Yourish.com

06/29/2009

Diehl me out

Filed under: Israel, Politics, palestinian politics — Tags: — Soccerdad @ 10:00 am

Jackson Diehl’s End the Spat with Israel, is a very important op-ed. It’s also interesting that both Diehl and David Ignatius are showing skepticism of the administration’s tactics regarding Israel. That’s not to say Diehl’s column is perfect – it isn’t, but he makes some very important observations:

But, starting with a statement by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in May, the administration made the mistake of insisting that an Israeli settlement “freeze” — a term the past three administrations agreed to define loosely — must mean a total stop to all construction in the West Bank and even East Jerusalem.

This absolutist position is a loser for three reasons. First, it has allowed Palestinian and Arab leaders to withhold the steps they were asked for; they claim to be waiting for the settlement “freeze” even as they quietly savor a rare public battle between Israel and the United States. Second, the administration’s objective — whatever its merits — is unobtainable. No Israeli government has ever agreed to an unconditional freeze, and no coalition could be assembled from the current parliament to impose one.

Finally, the extraction of a freeze from Netanyahu is, as a practical matter, unnecessary. While further settlement expansion needs to be curbed, both the Palestinian Authority and Arab governments have gone along with previous U.S.-Israeli deals by which construction was to be limited to inside the periphery of settlements near Israel — since everyone knows those areas will be annexed to Israel in a final settlement. Before the 2007 Annapolis peace conference organized by the Bush administration, Saudi Arabia and other Arab participants agreed to what one former senior official called “the Google Earth test”; if the settlements did not visibly expand, that was good enough.

(I’m not sure I buy the “Google Earth test” as presented by Diehl; the Saudi “peace plan” makes no exceptions, even for sections of Jerusalem such as Ramat Eshkol, Ramot or Gilo.)

Diehl doesn’t come out and say it, but the Obama administration has taken a strong anti-Israel posture in its dealings with in the Middle East. The premise of the Obama administration is that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that the heart of the instability in the Middle East, that Israeli intransigence is largely responsible for prolonging the conflict, so that pressure on Israel is the most effective way to solve the problems plaguing the Middle East. In other words, the Obama administration has fully adopted the premises of J-Street/ Peace Now/ Israel Policy Forum. (President Clinton subscribed to this view also, but since there was a Labor government in power when he became President, he was able to work with Israel with few excuses until 1996.)

Diehl’s also saying that adopting this position is self-defeating. He also realizes:

The result of such posturing is that the administration now faces a choice between a protracted confrontation with Israel — an odd adventure given the pressing challenges from Iran and in Iraq, not to mention the disarray of the Palestinian camp — or a compromise, which might make Obama look weak and provide Arab states further cause to refuse cooperation.

However, there’s a lot that Diehl gets wrong. For example:

Pressuring Israel made sense, at first. The administration correctly understood that Netanyahu, a right-winger who took office with the clear intention of indefinitely postponing any Israeli-Palestinian settlement, needed to feel some public heat from Washington to change his position — and that the show of muscle would add credibility to the administration’s demands that Arab leaders offer their own gestures.

Israel has changed a lot since 1996. Netanyahu – who wasn’t even such a right winger then – is certainly not one now. Still the portrayal of Netanyahu shows a myopic view of the Middle East that is so prevalent in the Washington press corps.

Barry Rubin writes:

Fayyad is prime minister for one reason only: to please Western governments and financial donors. Lacking political skill, ideological influence, or strong support base, Fayyad does keep the money flowing since he’s relatively honest, moderate, and professional on economic issues.

But his own people don’t listen to him. Most PA politicians want him out. International pressure keeps him in.

So here’s the Fayyad paradox. If he really represented Palestinian stances and thinking, there’d be some hope for peace. Since he’s so out of tune with colleagues, though, Fayyad sounds sharply different from them. And even he’s highly restricted by what’s permissible in PA politics, limits which ensure the PA’s failure, absence of peace, and non-existence of a Palestinian state.

The Palestinian political culture is so far removed from the Western premises of peaceful coexistence that it really doesn’t matter who the Israeli Prime Minister is. If Tzippi Livni had been able to form the most recent coalition, we would be no closer to resolving the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. And yet, even as Diehl argues that the administration’s pressure on Israel is excessive, he refuses to see the other side: the Palestinians in the nearly 16 years since Oslo are no more prepared to live peacefully with Israel than they were in 1993.

