted it, the right of return would end Israel as a Jewish state and the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the Philadelphi corridor demonstrated the need for Israel to remain in the Jordan valley – Israel is expected to agree the Palestinians terms.

The Game:

If accepting the Palestinian view of the 1967 borders would ensure that Israel could make peace with the Palestinian Authority (PA) that might be understandable. But in a recent paper, No End to Palestinian Claims: How Israel and the Palestinians View Borders, Pinchas Inbari shows that it is uncertain that such a concession would impel the Palestinians to make a deal. While Inbari doesn’t discount the possibility “there could be surprisingly favorable developments,” he still takes a cautionary approach based on the publicly expressed positions of the PA. In particular, Inbari writes:

The question, though, is whether the ratification of the 1967 border would entail the end of the dispute. Hopefully, the answer would be yes, with the United States putting its full weight behind the finality of the agreement.20 Yet we cannot ignore certain Palestinian positions which, if they do not change, are likely to generate crises even after an agreement is reached. For example, in an article posted prominently on Fatah’s website, the author discussed – uncharacteristically – the issue of the Jewish refugees. Zionism, according to this author, deliberately sowed terror in Iraq so as to frighten the Jews there and, eventually, settle them in Palestinian areas that were emptied of their residents, who then became refugees. Thus, the right of return is actually the right to return to lands that the United Nations allocated to the Arab state in the partition plan.21

What this means is that, from the Palestinians’ standpoint, the negotiations being held today are about the results of the 1967 war. The Palestinian state to be established along the 1967 lines is not intended to absorb the refugees from the 1948 lands; their proper place will be within the partition-plan borders. After “closing the file” on the 1967 borders, then, the “refugee file” will be opened, and the Palestinians will demand their return to the Arab state postulated by the partition plan. In other words, the real, intended border is not one along the 1967 lines, but the one of 1947.

The Palestinian peace effort so far has been a combination of failing to abide by previous agreements (Arafat committed to stopping incitement against Israel, a phenomenon that continues until today); impose new terms on Israel (prisoner releases were meant to apply only to non-violent prisoners and was a confidence building measure not a requirement); and ensure that grievances remain (claiming that Israel “occupies” their territory when over 90% of Palestinians have lived under the PA since the end of 1995.) The records suggests that accepting the Palestinian demand for a return to the 1949 armistice lines won’t bring Israel any closer peace. The Palestinians are looking for concesions, not an agreement.

The Editors’ Unreal Mideast

The New York Times and Washington Post have both recently weighed in with editorials about John Kerry’s peace process.

First the New York Times ran The Ticking Mideast Clock.

Signs of failure are everywhere. On Thursday, standing beside Mr. Kerry, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivered a harsh assessment of his Palestinian counterpart, President Mahmoud Abbas, and, implicitly, the prospect of a Middle East peace agreement. Days earlier, Israel let it be known that it would build more settlements in the West Bank, further poisoning the political atmosphere while shrinking the territorial space for a deal. Hard-liners in Mr. Netanyahu’s government are pushing a bill that would annex settlements in the Jordan Valley area of the West Bank, where about 6,000 Israeli settlers and 10 times as many Palestinians live.

So what did Netanyahu say?

A few days ago in Ramallah, President Abbas embraced terrorists as heroes. To glorify the murders of innocent women and men as heroes is an outrage. How can President Abbas say that he stands against terrorism when he embraces the perpetrators of terrorism and glorifies them as heroes? He can’t stand against terrorists and stand with the terrorists. And I’m wondering what a young Palestinian would think when he sees the leader of the Palestinian people embrace people who axed innocent men and women, axed their heads or blew them up or riddled them with bullets. What’s a young Palestinian supposed to think about the future? What’s he supposed to think about what he should do vis-à-vis Israelis and vis-à-vis the State of Israel?

So it’s not surprising that in recent weeks israel has been subjected to a growing wave of terrorist attacks. President Abbas didn’t see fit to condemn these attacks even after we learned that at least in one case, I stress at least in one case, those who served and are serving in the Palestinian security forces took part in them. In the six months since the start of peace negotiations, the Palestinian Authority continues its unabated incitement against the State of Israel. This Palestinian government incitement is rampant. You see it in the state-controlled media, the Government-controlled media, in the schools, in text books, in kindergartens. You see it in every part of Palestinian society. So instead of preparing Palestinians for peace, Palestinian leaders are teaching them to hate Israel.

