Binyamin Netanyahu « Yourish.com

06/18/2009

It’s not in Israel’s hands

Filed under: Israel, palestinian politics — Tags: Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 10:00 am

Meryl writes The unnoticed intransigence vs. the supposed intransigence, which analyzes a recent AP report about the Middle East. Meryl observes:

If you read only the mainstream media reports on Israel, you come away thinking that it is the Israelis who are the obstacles to peace, and that it is the Palestinians who are the ones who are willing to make concessions to create a Palestinian state.

That is, until you actually read what the leaders of the two nations are actually saying.

It’s a point that’s discussed in today’s Wall Street Journal, A Palestinian choice, which concludes:

Responding to Mr. Netanyahu’s speech, White House press secretary Robert Gibbs called it an “important step forward,” but offered little more than that. The Administration could help matters more by providing the Israelis with greater assurances that they won’t simultaneously demand further Israeli concessions while doing nothing serious to stop Iran — a leading patron of Hamas — from getting nuclear weapons. A Palestinian state poses enough challenges to Israeli security without it being an atomic spearpoint.

As for the Palestinians, for too long they have practiced a kind of fantasy politics, in which all right was on their side, concession was dishonor, and mistakes never had consequences. It hasn’t earned them much. Mr. Netanyahu’s speech now offers them the choice between fantasy and statehood. Judging from early reactions, they’re choosing wrongly again.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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06/15/2009

If you do it for us, we don’t have to

Filed under: Israel, palestinian politics — Tags: Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 11:00 am

Isabel Kershner reports Netanyahu backs Palestinian state with caveats:

But beyond the idea of a state, he seemed to offer little room for compromise or negotiation.
…
“Benjamin Netanyahu spoke about negotiations, but left us with nothing to negotiate as he systematically took nearly every permanent status issue off the table,” Saeb Erekat, the Palestinian negotiator, said in a statement. “Nor did he accept a Palestinian state. Instead, he announced a series of conditions and qualifications that render a viable, independent and sovereign Palestinian state impossible.”

Now between these two paragraphs there were few more reported.

He referred repeatedly to the West Bank, the territory presumed to comprise the bulk of a future Palestinian state, by its biblical name of Judea and Samaria, declaring it “the land of our forefathers.”

Mr. Netanyahu made no mention of existing frameworks for negotiations, like the American-backed 2003 peace plan known as the road map.

He did not address the geographical area a Palestinian state might cover, and he said that the Palestinian refugee problem must be resolved outside Israel’s borders, negating the Palestinian demand for a right of return for refugees of the 1948 war and for their millions of descendants.

He insisted that Jerusalem remain united as the Israeli capital. The Palestinians demand the eastern part of the city as a future capital.

(emphases mine)

Notice that Palestinian demands are reported as a matter of course. So when Erakat mopes that Netanyahu has left it so that there’s “nothing to negotiate” he’s really saying “Netanyahu rejected our unconditional demands.”

Also note the last word of Erakat’s quote, “impossible.” In many ways Palestinian nationalism is the antithesis of Zionism. Palestinian nationalism has fundamentally been about denying (and, where possible, destroying) Jewish nationhood.

But here’s something else, Zionism has always had a “can do” ethos. Herzl famously said, “Im Tirtzu, Ein Zeh Agada” or (as it is commonly translated) “If you will it, it is not a dream.” But Palestinian nationalism, has always been “can’t do.” We can’t fight terror, We can’t change our charter. We can’t concede any part of Jerusalem.

It’s always been we can’t do it, we need someone else to do it for us. So the Palestinians have become the biggest per capita recipients of foreign aid and still don’t have a state to show for all of their terrorism and diplomatic maneuvering. Because instead of having a positive national idea, the Palestinians have had a negative one.

Howard Schneider’s dispatch in the Washington Post, Netanyahu backs 2 state goal suffers from that same perspective.

But in a prime-time address delivered at Bar-Ilan University near Tel Aviv, he attached a weighty list of conditions dictated by his personal beliefs and by the need to satisfy his right-leaning coalition in the Israeli parliament: The Palestinian state would have to be demilitarized, with international guarantees that it remain so; it would have to cede control of its airspace to Israel; and it could be created only if the Palestinians recognize Israel as the Jewish homeland.

Netanyahu’s speech did a good job of providing a historical context to the conflict in the Middle East. In addition, it was excellent summary of Israel’s political consensus. Instead Schneider snidely refers to the as Netanyahu’s “personal beliefs” and as a sop to his “right-leaning coalition.” (President Obama’s speech in Cairo, on the other hand was an ahistorical statement of his personal beliefs and a sop to the many left wing groups who supported his election.) As with Kershner, Schneider treats Palestinian demands as sacrosanct; Israeli demands as unreasonable.

Though Netanyahu’s speech could certainly be viewed as a rebuke to President Obama, President Obama at least publicly was gracious in h is response. I have no idea if Netanyahu made the President rethink his position regarding the Middle East. Unfortunately, it appears that the media is still stuck in their old ways of thinking.

UPDATE: In his preview of PM Netanyahu’s speech, Schneider wrote:

But Netanyahu’s speech will also try to respond more directly to Obama’s effort in Cairo to “reset” U.S. relations with the Arab and Muslim world. While the speech was credited in Israel for reaffirming the alliance between the two countries and for strong language about Holocaust denial, Israeli analysts said that it also seemed to interpret key issues from an Arab perspective.

It associated Israel’s creation directly with the Holocaust, for example, rather than acknowledging the long-standing Zionist efforts to provide a Jewish homeland. It also dated the problems of Palestinians to Israel’s creation in 1948 without mentioning Arab rejection of a proposed partition plan and other events that Israelis regard as fundamental to the conflict.

(emphasis mine)

It wasn’t “Israeli analysts” who “seemed to interpret” President Obama’s speech from an Arab perspective. The Washington Post reported that that was the precisely the goal of President Obama. And taken together with the Post’s reporting of the Jewish anti-Israel influences who were important to President Obama, it’s very clear that the need for the Israeli leader to address the historical aspect of Zionism and force the President to speak honestly about that. Again, it’s not clear that it will work, but Netanyahu had no choice but to lay out Israel’s case unapologetically.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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06/01/2009

The media’s anti-bibi brigades

Filed under: Israel, Israel Derangement Syndrome, Media Bias — Tags: Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 11:00 am

One aspect of reporting on ties between Israel and the United States is to look for exaggerations in the extent of the rift between the two countries. We will see a lot of this in the coming years as journalists do all they can to fan the flames of discontent with Israel. It won’t matter if there are more serious crises going on, there will be journalistic push to magnify the divisions between the two allies.

AFP reports, Israel’s Barak visits US in bid to heal rift

Barak’s visit comes just two weeks after Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held his first meeting with Obama in Washington, revealing deep divisions over ways to move forwards towards Middle East peace.

How does Minister of Defense, Barak’s trip so soon after Netanyahu’s show “deep division?” I suspect that if Barak hadn’t followed up so quickly after Netanyahu’s visit, no doubt that also would have been reported as a sign of a “deep division.”

The hawkish premier sparked international criticism over his repeated refusal to endorse the creation of a Palestinian state, a bedrock principle of international peacemaking efforts over the past two decades.

And if Netanyahu did, or did not, so what? Mahmoud Abbas has refused to acknowledge a few things too.

Consider for a moment that two of Abbas’s three no’s – his refusal to amend the Arab peace plan and vocal opposition to Israel’s Jewish character – can be collapsed into one: an insistence on Palestinians’ “right of return” to Israel proper. This is a stipulation that no Israeli government would ever accept, while Obama rejected the “right of return” explicitly as “not an option” during his presidential campaign.

Why Netanyahu’s failure to adhere to the peace processors playbook is any more inimical than Abbas’s is unclear. I would point out that even by the peace processors reckoning Netanyahu has done more to support the peace process than Abbas.

Helene Cooper of the New York Times – whose idea of an expert is Chas Freeman or Ali Abunimah weighs in today with U.S. Weighs Tactics on Israeli Settlement:

Still, talk of even symbolic actions that would publicly show the United States’ ire with Israel, its longtime ally, would be a sharp departure from the previous administration, which limited its distaste with Israel’s settlement expansions to carefully worded diplomatic statements that called them “unhelpful.”