Finally Yaacov Lozowick sounds a warning that would serve the administration well:
American Pressure on Israel can Cost Lives.

I’m skeptical that this administration would take Diehl’s or Lozowick’s warnings to heart. It is too ideologically committed to its positions. I don’t believe that the President believes that a “spat” with Israel is counterproductive or a distraction from more pressing matters

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

02/09/2009

Voting for war?

Filed under: Israel, Israel Derangement Syndrome — Tags: — Soccerdad @ 11:00 am

Jackson Diehl starts off his latest (outrageous) column, A promise of War, with:

The past four Israeli elections have been won by a candidate who promised to end Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians. Tomorrow, for the first time in decades, Israelis may choose a prime minister who is promising to wage war.

The past four elections, that would be (in reverse order) Olmert, Sharon, Sharon and Barak. Yes Ariel Sharon promised peace, but in 2001, what he clearly promised was security, which, if Diehl remembers, was in the middle of the “Aqsa intifada,” which Arafat launched after failing to come to a peace agreement with Ehud Barak in 2000. Sharon won by campaigning that Barak’s diplomatic overtures to the Palestinians had been too generous. I don’t think that in 2001, the candidate “promising peace” was the one who proved victorious. And in 2003, Sharon won by campaigning against disengagement from Gaza, which he ended up adopting later. So it’s hard to see how Diehl’s snarky but superficial observation is correct.

(And I would conclude that fighting against Palestinian in terror did more to create peace – or the conditions for peace – than did the disengagement. But that requires an extra degree of analysis, something that Diehl isn’t interested in.)

What is Netanyahu for? Here’s Biur Chametz demonstrating an ability to comprehend what candidates are actually saying as opposed to projecting his prejudices onto Netanyahu.

From the Likud this time around I hear a substantial – and refreshing – change of tone. No more talk about working for a negotiated settlement or expectations of peace. Netanyahu is talking soberly about the challenges we face and the hard choices to be made. No more “I’ll bring you peace with security, or security with peace.” Netanyahu has put forward a plan for “economic peace”, suggesting that in the absence of real prospects for a diplomatic agreement we work on agreed steps to help the Palestinian economy. Frankly, I think that’s a crock, but it’s a potential way to maintain a diplomatic track which doesn’t entail unrealistic expectations or unacceptable demands. In other words, it may be a way to buy time while filling the diplomatic void with something concrete.

This is basically in line with what Barry Rubin writes (complete article here):

What is Israel’s consensus policy for the next government?

–To stress that we want peace, are ready for a Palestinian state, aren’t responsible for the conflict and violence continuing.

–To maintain deterrence and defend ourselves.

–To preserve the best possible relations with the United States, Europe, and other countries as long as it does not involve risks to Israeli national interests and citizens.

–Security cooperation with the PA to prevent terrorist attacks on Israel in exchange for helping them economically and against Hamas to ensure that it doesn’t take over the West Bank. Without illusions regarding Fatah and the PA, this effort seems to be working.

–To decide when to strike back at Hamas—and potentially Hizballah—based on any attacks on us. Precise response depends on timing, opportunity, and their behavior.

–To work for the isolation of Iran, Hizballah and Hamas.

Prof Rubin writes further:

Where are the main differences among the leading parties? They are more atmospherics than real: offering small concessions; making small demands. If much of the election revolves around personalities that is because strategy and policy are not hugely different among them. Bibi isn’t going to embark on a settlement-building campaign; Tzipi isn’t going to give away east Jerusalem.

The rest of Diehl’s column is Bibi-bashing fest. Hey, I’m not going argue that he was a great Prime Minister, but at least take the time to get things right instead of flinging as much as you can and seeing what sticks.

But here’s the Diehl’s central point:

In short, just at the moment that a new U.S. administration launches a policy aimed at addressing the multiple conflicts of the Middle East with intensive diplomacy, it may find itself with an Israeli partner that rejects negotiations with its neighbors and does its best to push the United States toward military confrontation with Iran and its proxies.

