After expressing their glee with the election of President-elect Obama, they tell us the advantage his election presents at this time:

In perhaps no other region was the election of Obama more favorably received than the Middle East.

I would argue that that the region where his election most favorably received were the editorial offices of most American newspapers. Still, as I recall, Ayman Al-Zawahri did not have the most enthusiastice greeting for the new President.

So guess what the priority of Scowcroft and Brzezinski is?

Immediate attention to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute would help cement the goodwill that Obama’s election engendered. Not everyone in the Middle East views the Palestinian issue as the greatest regional challenge, but the deep sense of injustice it stimulates is genuine and pervasive.

And what the rewards be?

Resolution of the Palestinian issue would have a positive impact on the region. It would liberate Arab governments to support U.S. leadership in dealing with regional problems, as they did before the Iraq invasion. It would dissipate much of the appeal of Hezbollah and Hamas, dependent as it is on the Palestinians’ plight. It would change the region’s psychological climate, putting Iran back on the defensive and putting a stop to its swagger.

This is interesting. In 2000, Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon and it had the effect of strengthening Hezbollah – Hezbollah, of course, changed its demands of Israel to inlcude a withdrawal from Shebaa Farms too – a client of Iran. In 2005, Israel withdrew from Gaza and that ended up strengthening Hamas, a client of Iran.

In mathematics, one way of solving a difficult problem, is to break it up into smaller problems. In the past Israel’s smaller steps towards making peace with its neighbors have strengthened Iran (through its clients). Now we’re to believe that if Israel carries out more withdrawals it will weaken Iran? If Israel’s small steps exacerbated rather than solved the problem doesn’t if follow that a complete withdrawal from Judea and Samaria will only increase the demands on Israel?

And how will this be accomplished?

The major elements of an agreement are well known. A key element in any new initiative would be for the U.S. president to declare publicly what, in the view of this country, the basic parameters of a fair and enduring peace ought to be. These should contain four principal elements: 1967 borders, with minor, reciprocal and agreed-upon modifications; compensation in lieu of the right of return for Palestinian refugees; Jerusalem as real home to two capitals; and a nonmilitarized Palestinian state.

In other words it needs to be solved in a way that meets the demands of the Saudi ultimatum. (It’s not a peace plan, it’s a list of Saudi demands with a very nebulous promise about normalization in exchange for Israel’s complying with demands.) The only clear difference between Brzezinski and Scowcroft and the Saudi plan is that the former National Security Advisers call for a “nonmilitarized Palestinian state.”

Of course that brings up a number of problems of its own. If the Palestinians can’t be trusted to be militarized, why should the Israelis trust them with any level of independence. But given the weapons that Fatah already has – courtesy of the United States and Israel – and that Hamas has – courtesy of Iran with the implicit cooperation of Egypt – how exactly would this future state be non-militarized? On the first question, Brzezinski and Scowcroft suggest an answer.

Something more might be needed to deal with Israeli security concerns about turning over territory to a Palestinian government incapable of securing Israel against terrorist activity. That could be dealt with by deploying an international peacekeeping force, such as one from NATO, which could not only replace Israeli security but train Palestinian troops to become effective.

I would point out that the CIA has, in the past, trained Palestinian troops to be effective. They were quite effective in using those skills against Israel. So the effectiveness of “Palestinian troops” is, at best, a mixed blessing. Good perhaps for the Palestinians; not so good for Israel.

Things are tough, but there’s reason for optimism.

To date, the weakness of the negotiating parties has limited their ability to come to an agreement by themselves. The elections in Israel scheduled for February are certainly a complicating factor, as is the deep split among Palestinians between Fatah and Hamas. But if the peace process begins to gain momentum, it is difficult to imagine that Hamas will want to be left out, and that same momentum would provide the Israeli people a unique chance to register their views on the future of their country.

I’m sorry. Israel ceded the Gaza Strip in 2005. That allowed Hamas to declare victory and parlay said victory into electoral success. Foreign aid and electoral success, did not make Hamas pursue peace. Their newfound political power was translated into the building of a terror infrastructure and sustained rocket attacks against Israel. Given Hamas’s “unique chance” then to “register their views,” Hamas chose to continue the armed struggle against Israel. Explain why Hamas would be more committed to peace after reconciling with Fatah.

Soon they conclude:

To say that achieving a successful resolution of this critical issue is a simple task would be to scoff at history. But in many ways the current situation is such that the opportunity for success has never been greater, or the costs of failure more severe.

What an ending! Why is the opportunity for success greater now than ten years ago? Well Arafat’s gone. But Hamas is in charge. Ahh. But Hamas will reconcile with Fatah and then, not wanting to miss out on this historic peace thing, will suddenly see the light and reject its history and ideology. Been there; done that. In 1993. It was Fatah then, but subsequent years have shown that the thrill of peace did nothing to disabuse Fatah of its terrorist past. “Peace negotiations” simply became another tactic it could use to attack Israel. And unlike terror attacks, talking peace offered Fatah protection against those inconvenient revelations that it never abandoned terror or its goal of destroying Israel.

As always, the likes of Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft are clear about what Israel must do, but not so clear about what’s expected of the Palestinians, or the Arab world for that matter.

One of the unsurprising aspects of this op-ed is that – except for the beginning – it could have been written any time in the past decade. Brzezinski and Scowcroft offer no new insights and really just throw a lot of platitudes at the situation in the Middle East. Yes, Iran will lose its swagger. Really? I would think that the drop in oil prices would have made Ahmadinejad drop his swagger, but he’s just as cocky as ever.

Nothing here is remotely original. All it is, is another way of saying: there won’t be peace until the United States pressures Israel to make risky concessions despite fifteen years of broken Palestinian promises of peace.

UPDATE: Daled Amos reminds us that Scowcroft has a – shall we call it – unique definition of peace. The Spine points out that the NATO idea is a non-starter. Solomonia is skeptical and links to the American Thinker, where the oped gets a pretty complete treatment.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.