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Karsenty, Accountability lose

A few weeks ago Israel’s government released a critique of the Al Dura case. During the so-called “Aqsa intifada,” Mohammed al-Dura was allegedly killed by the IDF during a shootout at the Netzarim Junction in Gaza. Or so it was reported by France’s Channel 2 and its reporter Charles Enderlin. Al-Dura became a cause in the Arab world. His image was put on postage stamps to inflame the “Arab street” against Israel. The Palestinian Authority released a video starring “Al-Dura” encouraging other children to become martyrs.

When the report was released, the Jerusalem Post’s diplomatic correspondent Herb Keinon wondered:

But still. Israel, by releasing this report 13 years on, has put this picture back into people’s minds, and it is not entirely clear whose interests are served by resurrecting this potent image.

Richard Landes responded:

What I’m afraid Keinon and the many others like him might be saying here is, in addition to our enemies, who will never drop that bone as long as there’s the most remote trace of the taste of blood on it – al Durah as symbol of Israeli evil – they also fear that the should-be rational people in the West, the liberals who should care about the truth, the journalists whose job it is to care about the truth – who won’t listen either.

But it’s these folks who are our target audience. They are the people – especially the journalists – who need to learn, when they see that image, that it is a symbol not of Israeli desire to kill children as Osama bin Laden and other blood libelers interpreted it, but a symbol of the incompetence of the media and the devastating impact of that incompetence, fortified with a stubborn, honor-shame reflex to deny any fault. Because we – and here I speak on behalf of democracies around the world, indeed all peoples who wish to live in peace and tolerance of the “other,” – we cannot afford the destructive impact of lethal journalism. We cannot afford to have our public sphere become the sewage dump of toxic, hate- and war-mongering lies, especially those of our enemies.

I agree. It wasn’t simply about setting the record straight, but about holding the media accountable. Israel’s decision to take a look at the case was a sign that Israel wasn’t going to let the media get away with broadcasting straight propaganda anymore.

Yesterday, however, a French court disagreed. In 2008 media critic, Philippe Karsenty was vindicated of the charge that he had libeled Enderlin and France 2. Apparently a major factor in that verdict, was that Enderlin was ordered to release the all the footage of the incident, but refused. But the case was appealed and, yesterday, Karsenty was found guilty of defamation. The AP reports:

In a report issued in 2004, Philippe Karsenty said the footage was orchestrated and there was no proof that the boy had been killed.

France-2 sued for defamation, and after a long legal battle, a Paris court fined Karsenty 7,000 euros Wednesday. He called the verdict “outrageous.”

Over the past decade Karsenty has amassed hours of video about the day of the shooting. At the heart of his claim is the fact that, according to the reporting by France-2, father and son received a total of 15 high-velocity bullets but in the video, neither appears to be bleeding. He says the firefight is real, but the shooting of the man and boy was staged for the camera.

At the end of the article, the AP gets reactions. Here’s one:

Gaza’s militant Hamas rulers said the ruling confirmed that Israel and their supporters lied about the military’s practices in the coastal territory.

“They deceive and cover their crimes in front of the media and the world,” said spokesman Fawzi Barhoum.

A spokesman for Hamas?!?!!?

Hamas is a terrorist group committed to Israel’s destruction and that’s who the AP gets a reaction from! Jonathan Tobin addressed statements like this that is encouraged all too often in the media:

The al-Dura myth is significant not so much because it annoys Israelis and their friends but because it reinforces the way Palestinians think of themselves and gives them carte blanche to commit any outrage. Debunking it is not pointless. It is the starting point for any effort to answer the lies about Israel that have become the foundation for efforts to isolate and boycott the Jewish state. Friends of Israel ignore it at their peril.

There is no libel against Israel that is too outrageous not to be published uncritically.

Perhaps the best debunking of the report comes from James Fallows who wrote Who Shot Mohammed al-Dura? in the Atlantic ten years ago.