Mr. Obama is to give a much-anticipated speech to the Muslim world from Egypt on Thursday. “There are things that could get the attention of the Israeli public,” a senior administration official said, touching on the widespread belief within the administration that any Israeli prime minister risks political peril if the Israeli electorate views him as endangering the country’s relationship with the United States.

But, the official added, “Israel is a critical United States ally, and no one in this administration expects that not to continue.” He spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the issue publicly.

Understand what’s going on here. Any sort of rebuke of Israel, is something that Cooper is rooting for. I believe that her anonymous official who feeds her the quote that she seeks, is misreading Israel’s electorate. This isn’t a right wing government by any stretch of the imagination. (I don’t believe that Netanyahu’s government from 1996 – 1999 was far to the right either, but this one is even less so.) My guess is that the Israeli electorate feels that the Obama administration is unfairly pressuring Israel while more serious crises are brewing, that the electorate will support the government. Additionally, the peace process is not new anymore,. Israelis know that the peace process has netted them Hamastan in Gaza, a mostly ineffective and corrupt Fatah government in the cities of Judea and Samaria and a strengthened Hezbollah. Assuming as Abbas apparently does, that the Palestinians need not deal with Netanyahu because his conflict with the Obama administration will lead to his defeat in a future election seems wishful thinking. Yet it seems that that is exactly what Cooper is wishing for.

I’m not going to argue that the Obama-Netanyahu relationship will be as close as the Bush-Sharon relationship. I’m not going to argue that the U.S. Israel relationship will be as strong during President Obama’s term in office, because it won’t. (Even if Livni were PM, this would be true.) However I’m not convinced that the conflict will be as severe as Netanyahu’s many critics in the media want it to be.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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05/28/2009

Unsettling

Filed under: Israel, Israeli Double Standard Time — Tags: Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 9:00 am

The Washington Post reported the other day that the United States is pushing Israel to stop all “settlement” activity. And that PM Netanyahu caught flack on the topic from an unexpected source: formerly pro-Israel Congressmen:

During meetings with congressional leaders this week, Netanyahu was stunned by the “harsh and unequivocal statements” with which lawmakers complained about the settlements, according to an account in the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth. The newspaper said that although the prime minister tried to highlight the threat of Iran in his talks, lawmakers instead returned repeatedly to the issue of settlements, leading his entourage to conclude that the message had been coordinated with the Obama administration.

That’s a reasonable conclusion, though I’m surprised it wasn’t reported last week. Regardless, Israel was relying on assurances from the now no-longer-in-power Bush administration:

Netanyahu spokesman Mark Regev said there are no plans for a full settlement freeze. “The issue of settlements is a final status issue, and until there are final status arrangements, it would not be fair to kill normal life inside existing communities,” he said.

Regev said the Israeli government is relying on “understandings” between former president George W. Bush and former prime minister Ariel Sharon that some of the larger settlements in the occupied West Bank would ultimately become part of Israel, codified in a letter that Bush gave to Sharon in 2004. In an interview with The Washington Post last year, Sharon aide Dov Weissglas said that in 2005, when Sharon was poised to remove settlers from Gaza, the Bush administration arrived at a secret agreement — not disclosed to the Palestinians — that Israel could add homes in settlements it expected to keep, as long as the construction was dictated by market demand, not subsidies.

Elliott Abrams, a former deputy national security adviser who negotiated the arrangement with Weissglas, confirmed the deal in an interview last week. “At the time of the Gaza withdrawal, there were lengthy discussions about how settlement activity might be constrained, and in fact it was constrained in the later part of the Sharon years and the Olmert years in accordance with the ideas that were discussed,” he said. “There was something of an understanding realized on these questions, but it was never a written agreement.”

But according to the New York Times it would appear that the Obama administration has no interest in continuing an understanding – albeit and unwritten one – that was extended by the previous administration:

Speaking of President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said, “He wants to see a stop to settlements — not some settlements, not outposts, not ‘natural growth’ exceptions.” Talking to reporters after a meeting with the Egyptian foreign minister, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, she said: “That is our position. That is what we have communicated very clearly.”

Mrs. Clinton’s remarks, the administration’s strongest to date on the matter, came as an Israeli official said Wednesday that the Israeli government wanted to reach an understanding with the Obama administration that would allow some new construction in West Bank settlements.

The Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, is expected to focus on the issue of settlement expansion when he meets with Mr. Obama on Thursday in Washington. Mr. Abbas and other Palestinian leaders have said repeatedly that they see no point in resuming stalled peace negotiations without an absolute settlement freeze.

Jonathan Tobin asks:

Does this leak of a plea by the Netanyahu government show that Jerusalem believes the Obama administration will actually unveil a new peace plan that will explicitly prohibit the construction of a house or add-on anywhere over the green line?

The question of settlement growth has been something of a red herring for years. Israel isn’t building new settlements and hasn’t since the 1990s. But unless the United States is going to adopt a position that every single one of these Jewish communities must be held in a choke hold — the better to ease them out of existence — natural growth must be allowed.

But here’s the rub:

George W. Bush’s June 2004 statement in which he explicitly supported the creation of an independent Palestinian state (albeit one that would not be ruled by supporters of terror and corrupt actors, something that pretty much renders such a state impossible under the existing circumstances) also said that any peace agreement must take into account the changes that have occurred on the ground since 1967. In other words, the large Jewish suburbs on the outskirts of Jerusalem and elsewhere close to the old border were not going to be handed over to the Palestinians under any circumstances. Then, as now, most Israelis would be willing to give up outlying settlements but now the clusters close to the old green line are where most of the “settlers” live. Ariel Sharon paid in hard diplomatic currency for this American statement but his successors soon discovered that the purchase was worthless.

Palestinian officials may claim that they won’t engage in peace talks without a complete “settlement” freeze, but that’s hardly the main obstacle to peace.

The Palestinian factions can’t even put on a unified front – and even if they can, there’s no guarantee that they’ll adopt a “moderate” position – and their moderate leader refuses to endorse a Jewish state (which would be a prerequisite for accepting a “two state solution.”)

And is the United States going to ignore the very real incitement that still comes from the Palestinians on a regular basis?

To see the perfect symbol of the problem with U.S. Middle East policy you need look no further. No one in the region takes America too seriously because it does not follow up and enforce its positions. The PA knows that it can do what it wants and pay no price. There is no–repeat no–real pressure on it to stop incitement, educate its people for peace, make any real compromise or concession. Instead, this “moderate” institution is continuing to teach its children that being a terrorist is the highest calling and due the greatest honor.

Just like Hamas does.

The Western media also has no interest in this issue either despite energetically seeking out any issue on which Israel can be criticized, even often when such things are made up and prove to have no basis in reality.

We have seen, and will see, the administration devote huge efforts to stopping settlers from adding a room onto an existing apartment. Will it devote any effort at all to turning the PA in the direction of peace or even enforcing U.S. law?

So with Iran about to develop nuclear weapons, Iran’s proxy, Hezbollah poised to gain power in Lebanon and North Korea threatening to abrogate its ceasefire with South Korea, the one area of foreign policy where President Obama has chosen to take a stand is where Israel can build. (Tobin pointed out that this would be an issue even if Tzippi Livni had been elected!) I guess I was wrong to dismiss reports of a clash coming between Obama and Netanyahu.

Netanyahu needs to be careful. He cannot allow himself to be bullied. He has a stronger base of support at home than he had thirteen years ago. He must make the case that ceding territory to hostiles is a recipe for disaster not peace and that the United States and the world has much bigger worries than where Jews live. It won’t be easy, but that’s his job.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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05/22/2009

Working together

Filed under: Iran, Israel — Tags: Barack Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 12:00 pm

While some folks thought it was fun to tally up the points Bibi and Barack scored against one another, it appears that they actually did some things of substance.

For one thing it appears that apart from Secretary of State Clinton’s highly inappropriate remarks an Al Jazeera, PM Netanyahu is discussing what is meant by “settlement freeze” with the administration.

