Mitchell, who in January boasted that a peace deal could be done within two years, said he hoped the indirect talks would lead to direct negotiations as soon as possible and encouraged the parties “to refrain from any statements or actions which may inflame tensions or prejudice the outcome of these talks.”

Just such a thing happened Monday when Israel announced construction of 112 new housing units in the West Bank settlement of Beitar Ilit. The administration had pushed hard — but unsuccessfully — last year for a complete freeze on settlements, and Israel’s new announcement came as Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas was meeting with Mitchell.

Now if Beitar Illit will remain part of Israel, why would building 112 houses there “inflame tensions?” I would think that orchestrating riots and honoring a terrorist are more obvious statements of contempt for peace.

In a similar vein we see in a Washington Post editorial:

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has resisted direct negotiations partly out of a conviction that Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu is intransigent. And Mr. Netanyahu regularly offers evidence that this is so. He recently appeared to rule out Israeli withdrawal from the Jordan Valley, which previous Israeli governments have conceded to a future Palestinian state, and he allowed new Jewish settlement construction to proceed in the West Bank despite the “freeze” he announced several months ago. Mr. Abbas, for his part, already rejected a far-reaching peace offer from Mr. Netanyahu’s predecessor.

The New York Times though, clarifies something:

Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, supports two states but wants the Palestinian side to be demilitarized and to accept an Israeli military presence on its future eastern border to prevent the import of weapons and rockets that could be aimed at Israel’s population centers.

The Israeli presence in the Jordan Valley, then, is a precaution. After being burned time and again by the Palestinians after withdrawing from territory, Netanyahu talks about protecting his country from that happening again. That’s a sign of intransigence?

But more generally that paragraph is disturbing. To defend Abbas claims that Netanyahu is being “intransigent” is dishonest. The editorial itself acknowledges that Abbas “…already rejected a far-reaching peace offer from Mr. Netanyahu’s predecessor.” That, to me, is the definition of intransigence. Yet somehow the adjective, “intransigent” in its various forms somehow only describes Israeli leaders.

The Post’s editors can lament that Netanyahu isn’t as generous as his predecessors. But the reason there is no peace that Abbas and Arafat before him rejected generous offers. If they are demanding that Netanyahu accept deals that were previously rejected by the other side they are in fact rewarding intransigence, not advocating for peace.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

After a long career supporting Israeli settlements in occupied land and rejecting Palestinian statehood, Mr. Netanyahu said last June that he accepted the two-state idea. Three weeks ago, he imposed a 10-month freeze on building Jewish housing in the West Bank, something no Israeli leader had done before. Settlers are outraged, and Mr. Netanyahu is facing a rebellion in his party. Together with his removal of many West Bank checkpoints and barriers to Palestinian movement and economic growth, these steps went well beyond what many ever expected of him.

Yet skepticism would be a polite way of describing the reaction of the Palestinians and much of the world, who view his steps as either too little too late or a ruse aimed at buying time to pursue his real agenda.

Interestingly, the article never mentions that the first time Netanyahu was Prime Minister he withdrew Israeli forces from most of Hebron. (By the way, the world acquiesced to the Arab conquest of Hebron by force largely as a consequence of the pogrom in 1929.)

Still Bronner gets to the heart of the problem:

But the Palestinians have concluded that they can get further by appealing to international bodies than by returning to talks with this Israeli government. Mr. Abbas repeated his rejection of talks without a full settlement freeze at a meeting of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s Central Council on Tuesday. Palestinian politics are also deeply divided not only between Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank but also within each group.

This, of course, leads to a question, why is there a need for such an article?

Israel hasn’t made peace with the Palestinians regardless of who the Israeli Prime Minister had been.

Consider that the Clinton administration was constantly at odds with Netanyahu during his first stint as Prime Minister. The administration must have been thrilled when Ehud Barak was elected. But the Camp David summit didn’t work out the way they’d planned and two months later Arafat lauched the “Al Aqsa Intifada.” And then:

On December 23, 2000, the United States proposed the creation of a “non-militarized” Palestinian state on 95 percent of the West Bank, plus three percent more traded to it by Israel, plus all of the Gaza Strip, with its capital in east Jerusalem. In other words, this would have been equivalent to about 99 percent of the pre-1967 territory then ruled by Egypt and Jordan.