The footage of the shooting is unforgettable, and it illustrates the way in which television transforms reality. I have seen it replayed at least a hundred times now, and on each repetition I can’t help hoping that this time the boy will get himself down low enough, this time the shots will miss. Through the compression involved in editing the footage for a news report, the scene acquired a clear story line by the time European, American, and Middle Eastern audiences saw it on television: Palestinians throw rocks. Israeli soldiers, from the slits in their outpost, shoot back. A little boy is murdered.

What is known about the rest of the day is fragmentary and additionally confusing. A report from a nearby hospital says that a dead boy was admitted on September 30, with two gun wounds to the left side of his torso. But according to the photocopy I saw, the report also says that the boy was admitted at 1:00 P.M.; the tape shows that Mohammed was shot later in the afternoon. The doctor’s report also notes, without further explanation, that the dead boy had a cut down his belly about eight inches long. A boy’s body, wrapped in a Palestinian flag but with his face exposed, was later carried through the streets to a burial site (the exact timing is in dispute). The face looks very much like Mohammed’s in the video footage. Thousands of mourners lined the route. A BBC TV report on the funeral began, “A Palestinian boy has been martyred.” Many of the major U.S. news organizations reported that the funeral was held on the evening of September 30, a few hours after the shooting. Oddly, on film the procession appears to take place in full sunlight, with shadows indicative of midday.

Fallows critique is important. He is not, in any way pro-Israel. He also refuses to believe that Mohammed al-Dura is alive. Still he carefully reviewed all the available evidence and concluded that Enderlin didn’t tell the correct story.

That is what any reasonable critic should have concluded. Unfortunately many in the media simply don’t care. They would rather see their preconceived narratives confirmed rather than examining their prejudices, premises or procedsses. Yeterday’s verdict was a victory for continued media malpractice.

The Algemeiner carried a brief interview with Karsenty yesterday.

1) Asserting Moderation

Having read many articles about Iran’s new President, Hassan Rouhani, I’m struck by how little evidence is presented that he is a moderate or reformer, even though those words are regularly used to describe him. He’s described as a reformer because he’s supported by previous presidents Khatami and Rafsanjani (and how exactly the latter is a “reformer” is a mystery). But that’s moderation by association. He is described as a critic of the outgoing President, Ahmadinejad or possibly of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Kahmenei. But that’s moderation by negation. It’s pointed out that when he was Iran’s lead nuclear negotiator he wasn’t confrontational. True, but this was about style, not substance.

At the Wall Street Journal, Sohram Ahmari put together an extensive indictment of Rouhani. (Michael Rubin offers more about Rouhani, here.) Amazingly, many of the same news organizations that now tout Rouhani as a moderate, reported on his activities in his previous roles in the Islamic Republic and the picture that emerges is of a hardline member of the regime. It’s important to remember that Rouhani isn’t a mid-level cleric who finally worked his way up to the top, but rather an important player in the government since it’s inception in 1979. (Rouhani was close to  the Ayatollah Khomeini.) Instead of relying on their own reporting in the past, news organizations created an image based more on Rouhani’s associations than on his actual record. A look at contemporaneous accounts shows a much different man, from the one portrayed in the media today.

Robert Mackey of the New York Times has noted that at rallies for Rouhani the name of Mir Hussein Mousavi was shouted. Mousavi, the leader of the “Green” movement in 2009, is still under house arrest. Mackey, intentionally or not, created a link between Rouhani and that protest movement. However, Rouhani, in the past was the face of the regime, not of dissenters.

In 1992, four protesters were hanged. The New York Times cited Rouhani, who was one of the representatives of the government who justified the harsh measures of the regime.

“These were not regular people,” Ayatollah Khamenei told new members of Iran’s Parliament today, the television reported. “The incidents in Mashad were a conspiracy by foreigners, our enemies. They have launched a holy war to turn public opinion in Iran against the Government.”

Other senior Iranian officials have delivered similar assessments about the spread of the protests that began last August in Teheran and have since recurred with greater violence in four major cities by the poor trying to save their makeshift dwellings from demolition by municipal crews.