So how did the editorial present Netanyahu’s remarks?

In his remarks on Thursday Mr. Netanyahu claimed that members of the Palestinian security force were involved in a recent attack against Israelis. Mr. Abbas should investigate the claim and, if it is true, bring those responsible to justice. He also needs to crack down on the incitement of hatred against Israel in Palestinian schools, textbooks and government-controlled media.

As part of the negotiating process, Mr. Netanyahu agreed to release 104 Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails over nine months rather than halt settlement construction. But when Mr. Abbas welcomed the latest group to the West Bank this week, Mr. Netanyahu accused him of embracing terrorists, even though Mr. Abbas never condoned the prisoners’ crimes. If Mr. Netanyahu felt so strongly about the prisoner releases, he should have chosen instead to halt settlement construction.

First of all, I don’t assume that Netanyahu made his charge about the participation of the Palestinian policemen without proof. But don’t expect Abbas to do anything. Of course the crackdown on incitement is twenty years overdue, why would the Times expect it to happen now?

But of course, as Honest Reporting points out, the Times is lying about Abbas condoning terror.

PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas:”I demand [the release of] prisoners because they are human beings, who did what we, we, ordered them to do. We – the [Palestinian] Authority. They should not be punished while we sit at one table negotiating. Besides, they spent many years in prison. How much longer? Do they have to spend all their life in prison and even die there?”

Prisoner releases were never meant for prisoners “with blood on their hands.” They were meant as a confidence building measure. That Abbas insists on releases for even killers shows that he condones the terror. (Six months ago he called a mass murderer a “pure soul!”)

The editorial’s point about Netanyahu choosing settlements over murderers is sophistry as Eugene Kontorovich explains:

But aren’t houses less important than justice for the murdered? Of course. However, unlike the release of terrorists, a construction freeze is fundamentally related to the substance of the negotiations themselves. That is, of all the proposed “gestures,” the freeze would not only be problematic in itself, but would have Israel start negotiations on its back foot.

Not allowing Jews to build houses in most of Jerusalem, in settlement blocs like Gush Etzion, Maale Adumim, and elsewhere that would surely remain under Israel sovereignty sends one message: we have absolutely no right to be here. We are trespassers. It is one thing to say the Palestinians can have a state because of demographic reasons, international pressure, and so forth. It is another thing to say we are trespassers in the Old City of Jerusalem and Hebron, where Jews lived until being expelled by Arab armies and mobs. A settlement freeze in effect agrees to the 1967 lines as the basis for negotiations–which even if it were a good idea, is a lot more than a “gesture of good faith.” It is one thing to say these territories should become Palestinian territory. It is another to say Israel took them from the Palestinians, that they always were, as Abbas claims, Palestinian territory.

Furthermore, if the negotiations were so important to the Palestinians why did Abbas demand any concession from Israel in order to negotiate? The Times doesn’t question this Palestinian tactic, encouraged by the peace processors, to demand a price for the privilege of negotiating as Kontorovich observes:

Of course, the way the narrative of the peace process is structured, Israel should not be surprised at the pay-to-play. And for this situation, the tireless proponents of “peace” bear primary responsibility. If, as the left argues, Israel needs peace more than the Palestinians need it, no wonder the Palestinians will charge Israel heavily for the privilege of giving them a state.

The editors of the New York Times may scoff at Netanyahu’s unwillingness to cede ground, but it is the peace process, as they advocate, that is the biggest obstacle to peace. Even the editorial’s lukewarm call for an end to incitement comes across more as an afterthought, a grudging acknowledgment of Israel’s concerns, not a sincere demand of the Palestinians. After all, how many New York Times editorials over the past twenty years even mentioned the word?

The Washington Post’s Will John Kerry’s Mideast peace framework bring results? is somewhat more balanced.

With the end of a nine-month term of negotiations approaching in April, Mr. Kerry last week shifted away from trying to push the two cautious and reluctant leaders toward accord on the terms of Palestinian statehood. Instead he pressed them to consider a U.S.-designed “agreed framework” that would set out principles for resolving what Mr. Kerry called the “core issues” while leaving difficult details for future bargaining.