Israel would have annexed small areas including three areas with large populations of Jewish settlers: Gush Etzion, Ma’aleh Adumim, and Ariel. All of east Jerusalem would have become Palestinian–including the al-Aqsa Mosque–except for post-1967 Jewish neighborhoods, the Western Wall, and the Jewish Quarter. Israel would have gotten an existing access road—which is about ten feet wide—to the quarter. There would be an international observer force in the Jordan Valley, along the Palestinian-Jordan border, to see that heavy arms or foreign soldiers were not being smuggled into Palestine.

In addition, though this was not spelled out in the specific proposal, the level of aid and compensation to the Palestinians then being talked about by the United States was at around $21 billion.

On December 28, 2000, the Israeli government approved of the offer with only one condition: that the Palestinians accept it, too. For the record, I supported that plan, too.

Yasir Arafat turned it down.

More recently, in the waning days of his tenure as Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert made an offer to Mahmoud Abbas. Abbas too turned it down. For all the talk we hear of the urgency of a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Palestinians seem not to feel much urgency.

So then the question isn’t really whether or not, or how much Netanyahu has changed, it doesn’t make a difference. The question is when will the Palestinians change.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

But there are potential pitfalls. What if President Obama has concluded that he can live with a nuclear Iran? What if the freeze instead of building confidence, actually encourages terror? And finally when the ten months are up, will Israel see (American) pressure to maintain the freeze?

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

If you read only the mainstream media reports on Israel, you come away thinking that it is the Israelis who are the obstacles to peace, and that it is the Palestinians who are the ones who are willing to make concessions to create a Palestinian state.

That is, until you actually read what the leaders of the two nations are actually saying.

It’s a point that’s discussed in today’s Wall Street Journal, A Palestinian choice, which concludes:

Responding to Mr. Netanyahu’s speech, White House press secretary Robert Gibbs called it an “important step forward,” but offered little more than that. The Administration could help matters more by providing the Israelis with greater assurances that they won’t simultaneously demand further Israeli concessions while doing nothing serious to stop Iran — a leading patron of Hamas — from getting nuclear weapons. A Palestinian state poses enough challenges to Israeli security without it being an atomic spearpoint.

As for the Palestinians, for too long they have practiced a kind of fantasy politics, in which all right was on their side, concession was dishonor, and mistakes never had consequences. It hasn’t earned them much. Mr. Netanyahu’s speech now offers them the choice between fantasy and statehood. Judging from early reactions, they’re choosing wrongly again.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

But beyond the idea of a state, he seemed to offer little room for compromise or negotiation.
…
“Benjamin Netanyahu spoke about negotiations, but left us with nothing to negotiate as he systematically took nearly every permanent status issue off the table,” Saeb Erekat, the Palestinian negotiator, said in a statement. “Nor did he accept a Palestinian state. Instead, he announced a series of conditions and qualifications that render a viable, independent and sovereign Palestinian state impossible.”

Now between these two paragraphs there were few more reported.

He referred repeatedly to the West Bank, the territory presumed to comprise the bulk of a future Palestinian state, by its biblical name of Judea and Samaria, declaring it “the land of our forefathers.”

Mr. Netanyahu made no mention of existing frameworks for negotiations, like the American-backed 2003 peace plan known as the road map.

He did not address the geographical area a Palestinian state might cover, and he said that the Palestinian refugee problem must be resolved outside Israel’s borders, negating the Palestinian demand for a right of return for refugees of the 1948 war and for their millions of descendants.

He insisted that Jerusalem remain united as the Israeli capital. The Palestinians demand the eastern part of the city as a future capital.

(emphases mine)

Notice that Palestinian demands are reported as a matter of course. So when Erakat mopes that Netanyahu has left it so that there’s “nothing to negotiate” he’s really saying “Netanyahu rejected our unconditional demands.”

Also note the last word of Erakat’s quote, “impossible.” In many ways Palestinian nationalism is the antithesis of Zionism. Palestinian nationalism has fundamentally been about denying (and, where possible, destroying) Jewish nationhood.

