via memeorandum
Jeffrey Goldberg writes:
For my money, the worst mistake Israel made was the mistake that led, ultimately, to the siege of Gaza: The 2005 unilateral withdrawal. Leaving Gaza wasn’t the problem, of course — you’d think the Jews would have learned sooner (see: Samson) that Gaza is no good for Jews, and Ariel Sharon was right to get out. But the method he used was tragic. By refusing to negotiate his exit from Gaza, he strengthened the hand of Hamas. If he had negotiated the withdrawal with the Palestinian Authority, he would have a) extracted concessions from the Palestinians, and b) strengthened the moderates. The moderates would have been credited by their people for coaxing Israel out of Gaza.
What’s wrong with this?
This is precisely what Israel did in 1995. Joel Greenberg of the New York Times reported on December 19:
At a new crossing point into Qalqilya this morning, a red sign informed Israeli motorists that they were entering a zone under the control of the Palestinian Authority. The sign warned that they could be stopped by Palestinian policemen and asked to produce drivers’ licenses and other identification.
“Now this is the frontier,” Mrs. Elimelech said. “When you cross over to Qalqilya, you’re abroad. Now it’s part of the emerging Palestinian state.”
Qalqilya is the closest town to Israel’s main population centers that has changed hands so far. Less than 10 miles separates it from the metropolitan sprawl around Tel Aviv.
Under the September agreement, Israel was to complete a pullout from six major West Bank towns and hundreds of neighboring villages by the end of this month. Jenin, Tulkarm, Nablus and Qalqilya have already been turned over to Palestinian control. Bethlehem and Ramallah are next. Despite a chorus of warnings by right-wing politicians that the withdrawals are returning Israel to the dangerously narrow borders it had before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the changes are taking place with little public protest.
Eight days later he reported:
Under a final cascade of stones, Israeli troops withdrew today from Ramallah, completing a pullout from six West Bank cities and their neighboring villages in preparation for Palestinian elections next month.
“Out!,” shouted youths as a column of Israeli jeeps moved away from a police station downtown, trailed by scores of cheering Palestinians. As stones pitched by the crowd arched toward the receding vehicles, Palestinian officers entered the station, raised a flag and greeted the throng from the roof, waving their rifles.
The scene was similar to others played out this month across the West Bank, and it set the stage for Palestinian elections planned for January 20.
Under an Israeli-Palestinian accord signed in September, Israeli forces have left six cities and more than 400 villages and towns in recent weeks, ending 28 years of control over much of the West Bank.
Two months later the New York Times reported:
A six-month lull in terror attacks in Israel was shattered in the early morning today when militant Muslim suicide bombers detonated pipe bombs in Jerusalem and Ashkelon, killing 25 people and wounding 77, some critically. Among the dead were two Americans.
This was a start of nine days of terror that ended (at the time) with:
The fourth in a series of savage suicide bomb attacks in Israel struck in the heart of Tel Aviv today, bringing the nine-day death toll to 61.
Its own power threatened by mounting public rage, the Government met in emergency session and declared that it was taking the all-out war against the new terrorism into areas under Palestinian control.
While the custom was to blame Hamas for the bombings, that blame was somewhat misplaced. By ceding territory, Israel was not only ending “occupation” but it was also ceding control. True Israel couldn’t stop all terror when it had control of the areas it gave up in the name of “peace,” but it also made an effort to do so. Arafat – the “moderate” of the time – did nothing to prevent the building of a terror infrastructure in the areas under his control. It’s actually worse than that, Arafat promoted the growth of Hamas. By subcontracting terror out to Hamas it allowed terror to continue and give Arafat a level of deniability.
As Daniel Pipes observed in 2001:
These facts tell us three things: Militant Islamic suicide killers are not born; they are manufactured. Like the four simultaneous suicide hijackings on Sept. 11, the four nearly simultaneous suicide attacks in Israel last week resulted from long-term planning by sophisticated organizations. They cannot operate clandestinely, but require the permission of a ruling authority, either the Taliban or the PA.
All of which leads to the conclusion that Sharon was right to hold Arafat responsible for the onslaught of suicide attacks on Israelis.
This, in turn, has an implication for the war on terrorism. No less than in Afghanistan, the American goal must be to shut down the suicide factory in the Palestinian areas.
And while it would be wonderfully convenient if Yasir Arafat could be delegated this task, the chances of his doing this are about as likely as the Taliban getting rid of Al-Qaeda – in other words, nil. Arafat has been in the business of murdering Israelis for nearly four decades; he does not deserve yet another chance.
Fourteen years ago, Israel did just as Goldberg recommended and paid a huge price for “strengthening the moderates.” Additionally, Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000. While that withdrawal was also unilateral, it was done under the auspices of and certified by the United Nations. Yet when Hezbollah violated the international border and kidnapped and killed three Israeli soldiers, the UN defended Hezbollah. Later the UN’s troops stood by and allowed Hezbollah to build up its arms to attack Israel leading to the 2006 war.
Does Goldberg really think that a deal with Fatah (then under Arafat’s successor Mahmoud Abbas) over Gaza would have changed the outcome of the withdrawal from Gaza? At best Abbas and Fatah would have gotten credit for a few months. But Abbas doesn’t command the respect that Arafat once did. If Hamas hadn’t won the elections, it would have bided its time (just as it did) until it was strong enough to oust Fatah. Maybe it would have taken a little longer than it did. But once Israel evacuated Gaza, the die was cast; regardless of whether Israel withdrew unilaterally or not.
One other thing to keep in mind is this. Barry Rubin has written:
In their hearts, these men–more than all the other dozens of Fatah and Palestinian Authority leaders–would be happy to make a two-state deal with Israel and might well stick to it. But in public, in pursuit of their ambitions, they know that any sign of moderation, compromise, or concession is suicidal, if not physically certainly in political terms.
Moderation in Palestinian politics is a relative term. And given the Palestinian political culture there is no advantage in pursuing moderation. So no, “strengthening the moderates” would not have made “disengagement” a success. Recent history shows that Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza was going to strengthen Hamas. When you cede territory to your enemies, you strengthen them. There’s no way to do it safely.
Crossposted on Soccer Dad.