That pushed both sides to “a point where the choices narrow down and the choices are obviously real and difficult,” as Mr. Kerry put it. According to Israeli and Arab news reports, Mr. Abbas must decide whether to accept the notion that Israeli troops would monitor the eastern border of a Palestinian state for an extended period and whether to acknowledge Israel as a state for the Jewish people. Mr. Netanyahu must consider whether, in exchange for such potentially historic commitments, he would agree that the territory of the Palestinian state be based on Israel’s 1967 borders and that its capital be in greater Jerusalem.

But “more balanced” doesn’t necessarily mean fair or even correct. Why should Netanyahu agree to the 1967 borders as a baseline for negotiations? Israel’s critics love to say that the United States has never supported settlements. But historically, the United States (and most of the world) never supported a return to the 1949 armistice lines. As far as getting “historic commitments” from the United States on the Jordan valley and the acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state, the first is a necessity given the disaster that ensued following Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza and the second is really a prerequisite for any peace. The Palestinians shouldn’t be rewarded for failing to acknowledge the Jewish historic right to the land of Israel for the past twenty years.

Of course, what neither editorial acknowledges is that there’s another player here. That’s Hamas. Last week Hamas said (with some justification) that Abbas has no authorization to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians. Jonathan D. Halevi quotes:

“Hamas movement stresses its opposition to the path of negotiations; our people has not authorized anyone to negotiate with the occupation; the possible outcome of these negotiations will not represent our people and only speaks for those who will sign on them, in light of the national consensus by all the Palestinian organizations regarding opposition to negotiations; and that any Arab backing authorizing the President of the PA to pursue the negotiations and to relinquish any part of Palestinian land cannot have any legitimacy whatsoever.”

Halevi elaborates:

The American initiative ignores the fundamental situation in the Palestinian arena, and the basic fact that the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah headed by Mahmoud Abbas does not enjoy the status that would allow it to make historic decisions in the name of the Palestinian people, and certainly not decisions that are not in line with the Palestinian consensus, which supports “the return of Jerusalem to Arab and Islamic rule” and the “right of return.”

In fact, the camp headed by Mahmoud Abbas represents a minority in the PLO (and even within the Fatah movement), in the Palestinian territories (the West Bank and Gaza), and in the Palestinian diaspora. The PA is not capable of making historic decisions based on concessions regarding basic Palestinian positions.

Even if one assumes the good faith of Mahmoud Abbas (something I do not assume) his power is limited. He has no ability to deliver peace or foster coexistence (even if he wanted to.) And yet these opinion makers assume (along with John Kerry) that it is somehow in Israel’s and Netanyahu’s interest to make “difficult” and likely irreversible choices to make a deal that cannot be consummated.

The Diplomacy that Enables Tehran

When I was almost fifty four, it was a very good year
It was a very good year for kindly faced clerics
Whose Justice Minister was an executioner
And Defense Minister waged an anti-American war
When I was almost fifty four.

Nearly two years ago Jeffrey Goldberg interviewed President Obama about how he would deal with the threat from Iran. Given Goldberg’s support for Israel, the interview was part of an administration campaign to tell Israel and Israel’s supporters in the United States that “we’ve got Israel’s back.”

It’s unsettling now, that Goldberg has declared that For Iran, 2013 Was a Very Good Year.

Remember that interim Iranian nuclear agreement forged in Geneva on Nov. 24, the one accompanied by blaring trumpets and soaring doves?

Would it surprise you to know that the agreement — a deal that doesn’t, by the way, neutralize the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program, just freezes the program, more or less, in place — has not yet been implemented? Would it surprise you to learn that this deal might not be implemented for another month, or more? Or that in this long period of non-implementation, Iran is free to do with its nuclear program whatever it wishes? And that one of the things it is doing is building and testing new generations of centrifuges? Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Agency, recently said , “We have two types of second-generation centrifuges. We also have future generations which are going through their tests.”

Happy New Year, everyone.

If there was urgency on the part of the West, the deal would have been in force by now. In fact the negotiations for the implementation of the deal were put on hold for a week, for a Christmas break! Goldberg’s miffed that the administration doesn’t view the urgency of holding Iran’s nuclear program in place – he doesn’t seem to accept President Obama’s claim that the deal would significantly “roll back” Iran’s nuclear program.

The Goldberg makes a very astute observation.