Hojatolislam Hassan Rouhani, secretary of the National Security Council, said at the Friday prayer sermon in Mashad last week that the riots in Mashad were “an attempt to undermine the stability in the province,” which borders the newly independent former Soviet republics in Central Asia, “to discourage expanding relations between Iran and our neighbors to the north.”

(Hojatolislam is an honorific for certain Islamic clerics.)

In 1999, again Rouhani showed his contempt for protest.

One speaker, senior clergyman Hassan Rowhani, declared that those who damaged public property during six previous days of reform protests would be tried as enemies of the state _ a crime that carries the death penalty.

(In this article, Rouhani was implicitly identified as a hard liner.)

While a number of news outlets portray Rouhani as seeking better relations internationally, that has not been the case in the past. In 1997, after a German court convicted an Iranian and three Lebanese nationals in the murders of four Iranian Kurdish dissidents and implicated Iran’s leadership in ordering the killings, Rouhani, as a member of the ruling class, faulted Germany.

Iran, which rejected the ruling in Germany, summoned home its Ambassador to Germany and withdrew four diplomats. It has also said it would recall envoys from the European Union countries that summoned home their ambassadors.

Today the Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Hassan Rowhani, said Iran had canceled a planned visit by an Australian economic delegation. It also suspended all trade contracts with New Zealand, the state-run news organizations reported.

Mr. Rowhani called for a ”total revision of ties with Germany,” urged a halt to investments there and a ban on purchases of German equipment, state television reported.

Also, some expected that Rouhani would seek better relations, specifically, with the United States. His record shows the opposite.

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright announced the changes on Friday in Washington’s first policy response to the reformers’ landslide victory in parliamentary elections last month.

But the mixed response she drew from conservatives here highlighted the differences that still split the Iranian government over the pace of any opening to the United States. The head of Iran’s top security agency, Hassan Rouhani, said Dr. Albright’s statement was ”repugnant and unacceptable.”

”We must condemn this new and flagrant interference in our affairs,” said Mr. Rouhani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. ”This statement is full of irksome, threatening and interventionist elements, which call our institutions into question.”

Then there are those who believe that Rouhani will end “the nuclear standoff with the West.” But Rouhani was one of those who initiated the standoff!

Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, said at a news conference that his nation would not accept any outside limitation on its uranium enrichment programs and that “no international body can force Iran to do so.”

The response came a day after the International Atomic Energy Agency adopted a resolution calling on Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities before the agency’s next meeting in November.

The agency has expressed alarm at Iran’s plans to enrich nearly 40 tons of uranium. Experts say that would be enough to provide Iran with the material for several nuclear bombs. The Iranian government insists that its nuclear program is for electricity production only.

In issue after issue the record of Hassan Rouhani stands in stark contrast to the image now projected in much of America’s major media. Wasn’t there one editor who thought to check his organization’s archives? It’s not difficult; you could do it in your pajamas.

Worse than simply being lazy, The Washington Post’s Joby Warrick and Jason Rezaian did some reporting. In Moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani wins Iran’s presidential vote, they interviewed a source.

Rouhani probably will bring with him a cadre of more moderate diplomats, technocrats and nuclear negotiators who favor a more pragmatic foreign policy, said Trita Parsi, author of “A Single Roll of the Dice,” a book on the Obama administration’s dealings with Iran.

But whether the political shift leads to a deal to restrain Iran’s nuclear program depends on many factors, much outside the control of Iran’s new president, Parsi said.

“Ultimately the ball comes back to our side of the court,” Parsi said. “Neither side can break this impasse alone.”

By mentioning Parsi’s book, they potrayed Parsi as an expert. But he isn’t a disinterested observer. He is an advocate for the current leadership of Iran. So Parsi’s observation – holding the United States responsible for mending fences with Iran – was passed off as news, but Rouhani’s record was obscured. A later article by the same two was more responsible, but still too timid in its treatment of Rouhani (and Iran.)

The earliest mention I found of Rouhani as a moderate, was from 2004, when he started to break with Ahmadinejad. There is no indication that the break was political, but seemed to be personal and possibly, theological. But someone doesn’t become a moderate because of who he isn’t.

