I am no historian. But I can’t help the feeling that the New York Times’s account of the recdently declassified transcripts of the Israeli government’s deliberations over the war wasn’t presented in academic fashion, but rather to promote the view of the Times and editors. First we learn:
The transcripts of the meetings show Mr. Dayan, the unflappable eye-patch-wearing defense minister, at the edge of desperation. As Syrian tanks rolled toward the Galilee unimpeded, he understood that he had misread the signals.
“I underestimated the enemy’s strength, I overestimated our own forces,” he is quoted as saying in an early meeting with Prime Minister Golda Meir and others. “The Arabs are much better soldiers than they used to be.” Then: “Many people will be killed.”
But of course, this being the New York Times, what’s important are the lessons learned.
In an editorial titled “Old Wounds, New Lessons,” the left-leaning Haaretz newspaper said that the leaders in 1973 “failed to see the limitations of Israel’s use of force and the possible forms its enemies’ operations would take.”
This was followed by:
Not surprisingly, the military chief of staff now, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, weighed in Friday with somewhat different observations in the newspaper Maariv.
“I believe that the intelligence failure and the sense of existential uncertainty that the war brought served as important lessons for the military enterprise, the understanding of the importance of its mission, and the great responsibility that rests on our shoulders,” he wrote. “This is the explanation for the Sisyphean efforts to increase the strength and capabilities of the army. This is why after 62 years of independence we continue to enlist every boy and girl. This is why we place the reservist soldiers at the core of the army. And this is also why they come.”
This is the New York Times, of course, so the article couldn’t end there with a balance of views – one from a highly ideological newspaper and the other from a military officer who knows what he’s talking about. So the reporter, Ethan Bronner, brings out “Yehezkel Dror, one of Israel’s most distinguished political scientists” for the final word.
“They did not understand that the Egyptians realized they didn’t stand a chance of destroying Israel,” he said. “They used the war for a political goal. Why didn’t we understand this? Because we didn’t think politically. He who thinks only militarily does not understand that the other side sees the army as a political tool, not to conquer but to reach a better deal on the Sinai.”
Mr. Dror added that when a Turkish flotilla last May tried to breach Israel’s sea blockade of Gaza, the government’s use of military force led to deadly consequences. He said that what is needed in leadership is both subtlety and clarity. Israel’s approach to the peace process with the Palestinians was an example, he added — “the main question of what Israel wants is unclear.”
Distinguished professors in Israel, of course, promulgate the exact same views as reporters and editors of the New York Times! They must be right.
Okay, but may I ask some questions? If Israel was too quick to fight, couldn’t the same reasoning be applied to the Egypt and Syria? After all Israel didn’t attack preemptively, it waited to be attacked! Or is it okay for Arabs to attack and kill Israelis but not okay for Israelis to defend themselves. Is there a Yechezkol Dror in Egypt or in Syria telling the populations there that attacking Israel was wrong and that had their countries entered into negotiations with Israel they could have gotten back most of the land they lost without firing a shot?
There’s another lesson that the Times hasn’t considered. Distinguished blogger Daled Amos concluded:
Letting world opinion dictate Israeli security concerns was nearly disastrous then.
If anything, the problem has only gotten worse.
Blogger Double Tapper remembers the Yom Kippur War.
The Yom Kippur War was fought from October 6 to 26, 1973, between Israel and a massive coalition of Arab states backing Egypt and Syria. The war began with a joint surprise attack on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in Judaism. The obvious reason for choosing the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur to stage a surprise attack on Israel was that on this specific holiday (unlike any other) the country comes to a complete standstill. Yom Kippur is the holiest day in the Jewish calendar; both religiously observant Jews and most of the secular majority fast, abstain from any use of electricity, engines, communications, etc., and all road traffic ceases. Many soldiers also went home from military facilities for the holiday, and Israel was more vulnerable with much of its military on leave.
If the point of the war was to recover territories lost in 1967, why go to war on the day that Israel was prevented from striking back immediately? Doesn’t the choice of Yom Kippur suggest that the Arab attack was intended to destroy Israel?
The view of the New York Times seems to be that Israel would have been better off losing the Yom Kippur War. But if Israel had followed that losing mentality, it would not be around now to write the history.