The smartest decision Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, made this year was to allow the smiling cleric (and former nuclear negotiator) Hassan Rouhani to win the election for the country’s presidency. Rouhani might very well turn out to be more moderate than Khamenei — superficially, of course, he is far more palatable than the man he replaced, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – but so far, there are no signs that Rouhani’s putative moderation has led to meaningful shifts in the policies of the Islamic Republic. Iran continues to be the most potent state sponsor of terrorism in the world; it is still the prime backer of Hezbollah in Lebanon and of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria; and it hasn’t shown any inclination to actually roll back its nuclear program.

Rouhani didn’t exactly win in an independent vote; he was allowed to win by the real leader in Iran. As Prime Minister Netanyahu has aptly described Rouhani, he is “wolf in sheep’s clothing.” Underneath Rouhani’s superficial trappings of moderation he is and always has been part of Iran’s senior leadership.

But now Goldberg gets to why 2013 was so good for Iran:

And ever since the so-far unimplemented interim deal was struck, Western companies have been sniffing around Tehran, looking for footholds in what they have been led to believe is a soon-to-open market. Merck is trying to partner with an Iranian drug company, and firms from France and Italy have entered talks with Iranian automakers and mining concerns. If Rouhani succeeds in improving Iran’s economic prospects even before the interim agreement goes into effect, his government will find itself under much less pressure to negotiate a final nuclear deal.

Even though the deal to freeze Iran’s nuclear program has not been implemented, Iran has, already, started to reap the economic benefits of the deal. As much as President Obama claims that the sanctions relief would be “reversible” the increase in economic activity confirms the critics’ view that the sanctions relief threatens the whole sanctions regime.

Goldberg ends by noting (and reinforcing an earlier point) that Lebanese politician, Mohamad Chatah wrote an open letter to Rouhani asking Iran to stop meddling in Lebanon’s affairs. Last week, before he could get signatures for his letter from other members of the Lebanese parliament, Chatah was killed by a car bomb likely by Iranian proxies, leaving Goldberg to lament:

The chance that anyone associated with the Iranian regime will pay for this murder is almost nonexistent.

Given Goldberg’s open support of President Obama in the past and even without his directly blaming the President for failing to live up to his words, this is a devastating indictment. Goldberg has illustrated that despite the President’s claims to be committed to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or that he’s under no illusions about the nature of the regime; Obama actions – or more precisely, his inaction – show that neither concern him much.

A couple of recent news stories make this abdication of responsibility even worse. The Wall Street Journal and the New York Times both reported (though citing different sources) that Iran and Syria have sneaked new sophisticated missiles into Lebanon.

(While it’s uncertain that he was necessarily referring to these missiles, an Iranian political commentator recently boasted that “It has been revealed that our missiles can now very easily reach Tel Aviv. We have weapons that can make Israel go blind.” In the same interview he compared the Geneva deal with the P5+1 to the Treaty of Hudaybiyya, which would mean that it is a tactical and temporary deal that Iran intends to keep only as long as it is to its benefit.)

Israel and Lebanon aren’t the only countries being further threatened by Iran’s seeming new aggressiveness. Michael Rubin writes that Bahrain is too and that means:

… despite hope in Western capitals that Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s election matters, it seems the Islamic Republic—or at least its Revolutionary Guards (IRGC)—are resurgent and bent on taking the constitutionally-mandated “export of revolution” to a new level. With Iran resurgent in Syria and still overwhelmingly influential in Iraq (and Iraqi Kurdistan), it seems that Tehran seeks to be turning its attention to its proxy war against Saudi Arabia on other fronts.

Finally, one aspect of the P5+1 deal that Goldberg didn’t address but is still important is the effect the P5+1 deal will have on the Security Council resolutions governing Iran’s illicit nuclear program. Not only by delaying the implementation of the Joint Plan Action do the P5+1 allow Iran to continue flouting Security Council resolutions obligating it to stop its enrichment program, but the language of the Joint Plan of Action itself undermines the force of those resolutions. Non-proliferation experts Olli Heinonen and Orde Kittrie wrote last month:

Article 25 of the UN Charter specifies that “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council.” Since Iran is a member of the United Nations, it is explicitly required to abide by Security Council resolutions, including those which required it to suspend its enrichment-related and Arak construction activities, not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and “provide such access and cooperation as the IAEA requests” to resolve IAEA concerns about Iran’s nuclear warhead research and development.