2) Velayat-e Faqih

Even if Rouhani’s record did confirm that he was a true moderate and not just, as a Washington Post editorial put it, “the default candidate of Iran’s reformists,” there is little reason to believe he would change anything in Iran. As Barry Rubin has observed, Mohammed Khatami made no difference in his eight years as President. But that’s because the president of Iran is still subordinate to the country’s Supreme Leader.

The doctrine by which Iran is governed is called “velatyat-e faqih,” or “guardianship of the jurisprudent.” Frederick Kagan explains the origin of this doctrine.

Khomeini outlined this interpretation in a series of lectures in exile in Najaf in early 1970. In accord with long Shi’i custom, one of his students transcribed the lectures (one of the ways by which a student can gain the formal recognition of his master) and published them under the title, “Islamic Government.” Drawing heavily (if sometimes selectively) on the Qu’ran and various hadiths (primarily Shi’a hadiths, including some rather obscure traditions), Khomeini argued that since Islam is a religion that encompasses and shapes all aspects of human life, there can be no division between religion and the state. Muslim society, he argued, requires a state that is guided by Islam and that enforces Muslim law. Any other form of political organization is illegitimate and puts the souls of its citizens or subjects in grave jeopardy.

He further argued that Shi’i jurisprudents (fuqaha, plural of faqih) are the successors of the Imams, and thus of the Prophet. Their duties, he claimed, went beyond interpreting the faith and amending the laws, but included holding executive power in a just Muslim society. The nature of the argument is very similar to Plato’s justification for the rule of the Philosopher-King in The Republic, but the justifications Khomeini offered were drawn almost entirely from the traditions of the Imams. An Islamic State, he concluded, must be governed by the “guardianship of the jurisprudent” (velayat-e faqih). …

Khomeini himself had been rather vague about how to determine which among the religious scholars of the age should establish and govern the desired Islamic State. But the key passage inIslamic Government clearly opened the door for his rule: “If a worthy individual possessing [the qualities of knowledge of the law and justice] arises and establishes a government, he will possess the same authority as the [Prophet Muhammad] in the administration of society, and it will be the duty of all people to obey him.”[1] In practice, Khomeini had taken power at the end of a populist revolution with strong Marxist and populist overtones, and he blended his theology with the ideology of that revolution to consolidate his power. Thus in March he held a country-wide referendum on the question: “Do you want the monarchy to be replaced by an Islamic Republic?” It passed with 98% of the 20 million votes cast. Only after that referendum (which had no real basis in the argumentation supporting the idea of an Islamic Republic) did Khomeini declare, on April 1, 1979, the official establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The first Constitution of the IRI was approved by referendum in December 1979, establishing Khomeini as the Supreme Leader of an Islamist state explicitly justified and organized by the principles of the guardianship of the jurisprudent (velayat-e faqih).

The sanitizing of Rouhani is a necessary fiction for those who want to believe that Iran will, in any way, change. Ruhani’s moderation is a means Parsi by which can pretend that Rouhani will appoint enough moderates to push back against Khameini. But the moderation of Rouhani and the power of Iran’s president are more the results of wishful thinking than of any critical thinking.

Long Live Rouhani the Reformer

To read the New York Times, the election of Hassan Rowhani was a victory for the people of Iran. Thomas Erdbrink reported in Iran Moderate Wins Presidency by a Large Margin:

The cleric, Hassan Rowhani, 64, won a commanding 50.7 percent of the vote in the six-way race, according to final results released Saturday, avoiding a runoff in the race to replace the departing president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose tenure was defined largely by confrontation with the West and a seriously hobbled economy at home.

Thousands of jubilant supporters poured into the streets of Tehran, dancing, blowing car horns and waving placards and ribbons of purple, Mr. Rowhani’s campaign color. After the previous election in 2009, widely seen as rigged, many Iranians were shaking their heads that their votes were counted this time.

“They were all shocked, like me,” said Fatemah, 58, speaking of fellow riders in the women’s compartment of a Tehran subway. “It is unbelievable, have the people really won?”