The chutzpah of Israel (or Bibi) for looking out for his nation’s interests!

At the end of his rant, Diehl leaves us with a story:

Still, it’s worth passing on Ross’s recollection of the last Israeli election night in which Netanyahu figured, on May 17, 1999. As Ross tells it in “The Missing Peace,” Abbas was staying at the Ritz-Carlton in Pentagon City, and the two men agreed to watch the returns together. When Ross arrived, Abbas greeted him by saying: “Either we toast the outcome or we jump out the window together.” Netanyahu lost in a landslide, but Ross warned the jubilant Abbas, “In Israeli politics never say never . . . if there is a catastrophe [Netanyahu] can come back.” You have to wonder if the Palestinian president and the Obama administration’s new Middle East counselor will be standing by their windows tomorrow night.

When Netanyahu was elected in 1996, the peace process had no credibility because it was premised on Arafat’s purported change from terrorist to statesman. No such change took place and Israel was subjected to higher levels of terror in the two and a half years after Oslo than it had seen in years. When Barak defeated Netanyahu it was because during Netanyahu’s term in office, terror was down; the Israeli electorate was no longer afraid of concessions. During his term, the economic situation of the Palestinians improved and he ceded most of Hevron to Palestinian Authority control. In short, Netanyahu did a lot more to advance the peace process than he’s generally credited with. And he also has done a lot more than Abbas ever did. Abbas is an ineffectual party man whose main qualification is that he wasn’t Arafat and that he’s not now Hamas. He never opposed terror against Israel.

That Ross would consider Abbas more of a kindred spirit than Netanyahu, says a lot more about Ross and similarly minded peace-processors than it does about Netanyahu. That Diehl finds this story significant – when the Arafat was still alive – says something about him too. He’s for a process, but he can hardly be said to be for peace.

For comparison I wrote a post in advance of the 2006 Israeli elections criticizing a Washington Post editorial on the topic. Diehl, who contributes to the editorials, didn’t view Olmert much better then, than he portrays Netanyahu now. By now, it should be clear to anyone objective that peace isn’t in Israel’s hands to make. First and foremost the Palestinians have to change their orientation and take responsibility for building a functioning state. Whether peace will result from that will depend on what kind of state they build.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

01/09/2009

Diehling with Iran

Filed under: Hamas, Iran, Israel, Israeli Double Standard Time, Media Bias — Tags: — Soccerdad @ 8:00 am

The Washington Post has dueling op-eds about Israel’s war against Hamas. Jackson Diehl predictably tells Israel that it’s on the wrong path in Hard Lesson for Israel. Charles Krauthammer disagrees.

Israel’s military campaign in the Gaza Strip is failing, but there may be a silver lining. The war against Hamas is proving — once again — that the Middle East’s extremist movements cannot be eliminated by military means. If the incoming Obama administration absorbs that lesson, it will have a better chance of neutralizing Iranian-backed groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and of eventually brokering an Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement.

This opening paragraph is rubbish. For example here’s Hanan Greenberg from Yedioth Ahronot:

According to figures collected thus far by Israel’s defense establishment, Hamas’ military infrastructure has sustained a serious hit, but their rocket capabilities still exist. A number of Hamas commanders have been killed or wounded during fighting, making it increasing difficult for their military wing to function properly.

The defense establishment has also noted that Hamas has been exercising caution in clashes with IDF soldiers. Hamas is tending not to put their forces at risk in areas in which they may fail. The IDF hit some of Hamas’ senior commanders, while those who have survived have gone underground. In many instances, the IDF has taken precaution not to target some of these commanders in their various hiding places, many of which are in heavily populated areas, when there is significant risk that innocent civilians could be hurt.

And I believe that Noah Pollak’s assessment that the rockets from Lebanon are a sign that Tehran is scared that its client is losing is correct.

After Israel killed Sheikh Yassin and Dr. Rantisi, Jonathan Schanzer wrote:

The March 22 targeted assassination of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin was designed by the Israelis to strike a major blow to Hamas. Many nations condemned the attack, however, and critics further claimed that the missile strike against Hamas’ paraplegic spiritual leader only strengthened the hand of Hamas.

A few weeks later, despite an outpouring of support from around the Arab world, Hamas does not appear any stronger. In fact, after the subsequent assassination on April 17 of Yassin’s successor, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Hamas appears even more off balance.

