Four speeches. Lots of argument and conflict.

The President seemingly said what he did on Thursday in the hope of preparing the stage to go to European leaders and the Palestinians hoping to head off an attempt by the Palestinians to bring a vote for statehood to the UN General Assembly. Some of you may question this motive. I do not. I do think that is exactly what President Obama was trying to do. The Congress of the United States is even working on legislation in which the President is urged to act against such a move.

There was an understanding, I believe based upon the counsel of Samantha Power, one of the President’s advisors, that the Palestinians could invoke UNGA Resolution 377 to go around a Security Council veto by the US.

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 377, the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, states that, in cases where the United Nations Security Council fails to act in order to maintain international peace and security, owing to disagreement between its five permanent members, the matter shall be addressed immediately by the General Assembly, using the mechanism of the Emergency Special Session.

Evidently, however, this is not true because, according to a J Post article published yesterday, in order for a vote to recognize statehood to take place at all, it needs to go through the Security Council first which means that absolutely nothing has changed. A US Security Council veto will prevent a vote from being taken. It is not the case that a vote is taken and then approved by the Security Council. There will be no vote if the US vetoes it. Thus, there was and is no need for the US to lobby European governments or for the US to convince the Palestinian leadership not to pursue it. This is a dead issue unless the sole purpose of US lobbying efforts are to get other nations to side with the US veto so that the US in not alone in vetoing the effort.

This is the real purpose of President Obama’s efforts in recent weeks. There is little or no chance that the Administration did not know about the rules in the UN. It is much more likely that the Obama administration was using the confusion about the possibility of the Palestinians utilizing UNGA 337 to pressure Israel to make concessions in order to promote negotiations so that other nations would be more willing to preemptively join the US in declaring opposition to a unilateral declaration of PA statehood in the UN. Now, that the cat is out of the bag, the entire argument is revealed to be a house of cards.

We are now back to where we were and where we were is that the Palestinians both need to negotiate in order to achieve the realization of a state and lack any bargaining chips in those negotiations other than violence or its absence. Because attacking security barriers is by definition an act of hostility, those who claim that “non-violence” may succeed are incorrect. Marching against borders is an act of violence even if done without weaponry or physical conflict. I wrote about this only a couple of weeks ago.

But what is more important now is that the situation is exactly as I wrote about in November, one in which the Palestinians lack any leverage in the negotiations. In fact, they have even less leverage now than they did then and that is saying a whole lot. If you haven’t read my article on Palestinian Leverage from November, you really should. It is all you really need to know about what is going on in the peace process.

Meanwhile, Rafah opened today. More on that to come.

It has been argued that the release of the documents present Israel in a bad light, namely as rejecting reasonable Palestinian offers. Therefore, some have suggested that the documents may have been released in order to bring condemnation upon Israel. J Street’s Ben Ami, in a rush to condemn Israel, seized on them to proclaim that the Palestinians are a peace partner and that Israel has refused to negotiate. Yet, this scenario for the release of the documents does not make sense because the PA has already stated flatly that they did not make the offers in question. One could make the case that any organization utilizing these documents to blame Israel is one that would condemn Israel anyway. J Street is clearly among them. My colleagues who continually try to explain why they are supportive of J Street, clinging to the conception that J Street is supportive and not overly critical of Israel, are finding themselves tiring of presenting a weakening, if not failing, argument.

The release of the documents has definitely done harm to the Palestinian Authority. As the PA faces both internal criticism (Hamas as well as no small part of Fatah) and external criticism (from most, if not all, of the Arab world) for its theoretical willingness to compromise on key issues, to suggest that it made such compromises in negotiations can only do it harm. So what is the origin of these papers?

Well, certainly there are those who will argue that they were created in an Israeli attempt to do harm to the PA by weakening it. This is absurd. Al Jazeera would certainly be much more willing to promote Israeli attempts to harm the PA than it would be to criticize the PA. Additionally, Israel has nothing to gain by weakening the PA and strengthening Hamas.