Wish I could share S Bakhash's optimsm on #Rouhani but y do those who say Ah'nijad had no power believ Rouhani will?http://t.co/nw8XbwKWEe …

— Lenny Ben-David (@lennybendavid) June 16, 2013

Similarly the Washington Post reports in Moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani wins Iran’s presidential vote:

This time, Iran’s Interior Ministry took no chances, releasing the official vote total in live updates, which showed a steady increase in Rouhani’s margin of victory over Ghalibaf.

Until last week, Ghalibaf was widely considered the front-runner, but he likely lost votes to fellow conservative candidate Jalili.

In the end, though, it did not matter, as Rouhani took a majority of the votes, which is already being viewed as a repudiation of not only the Ahmadinejad years but also the hold that conservatives have maintained over Iranian politics since 2005.

And further reported:

Rouhani probably will bring with him a cadre of more moderate diplomats, technocrats and nuclear negotiators who favor a more pragmatic foreign policy, said Trita Parsi, author of “A Single Roll of the Dice,” a book on the Obama administration’s dealings with Iran.

But whether the political shift leads to a deal to restrain Iran’s nuclear program depends on many factors, much outside the control of Iran’s new president, Parsi said.

“Ultimately the ball comes back to our side of the court,” Parsi said. “Neither side can break this impasse alone.”

Frankly, this is inexcusable. Trita Parsi isn’t a disinterested expert, but someone who actively advocates on behalf of the Iranian regime. (Whether or not he qualifies as a lobbyist for the regime seems to be a matter of some dispute.)

In this case, the New York Times was more cautious in predicting that Rouhani’s election would bring about change in Iranian policies than the Washington Post. Worse, the reporters for the Washington Post seemingly advocate for more American forbearance towards Iran.

Even if all of this is true, Barry Rubin points out:

Consider this: A stronger man and a more dedicated reformer and moderate than Rowhani, Muhammad Khatami, was president for eight years and did not accomplish a single reform under this regime.

Netanyahu: "15 years ago they said Khatami is moderate but nothing has changed. Iran will be judged by its action regarding nuclear program"

— Barak Ravid (@BarakRavid) June 16, 2013

However, as Israeli journalist by Avi Issacharoff writes in “The Regime Wanted Him to Win”:

So how did a member of Iran’s Assembly of Experts and Supreme National Security Council – and a confidant of Khamenei – become the “great hope” of the moderate camp? It may be the embrace he received from the two former presidents, Khatami and Rafsanjani, rivals to Khamenei, that put him into the reformist category.

“He never called himself a reformist,” explains Dr. Soli Shahvar, who heads the Ezri Center for Iran and Gulf Studies at Haifa University. “But he uses rhetoric that is less blustery than that of Ahmedinejad, and speaks more moderately, including on the subject of nuclear negotiations.” Shahvar’s conclusion with respect to Rouhani’s win is unambiguous. “I interpret his election in one way only: The regime wanted him to win. If they had wanted one of the conservatives to win, they would have gotten four of the five conservatives to drop out of the race, paving the way for [eventual runner-up, Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Bagher] Ghalibaf to win. But they didn’t do that. Moreover, it was the regime that approved the candidacy of Rouhani alongside only seven others. This is striking evidence that Khamenei wanted Rouhani to win, both internally and externally.”

According to Shahvar, from the internal perspective, a victory for another candidate like Ahmedinejad risked provoking a renewal of the demonstrations like those of 2009. “Victory for a candidate who is perceived as more moderate yet still has the confidence of Khamenei, serves the regime in the best way. Externally, Iran today is in a very difficult situation with regard to sanctions and its international standing. A conservative president would only have increased Tehran’s isolation in the world. A victory for someone from the ‘moderate stream,’ however, will immediately bring certain countries in the international community to call for ‘giving a chance to dialogue with the Iranian moderates.’ They will ask for more time in order to encourage this stream, and it will take pressure off the regime. And so we see that in the non-disqualification of Rouhani and especially in the non-dropping-out of four of the five conservative candidates there is more than just an indication that this is the result the regime desired.”

