Fuzzy intelligence

The latest NIE reports that Iran has halted its nuclear weapons development and is likely a number of years away from being able to field a nuclear weapon. This estimate is being hailed because it takes the urgency of an attack on Iran “off the table” but it brings up a problem. Norman Podhoretz asks

These findings are startling, not least because in key respects they represent a 180-degree turn from the conclusions of the last NIE on Iran’s nuclear program. For that one, issued in May 2005, assessed “with high confidence that Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons” and to press on “despite its international obligations and international pressure.”In other words, a full two years after Iran supposedly called a halt to its nuclear program, the intelligence community was still as sure as it ever is about anything that Iran was determined to build a nuclear arsenal. Why then should we believe it when it now tells us, and with the same “high confidence,” that Iran had already called a halt to its nuclear-weapons program in 2003? Similarly with the intelligence community’s reversal on the effectiveness of international pressure. In 2005, the NIE was highly confident that international pressure had not lessened Iran’s determination to develop nuclear weapons, and yet now, in 2007, the intelligence community is just as confident that international pressure had already done the trick by 2003.

I can’t attribute dark motives to this turnabout. I’d like to, really, but the fog of bureaucratic turf wars is not something I wish to cut through right now. Regardless, this turnaround should bring up questions about the reliability of our intelligence gathering operations rather than serve as a rebuke to a trigger happy administration.

Gabriel Schoenfeld asks the right question though

What accounts for this about face, a disavowal of a judgment reached with “high confidence”?

Schoenfeld wonders if this has something to do with the about face, though, on the surface, Asgari was seemingly providing information that pointed in the other direction.

Asgari, who according to reports is being held in a top-secret military installation, has been able to shed a new light on much of the Iranian regime’s most inner workings, especially regarding the Iranian nuclear development project.

Up until now, Iran – according to known intelligence – has been building two nuclear plants, in Arak and Bushehr, and has been using centrifuges to enrich uranium.

Iran, Asgari told his interrogator’s is working in another, stealth path, toward achieving its nuclear goal.

This third method involves attempts to enrich uranium by using laser beams along with certain chemicals designed to enhance the process. These trials are held in a special weapons facility in Natanz.

(much, much more at memeorandum.)
Instapundit (initially) takes the new NIE at face value, notes Well That’s Convenient and asks (rhetorically)

But what could have happened in 2003 that might have persuaded the Iranians to stop work on a weapon of mass destruction?

via memeorandumIt’s a sentiment that Thomas Joscelyn considers

Assuming for the moment that Iran really did halt its program, are we to believe that a substantial U.S.-led military presence in Afghanistan and in Iraq (or potential presence in Iraq, depending on when in 2003 this change supposedly occurred), had nothing to do with Iran’s supposed decision? That is, are we to believe that U.S. led forces on Iran’s eastern and western borders had nothing to do with Tehran’s decision-making process?

Also via memeorandum

(Hmm. Remember what David Pinto wrote to Instapundit? Maybe not, but I do. I’m a nerd that way.)

Meanwhile regardless of which NIE is correct, Ha’aretz concludes:

Professionals will now argue passionately, continuing the debates between Israel’s assessment (an Iranian bomb in 2009-2010) and the American one (a bomb in 2012-2013).The Americans failed to explain Monday how they reached their new conclusions. As such, the general public will find it difficult to decide who is right. Maybe in the future, when there suddenly really is a bomb in play, or maybe not  a decision on this can be final. Meanwhile, Israeli intelligence has adopted the “most severe” approach, but the American decision maker is only affected by the Americans writing the assessment.

It does not really matter. However successful or flawed this report may be, there is a new, dramatic reality, in all aspects of the struggle against the Iranian bomb: The military option, American or Israeli, is off the table, indefinitely.

Given the American interest in the peace process and likely disinterest in Iran, Israel probably has to tread carefully even if its intelligence estimate differs from the American one.

One question: If the 2005 estimate concluded that Iran had stopped its pursuit of nuclear weapons and the new one concluded that it was now close to fielding a weapon, would the administration’s critics be counseling caution or action?

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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I'm a government bureaucrat with delusions of literacy.
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7 Responses to Fuzzy intelligence

  1. There is no great mystery why the NIE turned around. The 2005 estimate was fixed by the same person who tried to fix the last estimate, Dick Chaney. Chaney, nore that any other person was also responsible for fixing the previous NIE that told us about all those Iraqi WMD You know the WMD that were stolen by space aliens in flying saucers shortly before we invaded Iraq.

    Gareth Porter of IPS reports that the NIE has been floating between intelligence agencies and the Bush Administration for a year, because Chaney refuses to accept it, and the Intelligence agencies refuse to back down on their estimate.

    The International Atomic Energy Agency has known since 2004 that the A.Q. Khan gang sold the Iranians defective centrifuge designs that can only enrich Uranium to reactor grade fuel, not atomic weapon material.