But here’s something else, Zionism has always had a “can do” ethos. Herzl famously said, “Im Tirtzu, Ein Zeh Agada” or (as it is commonly translated) “If you will it, it is not a dream.” But Palestinian nationalism, has always been “can’t do.” We can’t fight terror, We can’t change our charter. We can’t concede any part of Jerusalem.

It’s always been we can’t do it, we need someone else to do it for us. So the Palestinians have become the biggest per capita recipients of foreign aid and still don’t have a state to show for all of their terrorism and diplomatic maneuvering. Because instead of having a positive national idea, the Palestinians have had a negative one.

Howard Schneider’s dispatch in the Washington Post, Netanyahu backs 2 state goal suffers from that same perspective.

But in a prime-time address delivered at Bar-Ilan University near Tel Aviv, he attached a weighty list of conditions dictated by his personal beliefs and by the need to satisfy his right-leaning coalition in the Israeli parliament: The Palestinian state would have to be demilitarized, with international guarantees that it remain so; it would have to cede control of its airspace to Israel; and it could be created only if the Palestinians recognize Israel as the Jewish homeland.

Netanyahu’s speech did a good job of providing a historical context to the conflict in the Middle East. In addition, it was excellent summary of Israel’s political consensus. Instead Schneider snidely refers to the as Netanyahu’s “personal beliefs” and as a sop to his “right-leaning coalition.” (President Obama’s speech in Cairo, on the other hand was an ahistorical statement of his personal beliefs and a sop to the many left wing groups who supported his election.) As with Kershner, Schneider treats Palestinian demands as sacrosanct; Israeli demands as unreasonable.

Though Netanyahu’s speech could certainly be viewed as a rebuke to President Obama, President Obama at least publicly was gracious in h is response. I have no idea if Netanyahu made the President rethink his position regarding the Middle East. Unfortunately, it appears that the media is still stuck in their old ways of thinking.

UPDATE: In his preview of PM Netanyahu’s speech, Schneider wrote:

But Netanyahu’s speech will also try to respond more directly to Obama’s effort in Cairo to “reset” U.S. relations with the Arab and Muslim world. While the speech was credited in Israel for reaffirming the alliance between the two countries and for strong language about Holocaust denial, Israeli analysts said that it also seemed to interpret key issues from an Arab perspective.

It associated Israel’s creation directly with the Holocaust, for example, rather than acknowledging the long-standing Zionist efforts to provide a Jewish homeland. It also dated the problems of Palestinians to Israel’s creation in 1948 without mentioning Arab rejection of a proposed partition plan and other events that Israelis regard as fundamental to the conflict.

(emphasis mine)

It wasn’t “Israeli analysts” who “seemed to interpret” President Obama’s speech from an Arab perspective. The Washington Post reported that that was the precisely the goal of President Obama. And taken together with the Post’s reporting of the Jewish anti-Israel influences who were important to President Obama, it’s very clear that the need for the Israeli leader to address the historical aspect of Zionism and force the President to speak honestly about that. Again, it’s not clear that it will work, but Netanyahu had no choice but to lay out Israel’s case unapologetically.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

AFP reports, Israel’s Barak visits US in bid to heal rift

Barak’s visit comes just two weeks after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held his first meeting with Obama in Washington, revealing deep divisions over ways to move forwards towards Middle East peace.

How does Minister of Defense, Barak’s trip so soon after Netanyahu’s show “deep division?” I suspect that if Barak hadn’t followed up so quickly after Netanyahu’s visit, no doubt that also would have been reported as a sign of a “deep division.”

The hawkish premier sparked international criticism over his repeated refusal to endorse the creation of a Palestinian state, a bedrock principle of international peacemaking efforts over the past two decades.

And if Netanyahu did, or did not, so what? Mahmoud Abbas has refused to acknowledge a few things too.

Consider for a moment that two of Abbas’s three no’s – his refusal to amend the Arab peace plan and vocal opposition to Israel’s Jewish character – can be collapsed into one: an insistence on Palestinians’ “right of return” to Israel proper. This is a stipulation that no Israeli government would ever accept, while Obama rejected the “right of return” explicitly as “not an option” during his presidential campaign.