Rohani is being called a moderate, much as Rafsanjani has been in the past. Iranian moderates don't get past the Guardian Council.

— Lynette Nusbacher (@Nusbacher) June 13, 2013

C'mon. do u really belief #Iran's Supreme Leader would have approved #Rouhani as a candidate if he were a reformer or moderate? Get real

— Lenny Ben-David (@lennybendavid) June 16, 2013

A “reformer” winning a clear cut victory was probably the best case for Supreme Leader Khamenei. Someone who could put a more palatable face on the regime, could lead to the relaxing of sanctions. A clear victory meant no runoffs.

In the week before the election someone leaked and then denied that the Guardian Council – the body charged with vetting presidential candidates – was reconsidering Rouhani’s candidacy. What better way to buttress his reformist reputation?

Then two candidates, including the other “reform” candidate, Mohammed Reza Aref, dropped out of the race. Then there was one reformer, Rouhani.

In the end Rouhani was approved by the Guardian Council and did not stray so far as to be subjected to house arrest, like Mir-Hossein Mousavi four years ago. Is it really possible that Rouhani was not approved?

Finally, Rouhani won 50.7 percent of the vote. That isn’t even a full percent more that what was required to avoid a second round of voting. A second round of voting would have raised suspicions that the regime was trying to cheat him out of his rightful position.

If Rouhani is a true reformer, his election could spell real trouble for Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei. But that assumes that Khamenei isn’t the real power behind the presidency and that Rouhani is a true reformer. Evidence and experience suggest that neither is true and that the Khamenei got a friendly face to present his extreme agenda.

The White House’s statement suggests that this tactic has already met with success:

We respect the vote of the Iranian people and congratulate them for their participation in the political process, and their courage in making their voices heard. Yesterday’s election took place against the backdrop of a lack of transparency, censorship of the media, Internet, and text messages, and an intimidating security environment that limited freedom of expression and assembly. However, despite these government obstacles and limitations, the Iranian people were determined to act to shape their future.

The premise of this statement is that the Iranian voters demonstrated independence from Khamenei. In a sense, they did. But it couldn’t have happened if he didn’t allow it to happen.

1) Earning merit badges in terror

Following recent revelations that Hamas plans to train thousands of children soldiers a number of media outlets are reporting that Palestinian Islamic Jihad is running summer camps training youngsters in the fine points of urban warfare. Ynet reports:

An AFP correspondent listed some of the activities the Islamic Jihad summer camp offers its enrollees: Weapons use, jumping over fire and crawling under barbed wire, all performed to the tune of exploding charges.

Aside from technical skills, camp organizers also promise religious lessons.

Several photographs released on Wednesday show a young khaki-clad vacationer, his face colored in camouflage, dragged by two gun-toting tykes from an “outpost” adorned with an Israeli flag, in what appeared to be a reenactment of the Gilad Shalit kidnapping.

Charming.

https://twitter.com/Gregornious/status/345518250702016513

https://twitter.com/TPO_Hisself/status/345376094611976192

These terror camps have a long history, going back at least ten years. Fatah used to run them too. I wrote about them five years ago in a post titled Hello Martyr, Hello Fatah. This inspired Elder of Ziyon to produce a brilliant if disturbing video.

2) Tunisia’s Bellwether Constitution

Earlier this week Jackson Diehl wrote Hope that Islamists and Secularists can coexist in Tunisia.

Can anyone in the Middle East show a workable way forward? Perhaps not. But I was encouraged by two conversations I had in recent days with leaders of Tunisia’s ruling Ennadha movement, founder Rachid Ghannouchi and former prime minister Hamadi Jebali. While neither could be confused with Thomas Jefferson, both appear to grasp some of the essential principles that the post-revolution Arab political movements — and in particular the Islamists — must internalize.