No, the most likely scenario is one in which Hamas, a supporter of Hamas such as Iran or Hizballah, or an opponent of Abbas among Fatah supporters (Dahlan) created the concession documents and placed them among some legitimate documents in order to make the fabricated ones look real and to weaken the PA and to undermine its ability to represent the Palestinian people in negotiations. Now we can talk about whether or not the PA has a reasonable claim to that status in the first place, having lost the only election held in recent years, but this at least is a reasonable option. I think that an attempt to undermine or even oust Abbas is a reasonable guess as to why these documents were released to the press by whomever chose to do so.

Why? Israel wouldn’t accept it and Abbas knows that.

The alternatives to PA control of the West Bank are Hamas control of the West Bank which would be worse for Abbas and the PA than they would be for Israel (that’s really bad) or anarchy which would endanger even Hamas. In either situation, Israel would be much more likely to engage militarily and then withdraw than it would to remain in full occupation. In other words, Abbas is stuck in power while lacking even the power to abdicate. He has one real choice which he is doing everything in his power to avoid making, namely to concede enough to Israel in the peace process that Israel can help him and the Palestinian people as a whole out of the current predicament. No one else can help. The process is stuck not because of Israeli refusal to make concessions, but because of Abbas’s refusal to make the concessions that must be made.

This isn’t rocket science. There is an obvious need for a paradigm shift in the thought process of the Palestinian Leadership from one of “How do we achieve what we failed to achieve in 1948?” namely to eliminate Israel or even “How do we achieve what we all rejected in 1949?” namely a state based upon the pre-1967 borders to “How do we create something resembling a state today based upon the changes that have occurred since 1948, 1967, 1973, 1993, 2000, 2005 and 2009?” which is what must be done.

The following are basic realities that have been rejected by the Palestinians thus far and will need to be taken into account for a state for the Palestinians to have a chance to come to fruition.

1. The “Right of Return” to Israel for Palestinians to Israel isn’t an option. It isn’t an act of peace, but is an act of war. Restitution is the only option for those refugees. In fact, restitution is the only option for the vast majority of refugees who would theoretically be able to return to a Palestinian state, but not to Israel (refugees from the 1967 war). Any future Palestinian state could not possibly support a dramatic increase in population for decades, if ever, so even a “return” to a Palestinian state post negotiations isn’t a viable option. To be honest, Israel couldn’t support such a bump in population either, even if it didn’t result in an immediate civil war, which it would. There will be no substantial return of refugees to either Israel or to a future Palestinian state.

2. The western, northern, and southern borders of the West Bank are not really issues, as they could be solved easily with territorial exchanges, with the exception of two issues. First, Jerusalem and second, other large Arab population centers currently within Israel. I’ll address those in a moment.

3. There is no chance that Israel could or would concede a large portion of the Old City to the Palestinians and there is little doubt that most of the residents of the Old City would NOT wish to become citizens of a Palestinian state. They are far better off as citizens of Israel and have said as much. A UN vote granting the pre-1967 border would go against their wishes. Yes, they want a Palestinian state to be created, but they do not want to live in it. This is much like those American Jews who are strong advocates for Israel but have no desire to make aliyah any time soon.

4. There is no chance that Israel could concede free and secure access to the Western Wall and the City of David for Jews which essentially means that it must maintain control over the vicinity of Temple Mount and Silwan as well as maintaining security control over the Mount of Olives to the East of the Temple Mount.

5. Israel is not going to allow the Mount Scopus Campus of Hebrew University to once again become cut off from Jews, which means that Israel will maintain a contiguous territory connecting an area North and East of the Old City with West Jerusalem, no matter what other areas it might consider allowing to become part of a future Palestinian state.