This is something Schanzer expanded on recently:

Take, for example, Israel’s targeted assassination of Hamas leaders Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, and Ismail Abu Shanab in 2004. With its top leadership eliminated in a span of only a few months, Hamas was in utter disarray. Specifically, after Yassin’s death, Hamas never found a religious leader to fill the void. His death made Hamas increasingly vulnerable to the widely held perception that it was simply a group of violent terrorists with no religious mandate.

The assassinations of Hamas’ top leaders also sparked what might be called a locality crisis. After the deaths of Rantisi and Abu Shanab, Hamas appointed its new leader in secret so that Israel would not be able to assassinate him easily. Meanwhile, the new public face of Hamas became Syria-based Khaled Meshal, who quickly became a liability. The longer the most recognizable Hamas leader was based in Syria, the more potential there was for Hamas to experience friction and fragmentation between local Gaza fighters and the decision makers abroad. This also gave Hamas the unmistakable appearance of being an international terrorist organization rather than a local and organic “resistance” group, as it always purported to be.

And, of course, there was Operation Defensive Shield, which destroyed most of the terror infrastructure in Judea and Samaria. But analysts like Diehl won’t discuss such successes because it would explode their carefully constructed narrative.

Diehl continues.

Israel’s bet was that it could substantially reduce Hamas’s military capacity and then force it to accept a cease-fire with improved terms for Israel. Hamas, predictably, has refused to play by those rules. It has defined victory as its own survival; by that standard, it has no incentive to agree to a new truce unless it receives major benefits in return, such as an end to Israel’s economic blockade.

First of all this ignores a very important detail. Israel’s leaders didn’t get up one morning and decide to rid Gaza of Hamas. Israel belatedly responded to an increasing threat – that’s threat not “provocation” – from Hamas. Allowing Hamas to continue building its arsenal and fortifications was intolerable. (And Israel would still have agreed to an extended ceasefire, if Hamas hadn’t rejected the idea.)

Maybe Hamas has defined victory as survival, but has anyone else? Why should Hamas’s definition of victory be valid? Is Diehl using his op-ed space to boost Hamas’s fortunes? (Hamas is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization that Diehl considers to be non-violent and reform minded.)

Later Diehl writes:

The trap that Olmert, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni have created for themselves lies not just in Hamas’s ability to withdraw its fighters and rockets into mosques, schools and densely populated neighborhoods, where they could probably survive weeks of bloody fighting or go underground. The larger fallacy is the persistent conceit among Israeli leaders that Hamas can somehow be wiped out by economic strangulation or force of arms.

So Diehl presents Israel with an unpalatable choice. But wait. He writes that Hamas can withdraw into mosques. Consider what Elder of Ziyon observed:

In other words, Hamas and Islamic Jihad have made an official tactic out of using civilians as human shields and out of shooting at Israel as civilians. They are proud that the number of apparent (and real) civilian casualties has increased in recent days.

Their war policy is to violate the Geneva Conventions brazenly and officially. Their aim is to maximize the number of civilians killed in Gaza.

First Diehl acknowledges matter-of-factly that Hamas will violate war crimes and then he lectures Israel that Israel cannot defeat Hamas. But there’s something about the juxtaposition of the two ideas that’s troubling. Diehl takes it for granted that Hamas will violate international law and yet he declares it invincible. And why?

Unlike al-Qaeda, Hamas is not merely a terrorist organization but a social and political movement with considerable support. Its ideology, however repugnant to Israel and the West, is shared by a considerable slice of the population in every Arab country from Morocco to Iraq. Because it is extremist, it thrives on war, the suffering it inflicts on Palestinians, and the anger generated by the endless, graphic and one-sided coverage of the Middle East’s satellite television channels. Every day this war continues, Hamas grows politically stronger, as do its allies in other countries and its sponsor, Iran.

Yes, but if the past three years are any indication the social services are a distant second to the terrorism. As Diehl acknowledges later, Hamas was losing popularity before the war started because if failed to deliver a better life for those it ruled – blaming Israel only works for so long before you have to deliver – but he assumes that now Hamas is stronger because it’s being attacked.