Ghannouchi, a white-haired 72-year-old who spent most of his adult life in exile or prison, may be the boldest and most progressive thinker among Islamists in power. He goes so far as to compare the history of Muslim countries to Europe in the Middle Ages. “We also have spent five to six hundred years in darkness, where the capacity for reason has stopped,” he said. This “heritage of decadence,” he said, has created an orthodoxy in which “punishment is the main part of sharia.” …

The two men boasted about concessions Ennadha has made in the prolonged negotiations over Tunisia’s new constitution, including the exclusion of sharia and the inclusion of a provision on freedom of conscience. Now in its fourth draft, the constitution remains unacceptable to many secularists and human rights groups: Among other things, vague language appears to open the way for controls on free assembly and the media. Ennadha has, however, refrained from Morsi’s tactic of ramming a final version through without secular support — even though the process is months behind schedule.

Diehl makes clear that he’s looking for a silver lining here. And perhaps this is one. But Barry Rubin recently recommended Tunisian Interim President Moncef Marzouki – ‘The Invention Of A President, The Illusion Of A Democracy,’ an article by Anna Mahjar-Barducci written for MEMRI. Marzouki is one of the leading moderates in Tunisia. Here’s how he describes the “art of the possible” he made with the Islamists.

“For women’s rights also, the same thing goes. Of course I would like for us to write in the constitution that equality between man and woman is total and complete, but you cannot write this down in the constitution, because it would mean that Tunisian women would be able to marry Christians or Jews, and so forth. This would be a problem.

“So we would write down in the constitution that equality is the principle of the relationship between man and woman.

“We stop there. They understand what I mean, and I understand what they mean. If every political party imposed its point of view, then it would collapse.”

But “[t]hey understsand what I mean” is no guarantee. If a constitution is supposed to guarantee certain societal principles and those principles are not stated explicitly, there is little hope that the principles will endure. Marzouki’s saying that he cannot guarantee anything that the Islamists object to.

The difference in these two analyses stems from Diehl directly interviewing two savvy Islamists who were careful in what they said and Mahjar-Barducci quoting Marzouki in unguarded moments.

In general, Professor Rubin writes in If the Muslim Brotherhood is Taking Over Tunisia What Hope is there for Anyone Else?

President Moncef Marzouki is being described as weak in the face of this Brotherhood takeover. A former human rights advocate, he is backing down to the Brotherhood’s al-Nahda Party, the largest party in the government. He has called the opposition “secular extremists” who are seeking to stage a coup, but he never criticizes the violent Salafists.

Note that his claiming the opposition seeks to seize power by force authorizes “regime defenders” to attack them by force. In fact, Marzouki threatened that opposition members who were trying to overthrow the government would be hung. He has threatened anyone criticizing Qatar — al-Nahda’s financier — with prison.

Unlike other Arab countries, however, the moderate democratic opposition is well-organized and has not been intimidated. Not yet, anyway.

Both Diehl and Rubin agree that of all the Arab countries, Tunisia is the most likely to produce an open society. But Diehl appears to be more optimistic about those possibilities.

1) Fiji rescues UNDOF

With the Syrian civil war moving closer to Israel, Austria has withdrawn its contingent of peacekeepers from the UNDOF.

Job Opportunity: Peacekeepers Wanted http://t.co/qOIrcpdZaJ

— MediaBackspin (@MediaBackspin) June 9, 2013

Not to worry, Fiji is slated to pick up the slack.

the military from the island country of Fiji who will replace the Austrian peacekeepers on the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) stationed on the Golan Heights.

The contingent will be made up of 300 soldiers representing one-twelfth of the Fijan armed forces.

Fiji has been involved in a peacekeeping role before. In 1996, Charles Krauthammer wrote about what Fiji’s earlier involvement in peacekeeping meant:

The Fijians episode is only the most recent demonstration of the uselessness of the U.N.’s acting on its own as peacemaker. The most dramatic and tragic demonstration of this truth occurred not in Lebanon, nor even Bosnia, but Rwanda, from which the U.N. withdrew last April after ignominiously standing by while the worst mass murder since World War II occurred right before its eyes.