Why Netanyahu’s failure to adhere to the peace processors playbook is any more inimical than Abbas’s is unclear. I would point out that even by the peace processors reckoning Netanyahu has done more to support the peace process than Abbas.

Helene Cooper of the New York Times – whose idea of an expert is Chas Freeman or Ali Abunimah weighs in today with U.S. Weighs Tactics on Israeli Settlement:

Still, talk of even symbolic actions that would publicly show the United States’ ire with Israel, its longtime ally, would be a sharp departure from the previous administration, which limited its distaste with Israel’s settlement expansions to carefully worded diplomatic statements that called them “unhelpful.”

Mr. Obama is to give a much-anticipated speech to the Muslim world from Egypt on Thursday. “There are things that could get the attention of the Israeli public,” a senior administration official said, touching on the widespread belief within the administration that any Israeli prime minister risks political peril if the Israeli electorate views him as endangering the country’s relationship with the United States.

But, the official added, “Israel is a critical United States ally, and no one in this administration expects that not to continue.” He spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the issue publicly.

Understand what’s going on here. Any sort of rebuke of Israel, is something that Cooper is rooting for. I believe that her anonymous official who feeds her the quote that she seeks, is misreading Israel’s electorate. This isn’t a right wing government by any stretch of the imagination. (I don’t believe that Netanyahu’s government from 1996 – 1999 was far to the right either, but this one is even less so.) My guess is that the Israeli electorate feels that the Obama administration is unfairly pressuring Israel while more serious crises are brewing, that the electorate will support the government. Additionally, the peace process is not new anymore,. Israelis know that the peace process has netted them Hamastan in Gaza, a mostly ineffective and corrupt Fatah government in the cities of Judea and Samaria and a strengthened Hezbollah. Assuming as Abbas apparently does, that the Palestinians need not deal with Netanyahu because his conflict with the Obama administration will lead to his defeat in a future election seems wishful thinking. Yet it seems that that is exactly what Cooper is wishing for.

I’m not going to argue that the Obama-Netanyahu relationship will be as close as the Bush-Sharon relationship. I’m not going to argue that the U.S. Israel relationship will be as strong during President Obama’s term in office, because it won’t. (Even if Livni were PM, this would be true.) However I’m not convinced that the conflict will be as severe as Netanyahu’s many critics in the media want it to be.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

During meetings with congressional leaders this week, Netanyahu was stunned by the “harsh and unequivocal statements” with which lawmakers complained about the settlements, according to an account in the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth. The newspaper said that although the prime minister tried to highlight the threat of Iran in his talks, lawmakers instead returned repeatedly to the issue of settlements, leading his entourage to conclude that the message had been coordinated with the Obama administration.

That’s a reasonable conclusion, though I’m surprised it wasn’t reported last week. Regardless, Israel was relying on assurances from the now no-longer-in-power Bush administration:

Netanyahu spokesman Mark Regev said there are no plans for a full settlement freeze. “The issue of settlements is a final status issue, and until there are final status arrangements, it would not be fair to kill normal life inside existing communities,” he said.

Regev said the Israeli government is relying on “understandings” between former president George W. Bush and former prime minister Ariel Sharon that some of the larger settlements in the occupied West Bank would ultimately become part of Israel, codified in a letter that Bush gave to Sharon in 2004. In an interview with The Washington Post last year, Sharon aide Dov Weissglas said that in 2005, when Sharon was poised to remove settlers from Gaza, the Bush administration arrived at a secret agreement — not disclosed to the Palestinians — that Israel could add homes in settlements it expected to keep, as long as the construction was dictated by market demand, not subsidies.

Elliott Abrams, a former deputy national security adviser who negotiated the arrangement with Weissglas, confirmed the deal in an interview last week. “At the time of the Gaza withdrawal, there were lengthy discussions about how settlement activity might be constrained, and in fact it was constrained in the later part of the Sharon years and the Olmert years in accordance with the ideas that were discussed,” he said. “There was something of an understanding realized on these questions, but it was never a written agreement.”