6. Places such as Um-al-Fahem, the large Arab village in the Galilee on the Israeli side of the Green Line would make some sense to place on the Palestinian side of the border after a peace agreement, but just as in #3 above, most of its residents would rather maintain Israeli citizenship than to become Palestinian citizens even though they might advocate for the creation of a Palestinian state. The PA might want this village, a prosperous Arab center, as part of the Palestinian state and no few Israeli Jews would be happy to oblige, but if the residents’ opinions matter, it will remain an Israeli city.

7. There will be significant shifts of populations after any peace agreement as settlements in the midst of a future Palestinian state will likely be abandoned. Compensation will need to be made in these cases as well. Restitution for Jews from Arab lands will be a consideration, but unless the discussions expand and become one between Israel and the Arab world, this issue would not be relevant as the Palestinians as such would have no responsibility to offer compensation to those refugees.

8. Israel cannot possibly allow either the Palestinians or an international force to control the Eastern border with Jordan. International forces have proven grossly and dangerously ineffective at stopping weapons smuggling in Lebanon, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, etc…. No Arab forces could be trusted to prevent the importation of weaponry to those whom they would almost certainly consider their allies. Hence, Israel will need to maintain supervision over the Eastern border of the West Bank indefinitely or it will not be able to make any other concessions.

9. There is no desire on the part of the Arab world to increase its Jihad, its struggle, against Israel and in fact there is significant impetus to improve relations with Israel without it resolving the conflict with the Palestinians. This is demonstrable from the Wikileaks documents.

10. Gaza cannot be a part of discussions until Hamas is removed from power because the Palestinian Authority does not speak for the people of Gaza. Current discussions should involve the West Bank alone.

11. The 1967 border was considered “noticeably insecure” and all previous discussions of UNSC Resolution 242 indicate that whatever border results from a settlement of that conflict must be secure. The understanding from the Western perspective, notably not from the Arab perspective, is that UNSCR 242 meant that Israel would not be asked to turn over all of the land captured in the 1967 war. The Arab world has always interpreted UNSCR 242 to mean exactly that Israel must turn over all of that land. The US does not believe Israel must do so, but also does not wish to define the border because to do so would undoubtedly upset the Arab world or Jewish and many Christian voters in America depending upon which side the administration chose to support. An abstention is the same as a vote in favor of the Arab side on this issue. Hence, the US has no choice but to veto and to demand that borders be settled by the two sides through negotiations. This is exactly what the US is currently doing.

12. While they may make pronouncements in the United Nations, in Arab League meetings, or to the press in general to the contrary, a final settlement of the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians is not in the interest of the United States or that of many of the Arab League nations either because of positions they would need to take at that stage or because of consequences that would almost certainly follow such as turning hundreds of thousands of refugees into citizens of their states.

There are certainly more considerations that could be listed here. I simply came up with twelve significant ones. Any discussion of peace or of the creation of a Palestinian state that does not take these factors into account, if not many others as well, is not realistic.

President Abbas believes that the nation of Israel as recognized by the UN as a state exists, but he does not accept its Jewish nature now or in the future. He believes that it can exist solely within its recognized borders pre-1967. This is a position that has no chance to achieve peace because it has no chance to meet any of the most basic concerns of Israel including of note that the 1967 border was no where near secure and did not include most of Jerusalem on the Israeli side. The entire Old City would be on the Palestinian side.

In looking at no few recent articles including the one from Haaretz mentioned above, we find the concept, the ridiculous notion to be more accurate, that among the Palestinian concessions is the Right of Return of refugees and their descendants from 1948, much less 1967, to their homes within what would be Israel after a peace agreement. This makes no sense and cannot be understood as a concession. The only realistic option in addressing these refugees concerns is restitution, compensation for lost property.