Crossposted on Soccer Dad.
I loathe most MSM…but I do scan the “Letters to the Editor” sections to see if anyone else will point out their errors.
Please, please write a letter to the Times stating what you say here.
Also notable…the Yom Kippur war was during ramadan…hmmmmm…
I’ve noted over the years that Arab writings refer to the Yom Kippur War as the “October War,” glossing over the fact that they specifically chose Yom Kippur for their attack.
The reality is that Dayan and his generals believed that they could absorb the first blow without significant casualties and then knock out the Arab attackers via their air force, and mop up with their army. What they had not counted on was the Russian high tech anti-aircraft missiles that were fired at Israeli aircraft by Russian controlled crews that took a heavy toll on the Israeli air force.
It has always been a damned if you do, and damned if you do not, Israeli scenario in the Middle East. It has been 37 years since the Yom Kippur war, Israel learned a very painful lesson, and will no longer allow themselves to be surprised by anyone!
Ah yes, Herschel, I can recall after 9/11 protests that we would be insensitive to the Muslim street if we attacked during Ramadan; apparently it’s OK to attack during Ramadan sometimes.
Inadvertently the attack on Yom Kippur was probably helpful in that the streets were clear and the mobilization did not get caught up in the mess that a regular workday would have caused. Reservists were mostly at home and could muster more quickly than otherwise. On the other hand, I do not recall much outrage among the west about the timing of the attack…then again, a few years before no one bothered to note that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attacked during a holiday truce they had agreed to observe.
And while you hear all about the claim (probably true) that the Egyptian objective wasn’t to destroy Israel outright, the Egyptians would hardly have forsaken a chance to do just that if the IDF had been broken in the Sinai. It wasn’t lack of desire but lack of wherewithal. And in any case, it might be noted that Egypt wasn’t the only belligerent; the Syrians clearly set their sights on the Galilee and beyond, not just recovering the Golan. But this recognition would interfere with the narrative that the Arabs started the war for limited political purposes.
A major reason that the IDF high command thought it could absorb an attack and strike back was the strategic depth the Sinai gave to Israel. Israel never had strategic depth before. There was never any room to retreat to if necessary. Even the Golan gave a little depth to Israel’s defenses.
Kenneth Pollack, in “Arab Armies At War 1948-1991” describes a key action showing how Israel won in 1973. The Egyptians had set up a radio intercept company of Hebrew speaking intelligence officers. They monitored the Israel frequencies and listened to what the Israelis were saying to each other, so finding out what the IDF units were doing. Israelis, at least at that time, were notoriously lax about radio discipline and constantly gave useful information in clear.
But this operation did more than just tell the Egyptian high command what the Israelis were up to. It also told them what their own units were up to. It is difficult, sometimes impossible, to get accurate information out of Arab officers about what they are doing. By listening in on the Israelis the Egyptian staff would find out that the reports they got from the umpteenth division, saying that it was attacking the Israelis and had destroyed 100 tanks in two days, were complete fabrications. The umpteenth division was sitting in its foxholes and the officers were partying. So the high command could come down on any Egyptian officers lying to them. Without it the high command could not even tell if the various formations were where they said they were. Sometiems they weren’t.
But Israel caught on to this problem, and sent a commando raid that wiped out or captured the entire intercept company. Then the Egyptian command could not tell what Israel was up to, and worse, could not tell what the Egyptians were up to. This raid helped greatly in fighting the war.
If the academic left knew anything at all about military affairs–and usually its reaction is “ugh, guns, disgusting,” not that this stops them from pontificating about military affairs–it might draw some conclusions about the comparative nature of Arab and Israeli societies. Michael points out one such aspect: In the IDF information tends to flow freely and accurately, officers having no reason to fear for their personal safety if they inform their commanders of the real situations.
Another is that in Israel’s army decision-making is offered to ranks much lower than in Arab armies. Decisions in the Egyptian army often made at the level of colonel may fall to NCO’s in the IDF. It is one of many ways that Israel is shown to be an open society.
Not that this would change any minds in the ivory towers.
Moshe Dayan was always an over rated general and a rather unsavory fellow on other things too.