For instance, Israel has been working on the assumption that, with tacit agreement from the US, it may build inside the lines of existing settlements in the large settlement blocs that it believes it will retain under any future diplomatic agreement….The settlement issue was expected to be one of the top ones dealt with in working groups that have been set up between the US and Israel to discuss a wide range of topics. Israeli sources said work in these groups had already started.”

This, of course, will never be enough for the Arab world and their cheerleaders. But more importantly, it appears that there will be a joint Israeli-American monitoring group to judge how successful the administration’s outreach to Iran has been. Perhaps the concern most Americans have regarding Iran acquiring nuclear weapons is the reason the administration is apparently taking Israel’s concerns seriously.

It would appear, according to these reports that despite their differences, President Obama and PM Netanyahu have decided to work together.

Also see here.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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05/21/2009

The sport of Bibi bashing

Filed under: Israel, Israel Derangement Syndrome, Israeli Double Standard Time, Media Bias — Tags: Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 10:30 am

There’s something tasteless about headlining a “news analysis” Keeping score on Obama vs. Netanyahu (via memeorandum), but I suppose there will be a lot of this over the next three or four years as the media try to score points against Netanyahu. Bashing Bibi is a popular journalistic and diplomatic sport.

But Mr. Obama did not get his settlement freeze. In fact, Mr. Netanyahu told him it would be politically difficult for him to halt the construction of settlements. That is a hurdle to the administration’s broader peace objectives because Israel’s Arab neighbors have characterized a freeze as a precondition for them to establish normal relations.

Nor did Mr. Obama get much from Mr. Netanyahu on a peace plan beyond his promise to make good on a few commitments that Israel had already agreed to on the “road map,” an outline of peace steps that has not gotten either Palestinians or Israelis any closer to peace since President George W. Bush first announced it in 2003.

Mr. Netanyahu did agree to resume talks with Palestinians without preconditions. But he would not explicitly endorse the notion of an eventual Palestinian state, something his predecessor, Ehud Olmert, had already done.

“This is why I’m asking the question, did our president get suckered?” said Martin S. Indyk, a former United States ambassador to Israel and director of the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution. “We don’t know the answer yet, but unless he got something more from Bibi in that meeting than they’re telling us, that question can be asked.”

Indyk, of course, as Ambassador to Israel was very much into scoring points against Netanyahu when he served in that post, and it got the Clinton administration Ehud Barak, Camp David and the Aqsa Intifada.

But if the President didn’t get his “settlement freeze, why is that possibly a loss for President Oama? Despite its being touted as a necessary precondition for the Arab world to drop their official antisemitism, there’s no guarantee it would work.

Still Secretary of State Clinton announced that a “settlement freeze” is an American demand to terror TV channel Al Jazeera.

Still no amount of pressure will create a Palestinian State if that isn’t the goal of the Palestinians (via memeorandum).

Over and over, the pattern has been repeated. Following its stunning victory in the 1967 Six Day War, Israel offered to exchange the land it had won for permanent peace with its neighbors. From their summit in Khartoum came the Arabs’ notorious response: “No peace with Israel, no negotiations with Israel, no recognition of Israel.”

At Camp David in 2000, Ehud Barak offered the Palestinians virtually everything they claimed to be seeking – a sovereign state with its capital in East Jerusalem, 97 percent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, tens of billions of dollars in “compensation” for the plight of Palestinian refugees. Yasser Arafat refused the offer, and launched the bloodiest wave of terrorism in Israel’s history.

To this day, the charters of Hamas and Fatah, the two main Palestinian factions, call for Israel’s liquidation. “The whole world” may want peace and a Palestinian state, but the Palestinians want something very different. Until that changes, there is no two-state solution.

And as long as the Palestinians remain uncommitted to peaceful coexistence no amount of pressure on Israel will bring peace to the Middle East.

So after President Obama meets with Abu Mazen will we see scorecards about who “won” the encounter? Or whether Abu Mazen will endorse the concept of a Jewish state enthusiastically?

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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05/20/2009

The settlement panacea

Filed under: Iran, Israel, Israel Derangement Syndrome — Tags: Barack Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 10:00 am

In Upping the ante on Israel, David Ignatius notes that President Obama has asked the Arab world to start normalization with Israel.

To give Israel some quick tangible benefits, the United States wants the Arabs to begin normalizing relations with the Jewish state. Jordan’s King Abdullah describes this promise of recognition by the Arab League nations as a “23-state solution.”

The key to this front-loading strategy is Saudi Arabia. But the Saudis warn privately that they won’t normalize anything unless Israel makes some dramatic moves — such as freezing settlements in the occupied West Bank — that demonstrate its commitment to the 2003 “road map” for peace.

To break this logjam, the Obama administration appears ready to lean hard on Netanyahu. Obama has a range of options, starting with criticism of Israel for failing to meet the road map conditions and escalating to tougher measures.

Aside from the irony of a repressive monarchy deciding when Israel is moral enough to speak to, the problem with Ignatius’s formulation is that Israel (and presumably the United States) has/have a much different view of what constitute “settlements” than what the Saudis and the Arab League do. If President Obama adopts the Saudi definition, that would constitute a major change in American policy, but if he doesn’t the Saudis will still have their pretext for doing nothing.

It’s interesting that for seven years the Saudis have had their “peace plan” on the table, and only now someone’s asking them for a down payment to show their good faith. Of course if Ignatius is correct, the Saudis are still demanding something tangible and permanent from Israel even before they grant Israel the courtesy of acknowledging its existence.

(Barry Rubin doesn’t think that the difference between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu are so far apart.

On Israel’s side he said settlements have to be stopped–though there are no new settlements or expanding of settlements in territorial terms, a point that often is forgotten. There has to be reconstruction of Gaza along with an end to rocket attacks, which means a loosening of border controls.

This is not so difficult for Israel to accomplish: close down some outposts, remove new settlement efforts, and revise the border controls on Gaza. These are all things Netanyahu is quite prepared to do to maintain good relations with the United States.

I don’t think that changing the border controls on Gaza is without risk.)

It’s hard to read Ignatius without getting the impression that he does want the United States to pressure Israel, regardless of consequences.

Netanyahu knew Obama was a rare politician when they first met in March 2007. Back then, nobody was giving the Illinois senator much of a chance, but the Likud leader told his aides: “I think this is the next president of the United States.” Now Netanyahu faces the full force of the Obama political phenomenon — a president who feels politically secure enough to ignore the usual rules of the U.S.-Israel relationship and push hard for what he thinks is right.

Of course, just because President Obama (and David Ignatius) thinks it’s right, doesn’t make it so. Absent any serious movement on the part of the Palestinians or the Arab world in general, there will be no Middle East peace, no matter how hard Obama leans on Bibi.

The Washington Post, editorially, also advocates the “pressure Israel” approach to Middle East peacemaking:

It may be that a mere show of U.S. sleeve-rolling on the peace process, along with pro forma Israeli cooperation, will provide adequate cover for Arab states that are eager to join in an anti-Iranian alliance. That is what Mr. Netanyahu is calculating. If Mr. Obama genuinely intends to press for an early Israeli-Palestinian settlement, he will have to push U.S.-Israeli relations into a red zone of tension for the first time in many years. He would do well to make clear to Israeli voters that any government that will not explicitly embrace Palestinian statehood or an end to settlements will not have smooth relations with Washington. Even if that does not lead to a Middle East peace, it could help lay the groundwork for one in the future.

This begs the questions:

And if Israel were to take risks and make concessions will they be reciprocated? And if the United States and Europe makes promises to Israel will they be kept?

After all, the 1990s’ peace process taught Israelis the answer was “no” on both counts.

This is Israel’s central point: peace, yes, but only a real, lasting, and stable situation which makes things better rather than worse.

But is it Israeli voters and an Israeli government that need to get the message? Certainly over the past sixteen years, they’ve gotten a much different message, that concessions will be pocketed with no reciprocation and that moves for peace are utilized for terror.

Of course both Ignatius and the editors of the Post accept the flawed premise that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at the center of the instability in the Middle East and that, therefore, quick action is needed. The problem with this reasoning is:

what if Israeli-Palestinian peace will take many years to accomplish, but the Iranian nuclear bomb will only take a year or two to accomplish? Obama essentially proposes that America will race the Iranians — our peace process versus their nuclear program. Does anyone wonder who will win?