Here Diehl’s saying that though there may be some people who are offended by Hamas’s ideology, it must be tolerated. Maybe Hamas goes stronger, not because its so popular among its own people, but because naive Westerners tolerate it. That his own implicit support of Hamas might help the terrorists, seems to have escaped him.

I’ve already noted a number cases that suggest otherwise. And the NYT has another case (h/t Elder of Ziyon)

He was told that there were more serious cases than his and that he needed to wait his turn. But he insisted. “We are fighting the Israelis,” he said. “When we fire we run, but they hit back so fast. We run into the houses to get away.” He continued smiling.

“Why are you so happy?” a reporter asked. “Look around you. Don’t you see the misery that you are helping to cause?”

I realize that there aren’t that many reports that the people of Gaza are getting fed up with Hamas, still it’s remarkable that there are any such reports at all. And there seem to be more cases of ordinary people who have lost patience with Hamas, than who are happy with the way their elected government is behaving.

Edward Luttwak offers another possiblity:

The only possible explanation is that people in Gaza have been informing the Israelis exactly where Hamas fighters and leaders are hiding, and where weapons are stored. No doubt some informers are merely corrupt, paid agents earning a living. But others must choose to provide intelligence because they oppose Hamas, whose extremism inflicts poverty, suffering and now death on the civilian population for the sake of launching mostly ineffectual rockets into Israel. Hamas completely disregards the day-to-day welfare of all Gazans in order to pursue its millenarian vision of an Islamic Palestine.

If Diehl has some proof that Hamas is benefiting politically from the war, he doesn’t mention it; he just supposes it.

More from Diehl:

Though Israel must defend its citizens against rockets and suicide bombings, the only means of defeating Hamas are political. Palestinians, who have no history of attraction to religious fundamentalism, have to be persuaded to choose more moderate leaders, such as the secular Fatah. In the meantime, Hamas’s existence must be tolerated, and it should be encouraged to channel its ambitions into politics rather than military activity. That means, yes, elections — like those Hamas won in 2006, when it took control of the Palestinian legislature.

It’s funny that it takes Diehl about 3/4 of his essay to acknowledge that Israel “must defend its citizens” but after spending a significant part of the essay arguing that Israel was wrong to fight, his acknowledgment rings hollow. Still Diehl refuses to condemn Hamas’s violations of international law and the damage it inflicts on its own people. Seemingly he’d continue to tolerate Hamas at the expense of Israel’s population.

Diehl concludes:

Egypt was working on brokering a deal between the two Palestinian parties. A split began to emerge in Hamas between leaders who wanted to make that deal and extend the peace with Israel, and Iranian-backed hard-liners who wanted to draw Israel into a fight. Israel probably could have ensured that the moderates won the argument by offering to lift its economic blockade of Gaza in exchange for a continued cease-fire. It then could have focused on negotiating a two-state settlement with Abbas and on improving life for Palestinians in the West Bank, while Hamas absorbed the blame for the unremediable misery of Gazans.

Instead, Israel took the Iranian bait and chose to fight. Now, bogged down, suffering casualties and inflicting many more, creating terrible pictures for television, it will have to accept an unsatisfying settlement — or prolong its agony indefinitely. It should settle so that the leaders chosen by Israeli voters in an election next month will have the chance to work with a fresh American administration on a smarter and more effective strategy for countering Iran and its clients — one grounded in politics rather than bombs.

Israel took no bait. Israel responded to a threat. An intolerable threat. Again, describing the two week old war as taking “bait” mocks Israel’s right to self-defense. Yes, the pictures on television are terrible, but it is the result of Hamas’s actions. If instead of explaining away Hamas’s depravity, Diehl would condemn it and explain why Israel’s actions are justified, he would be helpful. Instead he is effectively defending Hamas.

And Israel’s strike against Hamas doesn’t strengthen the terrorist organization or its masters in Tehran, it weakens them.

A year and a half ago, Deborah Howell then-ombudsman for the Washington Post defended the papers decision to offer op-ed space to a Hamas spokesman on grounds that it “provoked.” Of course, the Post didn’t really need to go to anything so drastic, when it has a writer on its staff willing to defend Hamas’s outrages against international law, against Israel and against its own people.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

Powered by WordPress