But according to the New York Times it would appear that the Obama administration has no interest in continuing an understanding – albeit and unwritten one – that was extended by the previous administration:

Speaking of President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said, “He wants to see a stop to settlements — not some settlements, not outposts, not ‘natural growth’ exceptions.” Talking to reporters after a meeting with the Egyptian foreign minister, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, she said: “That is our position. That is what we have communicated very clearly.”

Mrs. Clinton’s remarks, the administration’s strongest to date on the matter, came as an Israeli official said Wednesday that the Israeli government wanted to reach an understanding with the Obama administration that would allow some new construction in West Bank settlements.

The Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, is expected to focus on the issue of settlement expansion when he meets with Mr. Obama on Thursday in Washington. Mr. Abbas and other Palestinian leaders have said repeatedly that they see no point in resuming stalled peace negotiations without an absolute settlement freeze.

Jonathan Tobin asks:

Does this leak of a plea by the Netanyahu government show that Jerusalem believes the Obama administration will actually unveil a new peace plan that will explicitly prohibit the construction of a house or add-on anywhere over the green line?

The question of settlement growth has been something of a red herring for years. Israel isn’t building new settlements and hasn’t since the 1990s. But unless the United States is going to adopt a position that every single one of these Jewish communities must be held in a choke hold — the better to ease them out of existence — natural growth must be allowed.

But here’s the rub:

George W. Bush’s June 2004 statement in which he explicitly supported the creation of an independent Palestinian state (albeit one that would not be ruled by supporters of terror and corrupt actors, something that pretty much renders such a state impossible under the existing circumstances) also said that any peace agreement must take into account the changes that have occurred on the ground since 1967. In other words, the large Jewish suburbs on the outskirts of Jerusalem and elsewhere close to the old border were not going to be handed over to the Palestinians under any circumstances. Then, as now, most Israelis would be willing to give up outlying settlements but now the clusters close to the old green line are where most of the “settlers” live. Ariel Sharon paid in hard diplomatic currency for this American statement but his successors soon discovered that the purchase was worthless.

Palestinian officials may claim that they won’t engage in peace talks without a complete “settlement” freeze, but that’s hardly the main obstacle to peace.

The Palestinian factions can’t even put on a unified front – and even if they can, there’s no guarantee that they’ll adopt a “moderate” position – and their moderate leader refuses to endorse a Jewish state (which would be a prerequisite for accepting a “two state solution.”)

And is the United States going to ignore the very real incitement that still comes from the Palestinians on a regular basis?

To see the perfect symbol of the problem with U.S. Middle East policy you need look no further. No one in the region takes America too seriously because it does not follow up and enforce its positions. The PA knows that it can do what it wants and pay no price. There is no–repeat no–real pressure on it to stop incitement, educate its people for peace, make any real compromise or concession. Instead, this “moderate” institution is continuing to teach its children that being a terrorist is the highest calling and due the greatest honor.

Just like Hamas does.

The Western media also has no interest in this issue either despite energetically seeking out any issue on which Israel can be criticized, even often when such things are made up and prove to have no basis in reality.

We have seen, and will see, the administration devote huge efforts to stopping settlers from adding a room onto an existing apartment. Will it devote any effort at all to turning the PA in the direction of peace or even enforcing U.S. law?

So with Iran about to develop nuclear weapons, Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah poised to gain power in Lebanon and North Korea threatening to abrogate its ceasefire with South Korea, the one area of foreign policy where President Obama has chosen to take a stand is where Israel can build. (Tobin pointed out that this would be an issue even if Tzippi Livni had been elected!) I guess I was wrong to dismiss reports of a clash coming between Obama and Netanyahu.

Netanyahu needs to be careful. He cannot allow himself to be bullied. He has a stronger base of support at home than he had thirteen years ago. He must make the case that ceding territory to hostiles is a recipe for disaster not peace and that the United States and the world has much bigger worries than where Jews live. It won’t be easy, but that’s his job.