At best Israeli-Arab peace is still a long term process. Even if American pressure on Israel brings the desired concessions from Israel, there won’t be a final peace between Israel and the Palestinians in the next four years. On the other hand the Iranian threat will continue to grow and become more serious. If those rooting for an American-Israeli confrontation get their wish, chances peace will become even more remote as Arab intransigence and Iranian power grow.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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05/18/2009

War by other means

Filed under: Iran, Israel — Tags: Barack Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 11:00 am

In Mideast Contest of wills, Jackson Diehl outlines the likely priorities of both President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu.

Contrary to what it would like Iran and the rest of the world to believe, Israel would not attack Tehran’s nuclear facilities without U.S. consent. Militarily, it would be next to impossible; politically, it would be suicidal to flout the United States on a matter of such strategic importance. If there is armed action against Iran during the next several years, it will be because Netanyahu somehow persuades or compels Obama to overrule the prevailing judgment of the U.S. government, which is that an attack is not a viable option.

Similarly, there will be no significant progress toward Middle East peace if Obama cannot move Netanyahu off some of his most cherished precepts — not so much the idea that Palestinians will accept something short of full statehood but that a settlement can be postponed indefinitely even as Israel blockades Hamas in Gaza and expands Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Some will advise the administration that there is nothing to gain in pushing the Israeli leader as long as the Palestinians themselves remain divided and unwilling to accept even reasonable offers — as they have been for several years. But the appearance that the United States is accepting of Israeli intransigence could turn opinion against Obama across the region.

Overall this is a pretty fair assessment once one gets past the condescension towards Netanyahu’s (perceived) positions.

But what’s troublesome is that there’s no sense that preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons could be in America’s (if not the world’s) interests too.

First of all, Reuel Marc Gerecht rejects the consensus that Israel necessarily won’t attack Iranian nuclear facilities without the consent of the Americans.

We shouldn’t be surprised if the Israelis reach a conclusion at odds with Washington’s near-consensus against pre-emptive strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. In 1981, Jerusalem certainly surmised that a raid against Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor could make Saddam Hussein furious and that he possessed conventional and unconventional means of getting even. But they went ahead and destroyed the reactor.

The consensus in Israel is just as widespread about the correctness of last year’s strike against the secret North Korean-designed reactor at Dir A-Zur in Syria — a project that may well have had Iranian backing. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert ordered the attack although the Bush administration opposed it. And in 1967, Israelis believed that pre-emptive action saved their nation from an Arab-initiated, multifront offensive that could have proved lethal.

And once one considers Israel’s historically based fears, it doesn’t take much to wonder if the prevailing wisdom – as expressed by Diehl – is a bit optimistic.

The Western advice may be sage: The threat of an Israeli retaliatory nuclear strike might be a sufficient threat to discourage Tehran’s mullahs from using a nuclear weapon directly, or from leveraging its protective nuclear umbrella indirectly to more aggressively support anti-Israeli jihadists. But Iran’s penchant for terrorism, its extensive ties to both radical Sunnis and Shiites, its vibrant anti-Semitism, and the likelihood that Tehran will become more aggressive (as has Pakistan in Kashmir) with an atom bomb in its arsenal doesn’t reinforce the case for patience and perseverance.

Consider: If Saddam Hussein had had a nuke in 1990, would George H.W. Bush have risked war? Consider as well the near certainty that ultra-Sunni Saudi Arabia will go nuclear in response to a Shiite Persian bomb. The prospect of another virulently anti-Semitic Arab state — deeply permeated with supporters of al Qaeda — possessing an atomic weapon cannot comfort Jerusalem. A pre-emptive strike offers Israel a chance that this nuclear contagion can be stopped.

Or as Saul Singer points out (h/t Israel Matzav)

But the real reason for the U.S. to pursue a truly non-nuclear (and non-terrorist) Iran is not to avoid Israeli military action, but to advance American interests and security. The Iranian nuclear prospect clouds the international security landscape like the financial crisis looms over the global economy. Both clouds must be removed for the international community to prosper. Just as the financial crisis also presents opportunities, so does the Iranian crisis. Forcing Iran to back down would be the greatest setback for Islamofascism since the fall of radical regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. Indeed, if Obama defuses the Iranian nuclear program, the world could experience the greatest advance in peace and security since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Conversely, if Iran does go nuclear or near-nuclear, existing clouds will continue to darken.

One of the most cherished precepts of analysts like Jackson Diehl is that with enough nice words and concessions, there is no enemy who can’t be reasoned with and stripped of his enmity. But reality is a stubborn thing and sometimes enemies see negotiations as war by other means.

Crossposted by Soccer Dad.

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05/15/2009

The coming confrontation?

Filed under: Iran, Israel, Politics — Tags: Barack Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 10:00 am

For now I’m going to persist in my illusion that Binyamin Netanyahu and Barack Obama are not headed for a major showdown next week when they meet.

Steve Rosen wrote:

The commentariat and the blogs are full of predictions that Obama and Netanyahu are headed for a clash when they meet on May 18, or soon after. These predictions are coming from pundits on the left, who imagine that U.S. pressure on Israel is the magical key to peace, and many on the right, who think the Obama team is dominated by the naive left and Arabists who know and care little about Israel’s security.

I am betting against all of them. My prediction: while Obama and Netanyahu will have differences on the margins, they will find common ground on the main elements of a coordinated strategy for an initial period of 12-24 months.

I know that I’m at odds with a number of bloggers I’m friendly with. But isn’t Obama surrounded by advisers who aren’t especially fond of Israel? Yes, that’s true. Doesn’t the President come from a background that’s hostile to Israel? Yes, that’s true too.

And didn’t the President just send a humiliating message to Israel demanding that Israel not strike Iran without informing him first? That I’m not so sure about. But it was reported in Ha’aretz! I’m not convinced that the message is as clear as Aluf Benn reported.

U.S. President Barack Obama has sent a message to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu demanding that Israel not surprise the U.S. with an Israeli military operation against Iran. The message was conveyed by a senior American official who met in Israel with Netanyahu, ministers and other senior officials. Earlier, Netanyahu’s envoy visited Washington and met with National Security Adviser James Jones and with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and discussed the dialogue Obama has initiated with Tehran.

The message from the American envoy to the prime minister reveals U.S. concern that Israel could lose patience and act against Iran. It is important to the Americans that they not be caught off guard and find themselves facing facts on the ground at the last minute.

Obama did not wait for his White House meeting with Netanyahu, scheduled for next Monday, to deliver his message, but rather sent it ahead of time with his envoy.

Note what’s going on. While I don’t know if this is standard diplomatic protocol, it appears that both President Obama and PM Netanyahu had an advance man going over the particulars of their meeting. Note that the message was apparently a concern that was “revealed” by the administration’s advance man.

I don’t think that the administration’s advance man leaked the message to Benn. So that means that he heard it from someone on the Israeli side. So would the Israelis have complained that they were dressed down by the President in advance of the meeting with Netanyahu next week? I’m skeptical. More likely, in the course of discussing the meeting with Benn, one of the Israelis commented that the possibility of an Israeli strike against Iran clearly concerned the administration. (How much someone from the advance team could reveal is unclear.) Benn worded the information he got in the most spectacular way, but the actual information that he learned was a lot more pedestrian.

Why do I think that it wasn’t the administration leaking the supposed message that Aluf Benn reported? Because if it came from the United States why didn’t either the NY Times or Washington Post report it? If the President issued a major rebuke to the PM, wouldn’t that be newsworthy here? Yet neither reported that an Israeli paper reported this rebuke. (The Jerusalem Post, from what I can tell didn’t report it either.)

The NY Times even had an article on the upcoming meeting, Israeli Leader to Meet Obama as U.S. Priorities Shift about the likely differences between Israel and the United States, especially regarding Iran and it didn’t mention the warning. The article is worth looking at for a number of details, but it doesn’t confirm Benn’s report at all.

The last time Benjamin Netanyahu met an American president as Israel’s new leader, in 1996, it did not go well. Mr. Netanyahu lectured President Bill Clinton about Arab-Israeli relations, aides recalled, driving Mr. Clinton into a profane outburst after his guest left.