    CNN reported at that time: “IAEA inspectors detailed its findings in the report titled “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran” — a report compiled for the June 14 meeting of the IAEA board of governors in Vienna, Austria. ”

    The Iranian Nuclear project was blocked by the inability of the Iranians to perfect their production of the P-2 centrifuge. The IAEA has recently closed its case on Iranian centrifuges concluding that the Iranians were currently unable to produce weapons grade U235, and not interested in obtaining the technology to do so.

    Most US intelligence agencies, recalling that the IAEA was spot on about the fraudulent Bush/Chaney claims about Iraqi nuclear weapons programs, dug in and refused to kowtow to Chaney’s demands for more dummied up intelligent estimates. There is no0 mystery here, only further evidence of the disgusting, corrupt, dishonesty and insane methods of the Bush Administration.

  2. Sabba Hillel says:

    Actually, the reports of Iraqi weapons were accurate but the outside world carefully gave him time to ship the weapons to Syrian and Iran and to hide the evidence. Similarly, I would be suspicious of the way the current reports are structured. It sounds more as if the political fight is being set up in order to influence the coming election.

  3. Sabba Hillel, I want a sip of what ever it is you have been drinking!

  4. Charles, joking is one thing. But you should probably keep away from kidding around when you’re brand new here, and nobody knows your style yet.

    There is a school of thought out there that thinks the Iraqi WMDs wound up in Syria and Lebanon. This theory is bolstered by satellite photos of truck convoys in the weeks leading up to the war in Iraq. The recent bombing of a mystery site in Syria that was not protested by any other Arab nation lends credence to the theory that Syria has something very nasty to hide. Several news reports have come out and said that the site was for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

    Many of us here look with great skepticism at the NIE report. That doesn’t mean we’re drunk.

  5. Meryl, I have read your blog for some time, and I often agree with you. I am a member of the reality based community, and I just don’t see the facts upon which your very strange claim is made. We know for example, that explosives sealed by IAEA inspectors before the invasion of Iraq were still under IAEA seal when American toups arrived. Minnasota “Channel 5” news team witnessed 101st Division troops brake open one explosive filled bunker at the al Qaqaa facility for the “Channel 5” team, and the troops were videotaped by the Minnesota TV journalist inspecting the explosives. The explosives appear to be under UN seals, incuding the explosives HMX used in nuclear weapons, and U.N. markings on the barrels are clear. Another bunker filmed by “Channel 5 News that day appears to have an IAEA seal on it.

    Members of the 101st Airborne Division showed the “5” EYEWITNESS NEWS crew bunker after bunker of material labeled ‘Explosives.’ Usually it took just the snap of a bolt cutter to get into the bunkers and see the material identified by the 101st as detonation cords.

    It is clear from the Channel 5 account, videos and photographs, that WMD related materials under international control were recovered intact by the US Army during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. However these materials, located at the Al Qaqaa storage facility, were not secured by the U.S. Army, despite the fact that the IAEA had alerted the United States government to the presence of WMD related materials at the IAEA facility.

    The Los Angelas Times on November 4, 2004, troops from the two military units, the Army 317th Support Center and the 258th Rear Area Operations Center, watched explosives being plundered from the al Qaqaa facility by looters over a several day period of time. “On our last day there, there were at least 100 vehicles waiting at the site for us to leave,” one soldier reported.

    US Weapons Inspector David Kay visits Al Qa’qaa facility in May. He stated: “I saw it in May and it was heavily looted at that time. Sometime between April and May most of the stuff was carried off. The site was in total disarray.”

    I tell the whole story on my blog:
    http://weblog.xanga.com/bartoncii/571774819/george-bush-and-the-emporers-new-clothes.html

  6. Michael Lonie says:

    Cheney is still VP (and we all know how tremendous is the power of the VP in American government) so why did the NIE reversal come with him still in a position to force the professional spooks to toe his line, as he supposedly did before?

    This is a complete reversal from the 2005 estimate, a 180. The Intelligence Community has had pretty poor success about all sorts of intel problems for many years. The CIA in particular has been chowder-headed about HUMINT and incompetent to furnish it reliably for decades, essentially since Angleton was fired. And for penetrating key decision-making by governments like those of Iran and Iraq you need good HUMINT sources.

    Nor is the IAEA to be trusted, any more than any other UN agency.

    The Mossad’s estimate is likely to be more reliable.

  7. The IAEA was 100% correct about non-existant Iraqi nuclear weapons program, while the Chaney altered pre-Iraq NIE relied on documents known to be forged, and informants who were known to be liers. That Chaney doctored NIE was wrong, and embarrassed the intelligence community. What does Chaney know that the CIA,and the NSA does not? Given Chaney’s record for incompetence, why would any sane person trust him.

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