The Right of Return as a peace concession amounts to “If you let us kill you this way, we won’t kill you the other way.” It is absurd as a notion, much less as a demand. More insane than this is the fact that the Palestinians and the Arab world act as if it is a demand that they cannot concede!!! It is an invalid and impossible demand to begin with!!! It simply cannot be done unless the goal is to eliminate the Jewish state and replace it with a Palestinian one. Thus, Israel cannot possibly agree to it. If that is true, it is not a valid negotiating position. It would amount to going to a car dealer to negotiate about the purchase of a car and the dealer only offering options that involve the car remaining in their possession after the sale.

The peace process is about the creation of two states for two peoples. One must be a state for the Jewish people. If that is not being discussed, there is no peace process.

Avi Issacharoff, Barak Ravid and Natasha Mozgovaya in Haâ€aretz (via the Daily Alert Blog)

Israel and the Palestinians are at odds over which subjects will open their next round of peace talks.

Prime Minister Netanyahu wants to begin with security arrangements, recognition of Israel as a Jewish state and a Palestinian willingness to declare an end to the conflict when an agreement is signed. But Palestinian President Abbas wants to begin by defining the borders of the Palestinian state.

Palestinian leaders adamantly refuse to recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

Boaz Ganor in Globes (via the Daily Alert Blog):

From the point of view of the heads of the Palestinian Authority, holding direct negotiations with Israel is an obstacle to their strategy, and even puts it at risk. This is because, until now, they have been working to achieve their strategic goals with wall-to wall support (to a certain degree even with the support of Hamas), without being asked to pay any price to Israel without signing any agreements, without recognizing Israel’s right to exist, and without renouncing “the right of return”, etc. Any significant progress in the direct negotiations with Israel will necessarily result in sharp criticism within the Palestinian arena and their position will be weakened.

Related see Jackson Diehl (via memeorandum)

But it’s worth noting that Abbas, following his first extended private conversation with Netanyahu in Washington, spent the subsequent days giving interviews to Arab media in which he publicly rejected each of those terms. Palestinians, he said, will never recognize Israel as a Jewish state; they will not allow Israeli forces to remain in the West Bank. In fact, if he’s pressured to make any concessions, he told the al-Quds newspaper, “I’ll grab my briefcase and leave.”

I don’t agree with everything Diehl writes and hope to follow up tonight.

Credit for the image: Elder of Ziyon.

See previous editions: the original and part ii.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

Abbas does not have a mandate to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians since his term in office had expired in January.

Nothing like forcing Abbas to negotiate against his will on behalf of a people whom he does not legitimately represent! There is a slight problem here, I think.

The true alternatives to a two state solution are the following:

• THREE state solution with an independent Gaza opposed by an independent West Bank with Israel in the middle,
• THREE state solution with an independent  West Bank opposed by an Egyptian controlled Gaza with Israel in the middle,
• THREE state solution with an Egyptian controlled Gaza and a Jordanian controlled West Bank, or
• STATE-SEMI-STATE solution, basically maintaining the status quo indefinitely.

It is time that the Palestinian people realized, as Israelis for the most part have for more than a decade, that a two state solution is the only good solution for either side.

No, not that peace process — not the one between Israelis and Palestinians. That oneâ€s probably beyond diplomacy.

And the Washington Post in an editorial The Settlement Rift:

The problem is that no Israeli government — not Mr. Netanyahu’s, not even one led by the current opposition — is likely to agree to a total construction ban. By insisting on one, the administration risks bogging itself down in a major dispute with its ally, while giving Arab governments and Palestinians a ready excuse not to make their own concessions. Meanwhile, the practical need for a total settlement freeze is debatable. Palestinian negotiators have already conceded that many of the towns will be annexed to Israel in any final deal; so did former presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.

While I don’t agree with all aspects of the editorial, it’s clear that the Post’s editors are critical of the administration’s efforts to pick a diplomatic fight with Israel. But that stance along with Friedman’s acknowledgement that diplomacy might not work between Israel and the Palestinians, makes me wonder if Abbas’s performance in Washngton has made people realize that the problems in the Middle East are not the fault of Israel.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.