Mr. Netanyahu is likely to avoid a repeat of that when he meets President Obama at the White House on Monday. But the underlying relationship between Israel and the United States has become more unsettled since Mr. Obama took office.

Left unmentioned is that during the Israeli campaign, Clinton held a “summit of the peacemakers” as a way of bolstering Shimon Peres’s campaign against Netanyahu. Obama didn’t interfere as blatantly in the recent Israeli elections.

The Times reports further:

Two weeks ago, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Leon E. Panetta, held a quiet meeting with Mr. Netanyahu in Jerusalem. Israel asked the United States for benchmarks to demonstrate that its diplomatic campaign was working.

The Israeli government, officials said, has assured the United States that it will not take military action against Iran without first consulting Washington. But it has also signaled that it will give the United States only a year or so to show that its good-will approach is getting results.

This would appear to cover the ground about the differences between the United States and Israel regarding Iran. (It also appears that Iran doesn’t have a year to convince the Americans, but only about five months.)

Even Robert Malley is quoted by the Times:

“There is potential for greater tensions than have existed for some time, certainly,” said Robert Malley, another veteran of Middle East peacemaking efforts. “But a collision is not inevitable.”

Presumably he’s somewhat aware of the administration is planning and he doesn’t necessarily see a conflict coming.

So why isn’t a confrontation as likely this time around as it was thirteen years ago?

1) Netanyahu is more popular at home than he was in 1996.
2) American support for Israel against Iran is pretty strong.
3) Nearly sixteen years of bad faith since Oslo has rendered the IOI syndrome InOperatIve.
4) Despite Obama’s leftist background, lately his foreign policy moves have belied his background as Victor Davis Hanson observes:

Consider also the dexterous Obama administration’s own about-face. It still finds it useful to damn the old Bush government’s embrace of wiretaps, military tribunals, and renditions — even as it dares not drop or completely discount these apparently useful Bush policies, albeit under new names and with new qualifiers.

Maybe the administration will see an advantage to showing Israel more sympathy.

Still J-Street thinks that peace won’t be achieved without American pressure (h/t My Right Word) And J-Street’s partners in undermining Israel, the IPF, has gotten the names of several ambassadors attached to a letter (.pdf) they’ve written urging Israel to, among other things, get rid of superfluous checkpoints and urge the Palestinians to stop terror. Of course they also recommend rebuilding funds for Gaza, which will only serve to strengthen Hamas. But then this letter is recommended by someone who considers M. J. Rosenberg, one of the “best Middle East analysts,” so take the recommendation with a grain of salt.

I hope I’m right that there will be no major friction between President Obama and PM Netanyahu. Obviously there is reason to expect differences. Hopefully despite their differing visions they will see the American-Israel alliance as more important than those differences.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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05/12/2009

When Bibi meets Barack

Filed under: Israel, Politics — Tags: Barack Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 1:00 pm

I don’t doubt that Prime Minister Netanyahu will have a major challenge next week when he meets with President Obama. But the chances for his success are not insurmountable.

The problems he goes in with are that the President has previously explicitly derided the Likud, Netanyahu’s political party and that the President is allied with J-Street, a group that believes that the United States knows better than Israel what is good for Israel and that, therefore, the United States should pressure Israel to give in to all demands made by the Palestinians.
(Seraphic Secret has a good roundup of the relevant background.)

Netanyahu will have to be careful how he approaches Obama, but it’s still possible for him to make the case that while the United States and Israel have different priorities, they can still work together successfully.

Elliott Abrams writes about what Netanyau needs to do:

Mr. Netanyahu has to care about forging a personal relationship with Mr. Obama, but Mr. Obama may feel he doesn’t need Mr. Netanyahu as a pal. Mr. Obama appears to have enormous faith in his own personal charm (and why not? Look where it’s gotten him) but we do not yet know when he pours it on. Just how much do personal relations with foreign leaders matter to him? For George W. Bush, they mattered a lot: His negative view of Gerhard Schroeder and Jacques Chirac and his trust in Ariel Sharon changed U.S. foreign policy.

Of course there’s baggage both will be bringing to the meeting:

… both Messrs. Obama and Netanyahu will come to the meeting half poisoned against the other. Mr. Netanyahu will have been told that Mr. Obama is weak and naive, won’t act against Iran and doesn’t understand the way the world works. Mr. Obama will have been told that Mr. Netanyahu is a “right winger” (and therefore bad by definition) who is tricky and untrustworthy and needs to be pushed hard if there’s to be “progress toward peace.” U.S. Middle East Envoy George Mitchell has already met Mr. Netanyahu several times and will offer the president his private opinion on their sessions in Jerusalem, which one can just imagine: Both smiling, both seeking to appear totally sincere, each doing all he can to maneuver the other into a narrow corner.

And after the meeting what will we need to look for:

It’s unlikely that we’ll know quickly whether they hit it off. The Israelis will almost certainly make this claim within seconds after the meeting ends, and will adduce every possible piece of evidence. Mr. Obama smiled; he put his arm on Mr. Netanyahu’s shoulder; his body language was friendly; his tie had positive colors.

The White House leaks will be more interesting, for the staff may want to keep Mr. Netanyahu nervous; we’ll have to watch what favored journalists are told about the chemistry in the days after the visit. We should not expect to hear the kind of crack that French President Nicolas Sarkozy apparently made to journalists after meeting the president (that Mr. Obama was “not always at his best when it comes to decisions and efficiency”), as that does not appear to be the Obama style. If he makes an exception for Mr. Netanyahu and has the staff trash the prime minister to the media, we’ll know the two men decided to loathe each other.

I don’t think that the meeting between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu necessarily will go badly next week. Still Netanyahu has a big challenge ahead of him to change the President’s mind.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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An agenda for J-Street

Filed under: Israel, Israel Derangement Syndrome — Tags: Add new tag, Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 12:00 pm

Short New York Times editorial: When PM Netanyahu visits with President Obama, Netanyahu ought to listen to his superior and faithfully do all that the President, in his infinite wisdom, asks him to do.

The NYT has a perfectly obnoxious editorial An agenda for Mr. Netanyahu.

If there is going to be a serious peace effort with Palestinians, Israel must work toward a two-state solution, Mr. Biden said. It must freeze further settlement construction in the West Bank and dismantle roadblocks between Palestinian cities and towns not needed for security. Israel must also grant Palestinians more responsibility for security to the extent that they combat extremists and dampen incitement against Israel, he added.

This should not come as news to Mr. Netanyahu. Mr. Obama and his aides have been telegraphing their intentions for weeks. But the Israeli leader’s responses have been unconvincing and insufficient. Growing tensions were obvious when his White House meeting slid later into May — after Mr. Obama hosted Arab leaders.

I would argue (and have argued) that Netanyahu did more in his first term to create a Palestinian state than any Palestinian (or Arab) leader ever did. I would also argue that the New York Times by underplaying or ignoring Arafat’s duplicity and the insincerity of Mahmoud Abbas had done more than its share of undermining peace in the Middle East.

Was the delay in the meeting due to tension, or because Netanyahu wanted the time to prepare an appropriate presentation for the President. Obviously the Prime Minister and President are not entirely on the same page. It is Netanyahu’s job to convince the President of the reasonableness of his position.

(And even if Netanyahu were to do everything the editors of the Times claim is necessary, what makes them so certain it would lead to peace or a Palestinian state?. Here’s “moderate” Palestinian “negotiator” Saeb Erakat:

“Let me recount two historical events, even if I am revealing a secret. On July 23, 2000, at his meeting with President Arafat in Camp David, President Clinton said: ‘You will be the first president of a Palestinian state, within the 1967 borders – give or take, considering the land swap – and East Jerusalem will be the capital of the Palestinian state, but we want you, as a religious man, to acknowledge that the Temple of Solomon is located underneath the Haram Al-Sharif.’

“Yasser Arafat said to Clinton defiantly: ‘I will not be a traitor. Someone will come to liberate it after 10, 50, or 100 years. Jerusalem will be nothing but the capital of the Palestinian state, and there is nothing underneath or above the Haram Al-Sharif except for Allah.’ That is why Yasser Arafat was besieged, and that is why he was killed unjustly.