Yet the Joint Plan of Action nowhere recognizes the Security Council’s authority to legally bind Iran. Iran’s steps to comply partially with its Security Council obligations to suspend enrichment and work at Arak are labeled “voluntary measures” in the Joint Plan of Action. Iran will use this to bolster its patently false argument that the Security Council has no legitimate legal authority to restrict Iran’s nuclear program. Since Iran is quite clearly wrong on this point, it is unclear why the P-5 plus 1 were willing to agree to undercut the Council’s authority with such a formulation.

The administration seems to be so hellbent on having achieved that Lee Smith observed:

In other words, from the point of view of the administration and its surrogates in the press, if you believe sanctions—rather than good will—is what got Iran to the table in the first place and further sanctions are likely to produce a better deal than relieving pressure on Iran, then you’re a warmonger. If you believe that sanctions should not be lifted until Iran complies with U.N. Security Council resolutions and ceases all activity on its nuclear weapons program, then you’re with Netanyahu and the rest of those Israeli liars.

Effectively then, the P5+1 generally and the Obama administration specifically, view the Security Council resolutions as impediments not expedients to reining in Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Given Goldberg’s critique, it’s disturbing to see that the Wall Street Journal reported on The Test for Diplomacy With Iran. (Google search terms)

U.S. and European diplomats have identified several vital issues to be negotiated following the interim deal Iran reached over its nuclear program with the five permanent members of the United Nations and Germany in late November.

Are they deluding themselves? Why are the West’s negotiators focused on the state of negotiations? Why are they not focused instead on Iran’s behavior that shows contempt for any of the goals that the West supposedly seeks?

Whether it is President Obama promising that he’s “got Israel’s back” or Secretary of State John Kerry insisting that “no deal is better than a bad deal,” the actions of the administration show otherwise. The American administration doesn’t fear a nuclear Iran as much as it fears not reaching a deal with Iran, no matter how empty the deal may be.

That’s why it’s been such a good year for Iran.

Hard Choices for Israel; Soft Treatment for the PA

John Kerry is returning to the Middle East to present his peace plan.

Two recent articles show the way the peace process is misrepresented in the media.

The AP reports Israel, Palestinians Face Hard Choices.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would likely have to recognize Israel’s pre-1967 war frontier as the starting point for border talks with the Palestinians, an ideological reversal that would put him on a collision course with his hardline base.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas fears he’ll be pressured to recognize Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people, a step he believes would abrogate the rights of Palestinian refugees and their descendants.

The parallelism here is bogus.

In the first place the idea that having the “pre-1967 war frontier” (more correctly they should be called “the 1949 armistice lines”) as a basis for any peace deal is a departure from the original intent of Resolution 242. After the 1967, Six Day War, there was an international consensus that an Israeli return to its pre-war borders was a “prescription for renewed hostilities.”

While Prime Minister Netanyahu’s explicit acceptance of a two state solution was considered an integral part of the peace process; a parallel acceptance by Palestinian Mahmoud Abbas is considered a dilemma. The fact is that one of the reasons that there’s still no peace is because the Palestinians reject the historical connection between the Jews and the state of Israel. Furthermore, since one of Abbas’s demands of a peace process (and one that has been accepted by the world) is that Jews are not allowed in Palestine for him to worry about the “rights” of Palestinian refugees is a bit hypocritical. That’s the point of a Palestinian state.

The choices presented associate a rejection of an international consensus for Israel as “hardline,” and a rejection by Abbas of fundamental aspects of peaceful relations as standing up for “rights.”

Later on the article reports:

Netanyahu has so far refused to accept the 1967 lines as a reference.

Doing so would imply Israeli willingness to partition Jerusalem and its sensitive religious sites, give up most of the West Bank and uproot tens of thousands of close to 600,000 Israeli settlers living on occupied land. Such ideas are anathema to Israel’s right-wing, including many in Netanyahu’s Likud Party.

Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, following a dramatic decision by Israel’s most famous hawk, then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

There are two things missing here.

1. Abbas has already rejected a proposal very similar. In fact Saeb Erakat, the chief Palestinian negotiator, said that any division of Jerusalem was unacceptable to Abbas.
2. While the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is sometimes presented as a hard choice Israel made for peace; its results are then ignored. In fact Hamas now has control of Gaza and has an effective veto over any peace deal.

