Some background first.
From the The Winograd Commission report:
a. The Prime Minister bears supreme and comprehensive responsibility for the decisions of ‘his’ government and the operations of the army. His responsibility for the failures in the initial decisions concerning the war stem from both his position and from his behavior, as he initiated and led the decisions which were taken.
b. The Prime Minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one. Also, his decision was made without close study of the complex features of the Lebanon front or of the military, political and diplomatic options available to Israel. He made his decision without systematic consultation with others, especially outside the IDF, despite not having experience in external-political and military affairs. In addition, he did not adequately consider political and professional reservations presented to him before the fateful decisions of July 12th.
c. The Prime Minister is responsible for the fact that the goals of the campaign were not set out clearly and carefully, and that there was no serious discussion of the relationship between these goals and the authorized modes of military action. He made a personal contribution to the fact that the declared goals were over-ambitious and not feasible.
From the summary of “Releasing Terrorists: New victims pay the price”
* The Israeli Cabinet approved on August 17 the release of almost 200 Palestinian security prisoners as a “goodwill gesture” to Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas. The list includes several prisoners “with blood on their hands,” who, by definition, were involved in the murder of Israelis.
* According to an informal estimate by Israeli security bodies, about 50 percent of the terrorists freed for any reason whatsoever returned to the path of terror, either as perpetrator, planner, or accomplice. In the terror acts committed by these freed terrorists, hundreds of Israelis were murdered, and thousands were wounded.
* Israel freed 400 Palestinian prisoners and five other prisoners in return for Elhanan Tannenbaum, who was held captive by Hizbullah, and for the bodies of three soldiers kidnapped on Mount Dov. According to Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Chairman Tzahi Hanegbi, from the date of the deal on January 29, 2004, until April 17, 2007, those freed in the deal had murdered 35 Israelis.
Keep those two bits of information in mind when parsing Ethan Bronner’s Olmert Says Israel Should Pull Out of West Bank:
In an unusually frank and soul-searching interview granted after he resigned to fight corruption charges — he remains interim prime minister until a new government is sworn in — Mr. Olmert discarded longstanding Israeli defense doctrine and called for radical new thinking, in words that are sure to stir controversy as his expected successor, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, tries to build a coalition.
Let’s just say, as demonstrated above, this wouldn’t be the first time that Ehud Olmert has “discarded longstanding Israeli defense doctrine” and the earlier times cannot exactly be called resounding successes.
In the past Israel has, of course, believed in deterrence and no releasing prisoners with blood on their hands. These are doctrines that Olmert (and other Prime Ministers) has (have) discarded and they haven’t made Israel any more secure or brought it closer to peace. I suppose you can package it as “radical new thinking” but that’s not the same thing as it being a good idea.
Dion Nissenbaum thinks that Olmert’s right but that it’s too late and that he should have made this speech last year.
Yes, a year after degrading Israel’s deterrence and with the results of the withdrawal from Gaza flying into Sderot on a regular basis, the Israeli public would have been quite receptive to the idea of more withdrawals.
Tim McGirk is similarly cynical.
But for all those who think that Olmert’s thinking is in any way new, how does it differ from the past 15 years since the Oslo accords were signed? Since then even Binyamin Netanyahu ceded land to the Palestinians. As I’ve written before, what’s now the mainstream Right for Israel, is roughly where Israel’s Left was twenty years ago. Netanyahu, if he’s elected, isn’t going to recapture Gaza – he might bring the fight to Hamas – but no Israelis will be staying there. And Netanyahu isn’t likely to reverse any facts on the ground in Judea and Samaria either. He may not be willing to cede as much land to the Palestinians, but that’s a far cry from saying that he’d be making the “occupation” irreversible.
And it takes a real naif – or knave – like McGirk or Nissenbaum to heap sarcastic praise on Olmert for saying the right thing too late, when in fact it is the Palestinians who haven’t changed over the past fifteen (or twenty) years. As Jonathan Spyer recently wrote after outlining the phony Palestinian efforts to codify their “commitment” to a two-state solution:
The advocates of the one-state solution then maintain that since Israel has chosen to sabotage the possibility of partition, there is no longer any possibility for the realization of this, and since Israeli settlement activity has de facto created a single entity west of the Jordan River, the appropriate–or perhaps sole possible–response of the Palestinian national movement is to accept this fait accompli and to begin a campaign for integration of the entire population of this area into a single state framework. This case has been made in myriad publications in a variety of languages over the previous half decade.[25] It is hard to find mention of the fact that this position was in fact the PLO’s official stance until 1988. Rather, the impression given is that after a long period of commitment to partition, the Palestinians and the international community must now abandon this position, because Israel’s actions have made it an impossibility.
More generally Barry Rubin writes that he premise of Olmert and his admirers have it all wrong:
The reality is that the Palestinians–albeit living off large-scale, though poorly spent, global subsidies–for whom time is an enemy. They face bad conditions; Fatah’s decline continues; the chance to have their own state slips away because their leadership pushes it away. Arab regimes face Islamist challenges that may be defeated but waste resources and stunt their progress. The chance for democracy, moderation, and stability has been lost for another generation.
Peace is preferable but much of what makes it so is that it must be a good peace, one that makes things better and is sustainable. Peace is possible only when the other side wants it. Today’s peace process mania is like a cartoon character whose legs windmill in a blur but which never advances.
But whether or not Olmert is correct, his statement causes mischief.
The Yedioth Ahronoth wrote that Olmert’s comments would complicate Livni’s job even before she takes over.
“He places on the doorstep of his successor a foreign policy doctrine, the likes of which has never been spoken by an incumbent prime minister,” commented his interviewers.
It should be no surprise that the ineffectual Mahmoud Abbas intends to pocket this for future negotiations.
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said he hopes the statements made by Prime Minster Ehud Olmert regarding sovereignty over Jerusalem, the territories and the Golan Heights will serve as a “deposit” for the next government.
And when lame duck Ehud Barak negotiated with Yasser Arafat, “under the gun” of the “Aqsa intifada” in early 2001, the Palestinians accepted all of his concessions as a starting point for future negotiations. Another example of defense doctrine disregarded, at great cost to Israel.
Ehud Olmert can’t help learning the the wrong lessons.
See also Daled Amos, My Right Word, Israel Matzav and Meryl.
Crossposted on Soccer Dad.