“In November 2008… Let me finish… [Israeli prime minister Ehud] Olmert, who talked today about his proposal to Abu Mazen, offered the 1967 borders, but said: ‘We will take 6.5% of the West Bank, and give in return 5.8% from the 1948 lands, and the 0.7% will constitute the safe passage, and East Jerusalem will be the capital, but there is a problem with the Haram and with what they called the Holy Basin.’ Abu Mazen too answered with defiance, saying: ‘I am not in a marketplace or a bazaar. I came to demarcate the borders of Palestine – the June 4, 1967 borders – without detracting a single inch, and without detracting a single stone from Jerusalem, or from the holy Christian and Muslim places.’ This is why the Palestinian negotiators did not sign…”

This is form a month ago. Does this sound like someone who believes in a two state solution or even compromise?)

I’d add that even this rather obnoxious article in the Washington Post makes an important point:

After the signing of the 1993 Oslo peace accords and throughout the 1990s, the West Bank and Gaza combined grew at a healthy 6 percent annually, according to the World Bank. That stopped with the second intifada, which proved disastrous economically. According to the World Bank, Palestinian gross domestic product in both areas peaked in 1999 and has fallen by about 30 percent since then. Current per capita income is about $4,000 a year.

So yes, under Binyamin Netanyahu the Palestinian economy grew. The growth stopped when Yasser Arafat decided to launch a terror war against Israel in September 2000. The Times need not lecture Netanyahu on making the lives of the Palestinians more comfortable.

The editors of the Times continue:

In his video speech to the same activist group, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Mr. Netanyahu said he wants peace with the Palestinians. He even committed to negotiations “without any delay and without any preconditions.” But it rings hollow. He has resisted — and his foreign minister and unity government partner, Avigdor Lieberman, has openly derided — the two-state solution that is the only sensible basis for a lasting settlement that could anchor a regional peace. On Monday, the 15-member United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted a statement endorsing the two-state solution.

Lieberman, in fact, has advocated a two state solution. And Netanyahu isn’t going to agree to a Palestinian state if it presents a threat to Israel. That’s hardly unreasonable.

Other differences also threaten next week’s meeting. One is the president’s decision to reach out to Iran, which has made Israel uneasy. Mr. Netanyahu — perhaps trying to ensure talks with the Palestinians never get anywhere — hinted that he might condition peace efforts on Mr. Obama’s success in ending Tehran’s nuclear program.

Actually the threat from Iran is more significant. I don’t think that Netanyahu is specifically conditioning peace efforts on progress against Iran’s nuclear program, but certainly it’s a priority to him. Iran doesn’t just threaten Israel, though, it threatens to project its power throughout the Middle East. If it acquires nuclear weapons, it will have one more threat to help them spread power. So any actions Israel takes ought not to strengthen Iran’s allies – Hezbollah and Hezbollah. In fact in the name of peace, Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon and Gaza, strengthening Iran’s allies and thus Iran too. So any concessions Israel makes need to be weighed against the risks they carry by strengthening Israel’s enemies generally and Iran specifically.

Stopping Iran’s nuclear program is crucial. Mr. Obama’s approach — a serious diplomatic overture followed by tougher sanctions if talks fail — is risky but worth it. Yes, the clock is ticking as Tehran’s capability improves. But Mr. Netanyahu should not artificially constrain Mr. Obama’s initiative. And Mr. Obama must discourage any move by Mr. Netanyahu to lead Israel, or push the United States, into unnecessary military action.

Nothing Netanyahu will say will “push” the United States into “unnecessary” military action. Of course the question here, is what the Times’s editors mean by “crucial.” If they mean “preferable,” well then any military action would be “unnecessary.” If, however, they mean “essential” then military action may indeed be necessary regardless of what Netanyahu says, unless they have some other plan for disarming a nuclear Iran. What do the editors suggest? Sprinkling pixie dust?

It cannot be either-or. We have seen how former President George W. Bush’s delay in engaging seriously on Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts sabotaged United States interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran by giving Al Qaeda and other extremists a rallying point for anti-Americanism. There are huge obstacles to peacemaking, including the rivalry between the ruling Fatah and militant Hamas Palestinian factions. Fortunately, there is also a new, potentially useful dynamic: Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt are as worried about Iran as Israel is. That is a shared concern that should be exploited to bind these old adversaries in common cause — to advance Israeli-Palestinian peace and to restrain Iran.

I’d argue that President Clinton’s focus on Middle East peacemaking to the exclusion of the threat of Al Qaeda is what really damaged American security. And did President Clinton’s deep involvement in the peace process bring peace any closer?

Of course the Times’s approach makes sense if you give credence to the view of Arabists that the central conflict in the Middle East is the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. There’s no evidence to suggest that’s true. And the main obstacle to peace making is the refusal of even “moderate” Fatah to unambiguously accept Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish State. And while there may be some good accomplished by exploiting the Arab fear of Iran, it should be done in a way that weakens Israel.

Finally we have:

As new leaders of two deeply entwined countries, President Obama and Mr. Netanyahu have an interest in getting their relationship off to a good start. Mr. Netanyahu, a smooth talker, will have to do better than vague promises, however. Just think what might happen if he declared an end to settlement construction and an early return to substantive final status negotiations.

Mr. Obama could then challenge Arab leaders who supported a 2002 peace initiative to respond, perhaps by initiating openly acknowledged diplomatic contacts and trade ties with Israel. Pessimism is the norm in the Middle East, but those kinds of moves could be game-changers.

Actually it should be up to the Arabs to initiate contacts with Israel ahead of any diplomatic process. That would show that their “peace initiative” might actually be sincere instead of an ultimatum camouflaged by vague promises of moderation.

In short the Times asks Binyamin Netanyahu to adhere to the agenda of J-Street – presumably also the agenda of President Obama. But Netanyahu’s responsibility is not to satisfy the whims of the United States but to protect his country and its interests as much as possible. The arrogance of the Times is astounding.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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05/04/2009

The Iranian priority

Filed under: Iran, Israel — Tags: Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 10:30 am

Ethan Bronner analyzes Israel’s foreign policy orientation in Israel Faces a Hard Sell in Bid to Shift Policy. The analysis begs two questions. The first is to what degree is there a difference between Israel and the Untied States? In other words, are Bronner’s assumptions accurate or is he magnifying the differences that exist between the two administrations?

The second question is, if Bronner’s assumptions hold, are the Americans being naive? Bronner lays out the potential sources of conflict.

Advisers to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are drafting policy suggestions aimed at forming a framework that he plans to present to President Obama at their first summit meeting, in Washington on May 18. In addition, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman left Sunday for Europe on his first official visit, and on Tuesday, President Shimon Peres is to meet with Mr. Obama in Washington.

Such an ambitious effort to reformulate the conflict will be, by all accounts, tough to sell for two reasons.

First, even though the standard approaches have not yielded success, no alternative has emerged.

Second, the Obama administration has repeatedly backed the two-state solution, as have the Europeans. In other ways, too, this White House has seemed to be closer in outlook to Europe than the past administration was.

Now his first observation is a really huge elephant that isn’t addressed in the whole article. If the standard approach to the peace process has not yielded success so far, why have no alternatives been explored? And why is Netanyahu’s approach apparently being dismissed even if ti doesn’t have a 15 year old record of failure like the standard approach.

I’d argue that Netanyahu did try a different approach during his first tenure as Prime Minister. While he clearly made quite a few mistakes, while he served as PM two trends emerged. The first is that the Palestinians did better financially.

Increasing Numbers

The number of Palestinians working in Israel is steadily growing. Lawfully employed Palestinians in Israel today number about 60,000, of whom some 13,000 work in industrial zones and in the settlements. All told, more than 100,000 Palestinians are estimated to be employed in Israel approaching the record number employed in 1992.

Working Together

Israel and the Palestinian Authority cooperate closely in locating employment opportunities and in creating jobs for Palestinians. For example, a number of successful job fairs which have provided employment, mainly in the field of construction, have taken place. Israel and the Palestinian Authority also cooperate in creating employment opportunities in the industrial zones at Erez and Karni. About 3,500 workers are employed today at Erez, while the plans for Karni call for the creation of tens of thousands of jobs.