Related please see I*Consult, Elder of Ziyon, Israel Matzav, Israelly Cool, Daled Amos, My Right Word and The Muqata.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

For one thing it appears that apart from Secretary of State Clinton’s highly inappropriate remarks an Al Jazeera, PM Netanyahu is discussing what is meant by “settlement freeze” with the administration.

For instance, Israel has been working on the assumption that, with tacit agreement from the US, it may build inside the lines of existing settlements in the large settlement blocs that it believes it will retain under any future diplomatic agreement….The settlement issue was expected to be one of the top ones dealt with in working groups that have been set up between the US and Israel to discuss a wide range of topics. Israeli sources said work in these groups had already started.”

This, of course, will never be enough for the Arab world and their cheerleaders. But more importantly, it appears that there will be a joint Israeli-American monitoring group to judge how successful the administration’s outreach to Iran has been. Perhaps the concern most Americans have regarding Iran acquiring nuclear weapons is the reason the administration is apparently taking Israel’s concerns seriously.

It would appear, according to these reports that despite their differences, President Obama and PM Netanyahu have decided to work together.

Also see here.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

But Mr. Obama did not get his settlement freeze. In fact, Mr. Netanyahu told him it would be politically difficult for him to halt the construction of settlements. That is a hurdle to the administration’s broader peace objectives because Israel’s Arab neighbors have characterized a freeze as a precondition for them to establish normal relations.

Nor did Mr. Obama get much from Mr. Netanyahu on a peace plan beyond his promise to make good on a few commitments that Israel had already agreed to on the “road map,” an outline of peace steps that has not gotten either Palestinians or Israelis any closer to peace since President George W. Bush first announced it in 2003.

Mr. Netanyahu did agree to resume talks with Palestinians without preconditions. But he would not explicitly endorse the notion of an eventual Palestinian state, something his predecessor, Ehud Olmert, had already done.

“This is why I’m asking the question, did our president get suckered?” said Martin S. Indyk, a former United States ambassador to Israel and director of the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution. “We don’t know the answer yet, but unless he got something more from Bibi in that meeting than they’re telling us, that question can be asked.”

Indyk, of course, as Ambassador to Israel was very much into scoring points against Netanyahu when he served in that post, and it got the Clinton administration Ehud Barak, Camp David and the Aqsa Intifada.

But if the President didn’t get his “settlement freeze, why is that possibly a loss for President Oama? Despite its being touted as a necessary precondition for the Arab world to drop their official antisemitism, there’s no guarantee it would work.

Still Secretary of State Clinton announced that a “settlement freeze” is an American demand to terror TV channel Al Jazeera.

Still no amount of pressure will create a Palestinian State if that isn’t the goal of the Palestinians (via memeorandum).

Over and over, the pattern has been repeated. Following its stunning victory in the 1967 Six Day War, Israel offered to exchange the land it had won for permanent peace with its neighbors. From their summit in Khartoum came the Arabs’ notorious response: “No peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel.”

At Camp David in 2000, Ehud Barak offered the Palestinians virtually everything they claimed to be seeking – a sovereign state with its capital in East Jerusalem, 97 percent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, tens of billions of dollars in “compensation” for the plight of Palestinian refugees. Yasser Arafat refused the offer, and launched the bloodiest wave of terrorism in Israel’s history.

To this day, the charters of Hamas and Fatah, the two main Palestinian factions, call for Israel’s liquidation. “The whole world” may want peace and a Palestinian state, but the Palestinians want something very different. Until that changes, there is no two-state solution.

And as long as the Palestinians remain uncommitted to peaceful coexistence no amount of pressure on Israel will bring peace to the Middle East.

So after President Obama meets with Abu Mazen will we see scorecards about who “won” the encounter? Or whether Abu Mazen will endorse the concept of a Jewish state enthusiastically?

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

To give Israel some quick tangible benefits, the United States wants the Arabs to begin normalizing relations with the Jewish state. Jordan’s King Abdullah describes this promise of recognition by the Arab League nations as a “23-state solution.”

The key to this front-loading strategy is Saudi Arabia. But the Saudis warn privately that they won’t normalize anything unless Israel makes some dramatic moves — such as freezing settlements in the occupied West Bank — that demonstrate its commitment to the 2003 “road map” for peace.

