Did Rube Goldberg invent the peace process?

Two articles in Ha’aretz makes me wonder if Rube Goldberg invented the peace process.

The first is a mea culpa that Haaretz had botched an earlier article that claimed that Gilad Shalit’s release was “imminent.” (h/t Yaacov Lozowick):

The sixth round of talks in Cairo began with much fanfare last Sunday, with a higher level of expectations than in the past – for several reasons. There was the sense of historic moment and expectation of change created by U.S. President Barack Obama’s speech in Cairo; the Egyptian ultimatum to the parties, naming July 7 as the signing date for a reconciliation agreement; the new, positive tone of statements from Hamas officials regarding the United States; and also America’s decision to return its ambassador to Damascus, suggesting Syria, too, would pressure the Hamas leadership to agree to the Egyptian compromise.

There was another reason for the high hopes: Egypt’s marketing efforts, joined by European and American interlocutors, implied that a resolution to the Fatah-Hamas conflict would quickly bring about a “mega-truce” (tahadiyeh): the lifting of the blockade of Gaza, Shalit’s release, early elections in the territories – perhaps to be followed by a new era in which Hamas would no longer in power. The United Nations, the European Union, former U.S. president Jimmy Carter and officials in the current American administration responded enthusiastically.

Of course after uncritically reporting that all of these wonderful things were about to come about last week, none of them did.

As usual, the grand schemers did not give sufficient consideration to the detailed positions of Hamas and Fatah, and especially to what is going on within the Islamic organization. Fatah and Hamas officials are much more skeptical than the West about a dialogue’s chances of success. Last Wednesday, a Fatah official explained to Haaretz that he was not disappointed. “Disappointment is for those who harbor great hopes for such an event. I didn’t have any expectations,” he said.

Hamas clearly saw the difficulties inherent in the Egyptian proposal. Hamas was not being asked to consent to the establishment of a unity government that would recognize Israel, or to cede its control in Gaza. However, the special committee that the Egyptians sought to manage the funds designated for the rehabilitation of Gaza would sooner or later have stolen authority away from the Hamas government. And the plan to establish a joint Hamas-Fatah security force was intended to weaken the organization’s military grip on Gaza. The heads of Hamas’ military wing were not prepared to consider the entry of an Arab force into Gaza. General elections also might not have served Hamas well, given its weak showing in recent polls (18.8 percent support versus 38.5 percent for Fatah).

Of course, Ha’aretz doesn’t acknowledge (even though one of the reporters here, also reported the phony story last week) that it was party to the “grand schemers.” It’s funny to read after all those pronouncements otherwise that Hamas is still not going to recognize Israel. After all why should it? Hamas is more valuable as a potential peace partner than an actual one.

The second describes an American/Saudi initiative to get Syria to redraw its borders so Israel will withdraw from Shebaa farms.

Marking the Syrian-Lebanese border would neutralize the Israeli claim that Shaba Farms was previously Syrian territory, and that a withdrawal must be carried out only in the course of negotiations with Damascus. The United Nations also defines the area as Syrian territory, and did not call on Israel to pull back from it during its 2000 withdrawal from southern Lebanon.

It’s not an Israeli claim. Shebaa Famrs was considered Syria territory to be negotiated over between Israel and Syria until, about the time that Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000. Then Syria claimed that Shebaa Farms was Lebanese territory in order to give a pretext for Hezbollah to continue attacking Israel, Syria deeded Shebaa Farms to Lebanon. (Was Shebaa Farms occupied by Syria prior to 1967?)

And what good would emerge from Syria’s marking tis borders and a subsequent Israeli withdrawal?

Withdrawing from the disputed area would also obviate one of Hezbollah’s primary pretexts for continuing to maintain weapons to fight Israel’s presence on what it considers Lebanese soil. In marking its border, however, Syria would be sending a strong message to Hezbollah that the militant group’s accumulation of arms is no longer part of the country’s military strategy.

Such a move would likely bolster the position of Saad Hariri, Lebanon’s pro-West prime minister-delegate, as well. Hariri has stated that the Lebanese parliament must tackle the issue of disarming Hezbollah. He has also conditioned forming a government on the Hezbollah-led opposition holding no more than a third of the seats in parliament, thus preventing it from being able to veto key government decisions. The Lebanese Constitution stipulates that certain important decisions must be made with the ascent of two-thirds of parliamentarians.

Of course, as it did with Shebaa farms, Iran and Syria’s client, Hezbollah could well find or manufacture another pretext for holding onto its arms. The idea that Syria wants peace is, as Barry Rubin has argued, a chimera:

While the Syrian regime poses as being desirous of peace and engagement with the West, in fact its institutions, ideology, propaganda, and activities go in the exact opposite direction. To survive, the minority-dominated, dictatorial, and economically incompetent government needs radicalism, control over Lebanon, regional instability, anti-Americanism, and using Israel as a scapegoat.

Like Hamas, Syria, too is more valuable for its potential, so it prefers to make mischief than to make peace.

But that’s what makes all of these schemes seem so convoluted, We are continually told that if only such and such conditions are fulfilled Hamas or Syria or Hezbollah will say just the right words that Israel could accept. And of course they never do. The peace processors’ promises are like the pots of gold at the end of the rainbows – always in the distance. There are no conditions Israel can fulfill that will bring peace, there needs to be a change in its enemies to accept Israel’s right to exist.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.