(What happened to Erez?

Although the opening of the crossings is essential to the Gazan economy, Palestinian terror networks have frequently attacked the Erez Crossing. “On average, there are between two to four attempted Palestinian terrorist attacks on the Erez compound each month,” according to an IDF security officer at the checkpoint.

In the last four years, Palestinian terror networks have targeted the Erez Crossing with almost 500 mortar shells. In May 2008, a Palestinian bomber from Gaza blew up an explosives-laden truck on the Palestinian side of the Erez Crossing, causing an estimated $3.5 million in damages to the Israeli checkpoint.

In other words one of the institutions of co-existence was closed by incessant terror attacks.)

Alongside the improved economic situation for the Palestinians was a drop in terror. As I observed before:

So under Netanyahu, Palestinians had more prosperity and Israel had more security. Yet because Netanyahu insisted that Arafat abide the agreements he signed, he was undercut by the Clinton administration and pilloried in the press. By 1999, Israelis felt secure enough to elect the more accommodating Ehud Barak as their Prime Minister and by the end of 2000 they were shown how uncommitted to peace the Palestinians were.

Or put a different way, Netanyahu got an alternative to work while he was Prime Minister the first time, but the Americans (and Europe etc.) and the media ignored the results.

For Bronner to write that nothing else has been tried is not accurate. It’s been tried and ignored.

Netanyahu’s job (and now Michael Oren’s job) will be to make that point to the administration. Whether the administration will buy it or not, is a different matter.

The question is whether this is a difference of emphasis or of substance.

Bronner makes some hay about Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman.

Israel’s own diplomats view his arrival as their chief with circumspection, especially because his predecessor, Tzipi Livni, was admired by her colleagues in Europe. Whenever she went to Paris, for example, she saw not only the foreign minister but also President Nicolas Sarkozy. So far, Mr. Sarkozy has not agreed to see Mr. Lieberman this week.

“I tell people who worry about Lieberman that I worry too,” a senior Israeli diplomat said, requesting anonymity to speak freely of his boss. “But after I stop worrying I tell myself, you have to be fair, you have to give this guy a chance to express himself as the foreign minister of Israel, not just as a candidate.”

(Ehud Barak is apparently a bit more generous.)

But then he gets down to the nitty gritty:

Increasingly, the Arab world — especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan — seems worried about Iran as well. American officials who have recently visited those countries said that their leaders spoke about Iran in ways that were almost identical to what they heard from officials in Jerusalem. Therefore, the opportunity for a regional alliance against Iranian influence is great.

But, they say, for Arab leaders to work alongside Israel on this, even quietly, requires demonstrable Israeli movement on ending its occupation of the West Bank by freezing or reducing settlements and handing over more power to the Palestinians.

So is the Arab view presented here accurate? In other words do the “moderate” Arab countries fear Iran conditionally or unconditionally? Need Israel placate them regarding the Palestinians in order to get cooperation to oppose Iran? Or would Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan – despite their rhetoric to the contrary, paying lip service to the Palestinian cause – join in the Western effort against Iran regardless?

Clearly there are those in the administration who see Israeli concessions as the paramount concern. Last week David Ignatius wrote a flattering profile of NSC director Gen. James Jones.

Jones is an activist on the Palestinian issue, which he lists as a top priority for the new administration. He wants the United States to offer a guiding hand in peace negotiations — submitting its own ideas to help break any logjams between the Israelis and Palestinians. “The United States is at its best when it’s directly involved,” Jones says. He cites U.S. diplomatic efforts in the Balkans. “We didn’t tell the parties to go off and work this out. If we want to get momentum, we have to be involved directly.”

This stance may antagonize the new Israeli government of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, as may the prospect of U.S. diplomatic engagement with Iran. Ideally, the administration would like to explore a new security architecture for the Persian Gulf that recognizes Tehran’s rising power but also sets limits. But officials caution that such broad talks won’t happen quickly, given the mixed signals from Iran.

So given Jones’s antagonism towards Israel, if he is influential in the administration, the differences with the Netanyahu government

The other question is whether the apparent emphasis of the Obama administration on Israel in order to enable an effective counter to Iran, or whether the Israeli approach as described by Bronner is correct:

He, like the entire Israeli leadership, argues that since Iran sponsors Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, both of which reject Israel’s existence and seek its destruction, the key to the Palestinian solution is to defang Iran and stop it from acquiring the means to build a nuclear weapon.

Amir Taheri summarizes the Iranian view of things:

Khomeinist propaganda is trying to portray Iran as a rising “superpower” in the making while the United States is presented as the “sunset” power. The message is simple: The Americans are going, and we are coming.

Tehran plays a patient game. Wherever possible, it is determined to pursue its goals through open political means, including elections. With pro-American and other democratic groups disheartened by the perceived weakness of the Obama administration, Tehran hopes its allies will win all the elections planned for this year in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.

“There is this perception that the new U.S. administration is not interested in the democratization strategy,” a senior Lebanese political leader told me. That perception only grows as President Obama calls for an “exit strategy” from Afghanistan and Iraq. Power abhors a vacuum, which the Islamic Republic of Iran is only too happy to fill.

So presumably an American approach that doesn’t view Iranian power as the primary challenge in the Middle East misreads the situation.

And as Barry Rubin points out, the State Department’s own analysis supports the view that Iran is the major challenge for the United States in the Middle East.

What can this report teach U.S. policymakers?

Regarding Iran, their government has massive evidence of its continuing role as “the most significant state sponsor of terrorism.” Why is Iran doing this? According to the State Department, “To advance its key national security and foreign policy interests, which include regime survival, regional dominance, opposition to Arab-Israeli peace, and countering Western influence, particularly in the Middle East.” That’s right, and it’s not going to change, especially one Iran has nuclear weapons.

Not only does Tehran use the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (the institution most supportive of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) “to clandestinely cultivate and support” Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hizballah; plus radical Islamist groups in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and in Iraq against U.S. forces.

As for Syria, events highlighted its “ties to the world’s most notorious terrorists,” including the death of Hizballah Operations Chief Imad Mugniyah, killed while under Syrian government protection. “Among other atrocities, Mugniyah was wanted for the 1983 bombings of the Marine barracks and U.S. Embassy in Beirut, which killed over 350.” Moreover, as the report shows, Syria has been tightening its alliance with Iran and continued financing terrorism.

While U.S. efforts reduced their numbers, terrorists destabilizing Iraq continued coming in “predominantly through Syria,” and “receiving weapons and training from Iran.”

Here’s the bottom line: Not only do Syria and Iran believe that destabilizing the region, bullying or controlling their neighbors, and expelling U.S. influence is in their interest but they’re also directly involved in trying to kill Americans.

American interests in the Middle East are threatened by Iran. The United States must marshal its allies to fight Iranian designs. The Israeli view of the situation – that Iran is the major source of instability in the Middle East – is largely in agreement with the State Department’s latest analysis. So the question is whether the Obama administration will allow itself to be distracted by pretending that pressuring Israel will make handling the Iranian challenge easier or whether it will heed the State Department’s analysis and give priority to the Iranian threat.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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04/26/2009

An Israeli bull in the Iran shop?

Filed under: Iran, Israel — Tags: Barack Obama, Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 10:00 am

Jim Hoagland fears that President Obama’s plans for the Middle East are imperiled by Israel. In An Israeli surprise for Obama?, Hoagland writes:

The review cannot be completed until Obama has what may be his toughest meeting yet with a foreign leader. That Oval Office session with Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s newly elected prime minister, will come in mid-May. Netanyahu’s impressions of Obama’s intentions on Iran will determine war-or-peace choices for the Middle East.

The survey of American options on Iran forms a major part of the sprint that the president and his advisers have made toward the 100-day milestone they will reach on Wednesday.They have authored strategic reviews on Afghanistan and Iraq, dispatched special envoys to urgent trouble spots, and invited Middle East leaders to the White House to keep that region’s flickering peace hopes alive.