These operations are a direct consequence of the grandiosity of a U.N. apparatus that refuses to acknowledge its unsuitability to any kind of active warfare, its dearth of military expertise, its abject lack of independence, and its fractured command and troop structure. It is a disgrace that these forces are deployed around the world in places where they do more harm than good.

An expensive disgrace. It costs the U.N. about $ 130 million a year to keep UNIFIL going. It has cost more than $ 2.5 billion since 1978. Why not withdraw the troops and give the money directly to war victims on both sides of the Israel-Lebanon frontier for reconstruction and compensation? And let the good Fijians go home.

What’s true for UNIFIL, where the UN’s soldiers did nothing to protect Israel is equally true for UNDOF. If the UNDOF troops served any purpose they wouldn’t be running at the first sign of trouble! In recent weeks rebels have kidnapped UNDOF peacekeepers and they’ve been the target of occasional gunfire. And of course the peacekeepers are doing nothing even as Syrian rebels threaten to “liberate” the Golan.

They’d rather run than fight.

2) Egypt to Ethiopia: Don’t Dam it

Tensions are mounting over the Nile.

The Washington Post reports Egypt frets, fumes over Ethiopia’s Nile plan:

But trace the Nile about 1,400 miles upstream and there’s a rising colossus that threatens to upset a millennia-old balance. There, in the Ethiopian highlands, one of the world’s largest dams is taking shape.

For Ethiopia, the dam promises abundant energy and an escape from a seemingly permanent spot in the lowest rungs of the world’s human development index. But for Egypt, the consequences could be dire: a nationwide water shortage in as little as two years that causes crop failures, power cuts and instability resonating far beyond even the extraordinary tumult of the recent past. …

To Egyptians accustomed to thinking of their country as a powerhouse of the Arab world, the idea of bowing to a historically weaker African rival has been a sobering reminder of their nation’s diminished clout. It has also been an early test for the year-old government of President Mohamed Morsi — one that critics say he has badly mishandled.

While Morsi has stated that “all options are open,” Egypt’s military has been more circumspect. A spokesman for the military said explicitly that the dam building is not a “military issue.” Ethiopian insists that the dam will not harm Egypt as it isn’t looking to divert its waters for irrigation but to harness them for power.

3) #BDSfail news

By now you’ve probably read that the traffic mapping app, Waze is being sold to Google. But what’s especially interesting is why the reported deal with Facebook fell through:

What perhaps was different about Google’s offer was a willingness to allow Waze to return its own identity (as an R&D firm, regardless of what the company’s new owners do with the technology Waze is continuing to develop).
As Waze CEO Noam Bardin put it in a blogpost announcing the sale (the post was published at the same time Google VP Brian McClendon announced the sale in his own blogpost): “Nothing practical will change here at Waze. We will maintain our community, brand, service and organization – the community hierarchy, responsibilities and processes will remain the same. Our employees, managers, founders and I are all committed to our vision for many years to come.”
McClendon’s post also explicitly noted: “The Waze product development team will remain in Israel.”
Part of that vision is keeping Waze independent – and in Israel. Waze executives, among them company President Uri Levine, have many times stated that they planned to keep the company here, and saw no reason to move elsewhere. According to a company source, Waze executives, anticipating a buyout at some point, long ago decided that they wanted to be sure employees were treated fairly if an acquisition took place.

(This writer says that keeping Waze in Israel was not a dealbreaker. However staying in Israel was important to Waze management.)

In another display of pride in Israel, Norm Geras interviewed architect Daniel Libeskind. (h/t Instapundit) Libeskind was asked about his relationship with Israel, where he once lived:

I always felt that I was fortunate enough to experience two paradises – Israel and America! I have a very close relationship to Israel. It is still a young country which has faced numerous difficulties in its short existence. However, I am hopeful that this nascent nation, despite its geographic location and problems both internally and externally, will continue to grow and be a positive force for good and democracy in the region.

If you’re not looking for these sentiments, you won’t find them. In much of the MSM, Israel is an object of scorn and derision. Those who condemn Israel, or are, at least, ashamed of it are considered the norm and worthy of attention. It’s nice to see that there is a perception of Israel uncontaminated by such influences.