Yet it is Netanyahu who is said to be “right wing” or giving in to “hardline” opinion and Abbas is the one who’s status is not critiqued in any way.

A New York Times article, Israel’s Pairing Prisoner Release and Settlements Angers Many, similarly presents a major choice that Netanyahu made in ideological terms. For one thing, it wasn’t Israel that paired prisoner releases and settlements; it was Secretary of State John Kerry. Rather the article is reported in a fashion to show that Netanyahu has angered Israelis across the political spectrum.

Netanyahu chose the prisoner releases because he assumed that releasing prisoners (originally intended to be a “confidence building measure” and only applying to non-violent prisoners) would be required in any final deal but that settlement freezes would weaken Israel claims to the lands affected in the final status.

While the Israeli distaste for the prisoner releases is reported; there is no reporting of the Israeli revulsion at the Palestinian celebration of these monsters.

One of the critics that the New York Times quotes is David Weinberg.

“The thing that bothers me most is the connection that’s been created between prisoner release and settlement construction,” said David M. Weinberg of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University. “It’s tainted with the whiff of being some sort of perfume meant to cover up the stink of the terrorist release, so that undermines whatever sense of real positive Zionist direction those on the right would theoretically feel from building in the territories.”

It isn’t clear that Weinberg is necessarily criticizing Netanyahu. From the statement printed, he could have just as easily been criticizing Kerry for offering Netanyahu the choice. However it is presented in a series of criticisms of Netanyahu. But Weinberg has written more about prisoner releases.

Furthermore, it makes sense to invest in quality-of-life infrastructures in the PA like industry, modern housing, the justice system, and water and waste facilities – all of which are necessary if a long-term architecture of peaceful coexistence is to emerge.

But why look the other way when Abbas signs checks to terrorists, feeding the narrative that murdering and maiming Israelis is a heroic enterprise?

Shouldn’t this be a central topic for discussion in the current Israeli-Palestinian peace talks? Shouldn’t abjuring terror, refraining from glorifying terror, and stopping to pay for terror, be a central Israeli and international demand of the Palestinians?

The reporters for the Times were so intent on portraying Netanyahu as out of touch that they ignored the real elephant in the room – the Palestinian celebration of the murderers. While the Times reported on the celebrations, it didn’t express any judgment of those celebration; it didn’t quote Israelis who were offended by the honoring of unrepentant murderers.

The Times went even further.

“I can’t describe my feelings,” said Nawaman Al-Shalabi, who was convicted in the killing of three Arabs suspected of collaboration with Israel. “Twenty-two years, now I know what’s the meaning of freedom.”

Last year the New York Times featured a picture of the mother of a terrorist who just killed an Israeli soldier rather than one of the soldier. It would appear that the New York Times is still in the business of glorifying terrorists. It’s nice to know that a man who killed three people now gets to enjoy freedom his victims never will. There’s no reason to amplify his joy, unless it’s to show the perversity of the Palestinian reverence for murderers, which the Times makes no effort to illustrate.

The common theme in both articles is that Israel is led by an ideologue incapable of making the necessary sacrifices for peace and that Palestinian demands are perfectly reasonable no matter how much they contradict the fundamental requirements of peaceful coexistence.

The bias displayed by these articles appear to be consistent with the views of Secretary of State Kerry. Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon argued that those who believe that there can be peace without a change in the Palestinian political culture are fooling themselves.

Ya’alon revealed why he had rejected the proposals, and in doing so, signaled a major impasse in the diplomatic process with the Palestinian Authority and US efforts to lead to a breakthrough.

“When I’m told about the security answer in Judea and Samaria, and when they talk about satellites, drones and technologies, I say, ‘guys, you’re wrong.’ The principal problem is education. If in Nablus and Jenin they continue to educate the young generation as it is being educated today, to idolize terrorism and jihad, and that the Jewish people have no right to this land, if this is how they’re educated, than technology stops nothing,” he said. “If the education does not change, we’ll have the same pressure from the inside. And then there will be a Hamastan in Judea and Samaria, like in Gaza. It’ll hurt us, it’ll hurt Jordan and it’ll hurt other interests in the area.”

Those like Kerry, the AP or the New York Times who see peace around the corner if only Israel would be reasonable take great pains to ignore the other side of the equation. Ya’alon’s response is an important reminder about the limits of peacemaking; especially when only one side is making the concessions.