To break this logjam, the Obama administration appears ready to lean hard on Netanyahu. Obama has a range of options, starting with criticism of Israel for failing to meet the road map conditions and escalating to tougher measures.

Aside from the irony of a repressive monarchy deciding when Israel is moral enough to speak to, the problem with Ignatius’s formulation is that Israel (and presumably the United States) has/have a much different view of what constitute “settlements” than what the Saudis and the Arab League do. If President Obama adopts the Saudi definition, that would constitute a major change in American policy, but if he doesn’t the Saudis will still have their pretext for doing nothing.

It’s interesting that for seven years the Saudis have had their “peace plan” on the table, and only now someone’s asking them for a down payment to show their good faith. Of course if Ignatius is correct, the Saudis are still demanding something tangible and permanent from Israel even before they grant Israel the courtesy of acknowledging its existence.

(Barry Rubin doesn’t think that the difference between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu are so far apart.

On Israel’s side he said settlements have to be stopped–though there are no new settlements or expanding of settlements in territorial terms, a point that often is forgotten. There has to be reconstruction of Gaza along with an end to rocket attacks, which means a loosening of border controls.

This is not so difficult for Israel to accomplish: close down some outposts, remove new settlement efforts, and revise the border controls on Gaza. These are all things Netanyahu is quite prepared to do to maintain good relations with the United States.

I don’t think that changing the border controls on Gaza is without risk.)

It’s hard to read Ignatius without getting the impression that he does want the United States to pressure Israel, regardless of consequences.

Netanyahu knew Obama was a rare politician when they first met in March 2007. Back then, nobody was giving the Illinois senator much of a chance, but the Likud leader told his aides: “I think this is the next president of the United States.” Now Netanyahu faces the full force of the Obama political phenomenon — a president who feels politically secure enough to ignore the usual rules of the U.S.-Israel relationship and push hard for what he thinks is right.

Of course, just because President Obama (and David Ignatius) thinks it’s right, doesn’t make it so. Absent any serious movement on the part of the Palestinians or the Arab world in general, there will be no Middle East peace, no matter how hard Obama leans on Bibi.

The Washington Post, editorially, also advocates the “pressure Israel” approach to Middle East peacemaking:

It may be that a mere show of U.S. sleeve-rolling on the peace process, along with pro forma Israeli cooperation, will provide adequate cover for Arab states that are eager to join in an anti-Iranian alliance. That is what Mr. Netanyahu is calculating. If Mr. Obama genuinely intends to press for an early Israeli-Palestinian settlement, he will have to push U.S.-Israeli relations into a red zone of tension for the first time in many years. He would do well to make clear to Israeli voters that any government that will not explicitly embrace Palestinian statehood or an end to settlements will not have smooth relations with Washington. Even if that does not lead to a Middle East peace, it could help lay the groundwork for one in the future.

This begs the questions:

And if Israel were to take risks and make concessions will they be reciprocated? And if the United States and Europe makes promises to Israel will they be kept?

After all, the 1990s’ peace process taught Israelis the answer was “no” on both counts.

This is Israel’s central point: peace, yes, but only a real, lasting, and stable situation which makes things better rather than worse.

But is it Israeli voters and an Israeli government that need to get the message? Certainly over the past sixteen years, they’ve gotten a much different message, that concessions will be pocketed with no reciprocation and that moves for peace are utilized for terror.

Of course both Ignatius and the editors of the Post accept the flawed premise that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at the center of the instability in the Middle East and that, therefore, quick action is needed. The problem with this reasoning is:

what if Israeli-Palestinian peace will take many years to accomplish, but the Iranian nuclear bomb will only take a year or two to accomplish? Obama essentially proposes that America will race the Iranians — our peace process versus their nuclear program. Does anyone wonder who will win?

At best Israeli-Arab peace is still a long term process. Even if American pressure on Israel brings the desired concessions from Israel, there won’t be a final peace between Israel and the Palestinians in the next four years. On the other hand the Iranian threat will continue to grow and become more serious. If those rooting for an American-Israeli confrontation get their wish, chances peace will become even more remote as Arab intransigence and Iranian power grow.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.