Obama has already offered diplomatic engagement to Iran without preconditions — making Tehran’s behavior, not Washington’s conduct, the dominant issue for international opinion. The policy adjustments have been necessary and adroitly handled.

But they have also stirred doubts in Israel’s untested and politically heterogeneous government about Obama’s commitment to Israel’s security, as Netanyahu defines it. These misgivings create a queasiness between the two allies that cannot be publicly discussed by either without damaging political consequences.

I do think that Hoagland is correct in that final sentence. While I don’t think there are necessarily diplomatic between the Obama and Netanyahu administrations yet, there are plenty in the media who are willing to play up the likelihood of a clash. But have the policy adjustments been adroitly handled? After reaching out to Iran – especially on the Iranian New Year – and specifically asking Iran to release Roxana Saberi, the administration simply expressed its regret at the slap when she was convicted of espionage.

Hoagland writes further:

There are serious arguments on the other side, beginning with doubts about Israel’s ability to identify, reach and destroy all of Iran’s bomb-building capabilities. There is also a widespread belief that not even the hawkish Netanyahu would risk the rupture with the United States and the fury of the Arab street that an Israeli attack on Islamic Iran could bring.

“The Israelis who have to decide this thing will find these arguments very familiar,” said a former ambassador to Israel from a developing country. “They are precisely the arguments used in 1981 to say Israel could not and should not disable Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor in Iraq before that happened. They are arguments that could have been used against striking the North Korean reactor in Syria last year. And yet, it did not turn out that way at all in either case.”

Asked whether Israeli warplanes had the range to fly around Arab-controlled airspace to hit Iran, a European official replied: “You might think not, unless you noticed the emphasis being put on Israel’s in-air refueling capacity in its recent military exercises. In any event, Arab air defenses have never been a problem for Israel.”

(Daniel Pipes has covered the capability and consequences questions.)

But there are additional issues that Hoagland doesn’t address. If Israel deems that Iranian nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to the country, it really doesn’t matter if the PM is Binyamin Netanyahu or Ehud Olmert or Ehud Barak, survival would come before political fallout. It’s unfair of him to characterize Netanyahu as “hawkish.”

Also Hoagland limits the Iranian nuclear question to its effects on Israel. What about the Middle East as a whole? Barry Rubin writes:

1. A nuclear Iran will make it impossible for the West to protect its interests in the Middle East. All Western countries would be too intimidated to act in any way
contrary to Iran’s desires out of concern that Iran would use nuclear weapons against itself, its troops, or others.

2. A nuclear Iran would intimidate all Arab regimes to appease Iran including, for example, rejecting Western basing rights or alliances. They might well believe that the United States is unlikely to go to nuclear war for them. Better get the best surrender terms from Tehran.

This means forget about any Arab-Israeli peace. Arab cooperation with the West would plummet. Western citizens and interests in Arabic-speaking countries would be in great danger. Arab states would be afraid to cooperate with the United States in resisting the expansion of the Iran-Syria bloc and are far more likely to join it. Islamist regimes are more likely to take over in many countries.

Or consider this. If the “hawkish” government of Menachem Begin hadn’t struck the Iraqi reactor in 1982, Kuwait might today still be the 19th province of Iraq and Saddam might still be in power with Uday and Qusay primed to take over.

I don’t doubt that there will be policy differences between the United States and Israel. If the United States views the Iranian nuclear capability as strictly an Israeli issue, those differences will come to the fore rather quickly. Netanyahu’s job, then, as Prime Minister is to make the strongest case possible for Israel’s concerns. Dr. Rubin recommends this summary of Netanyahu’s calculations.

Netanyahu believes the Iranian threat provides Israel with an unprecedented opportunity in that, for the first time since 1920, moderate Arab states share the same strategic assessment. In fact, Iran will be central to the plans Netanyahu will present to Obama. He will explain to the American president that the existence of Israel is the guarantor of the continued existence of the Jewish people following the Holocaust and that nuclear weapons cannot fall into the hands of those who deny the existence of the Jewish state. Netanyahu would prefer that the U.S. deal with the Iranian threat and, if Obama asks what Israel would be willing to give in return, the Israeli premier would show great interest in the subject.

Or perhaps Netanyahu will make it clear that not just Israeli interests are threatened by a nuclear Iran.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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03/26/2009

Netanyahu and the Palestinian veto

Filed under: Israel, Israel Derangement Syndrome — Tags: Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 10:00 am

Regarding Israel’s incoming Prime Minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, the New York Times observes:

“I think that the Palestinians should understand that they have in our government a partner for peace, for security and for rapid development of the Palestinian economy,” said Mr. Netanyahu.

He added that peace is a ”common and enduring goal for all Israelis and Israeli governments, mine included. This means I will negotiate with the Palestinian Authority for peace.”

His remarks were relayed on Israel Radio. It remained unclear what terms Mr. Netanyahu was offering for peace.

Similarly The Washington Post reports:

“I will negotiate with the Palestinian Authority for peace,” said Netanyahu, leader of the right-wing Likud party.

There was no mention of creating an independent state, a goal that has formed the basis of U.S. and Western-sponsored peace talks. President Obama reaffirmed U.S. support for the idea in comments in Washington on Tuesday, calling progress toward a Palestinian state “critical” to ending an “unsustainable” situation in which Palestinians live under Israeli-imposed restrictions and Israelis worry about their security.

But as Barry Rubin points out, Israel isn’t the main problem here.

Clearly, peace with Hamas is more important for Dahlan than peace with Israel. And make no mistake: these two alternatives are mutually exclusive.

Indeed, Dahlan is ready to do anything to cooperate with Hamas, as long as it accepts the PA and Fatah as leading partner. He explains the PA won’t ask Hamas to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Fatah isn’t bound either to any PA recognition of Israel and, “as a resistance organization,” can continue attacking Israel whenever it chooses.

Why, then, has the PA agreed to accept Israel’s existence? Dahlan says: only to get international aid money and support. If this is how Dahlan thinks, his comrades’ views are more extreme. The inescapable implication is that if the PA ever signs a peace treaty with Israel—though don’t hold your breath—and gets a Palestinian state whose capital is east Jerusalem this would not block Fatah or Hamas from continuing armed struggle.

This attitude fits perfectly with the fact that even today the PA does nothing to prepare its people for peace and compromise. The claim that a Palestinian state should and will some day encompass all of Israel is maintained by schools, sermons, leaders, and media. It is contained, too, in the demand for a “right of return”—flooding Israel with several million Palestinians—as more important than getting a state where refugees can be resettled in a country of their own.

No wonder every poll shows overwhelming Palestinian support for armed attacks on Israeli civilians and little backing for a compromise peace that would end the conflict forever.

Of course the Palestinians embrace the peace process. For them it’s meant the receiving of plenty of foreign aid, the acquistion of territory and absolutely no responsibility for creating a civil society.

From 1996 to 1999, when Netanyahu was first prime minister he signed the Hebron Accords and withdrew Israeli troops from most of that city. If anyone is aware of any reciprocal action that Arafat took during that time that increased the chance of coexistence, I’d be interested in hearing it. Even now, ten years later, the myth that Netanyahu was the main obstacle to peace persists.

It makes no difference that Netanyahu’s successor, Ehud Barak went all out to make peace, only to be rebuffed at Camp David and finally faced the Arafat organized “Aqsa intifada” starting in late 2000. It makes no difference that Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 led to the strengthening of Hamas and the deteriorating security situation for Israel’s southern residents. What we have seen over the past ten years is that no matter how committed an Israeli government or an American government is towards making peace in the Middle East, the Palestinian veto remains the main stumbling block to peace.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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03/25/2009

Coalition coalescing

Filed under: Israel — Tags: Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 11:00 am

Last week Barry Rubin suggested that Binyamin Netanyahu’s agreement with Yisrael Beiteinu that included party head Avigdor Lieberman as Foreign Minister was a ploy and that we wouldn’t know the true makeup of the Israeli government until the beginning of April. He didn’t believe that Netanyahu would agree to a narrow government or that he would really keep Lieberman as Foreign Minister. So far the first part was accurate, but with Labor joining Likud, Lieberman remains slotted as Foreign Minister.

The New York Times reports:

Likud and Labor negotiators agreed on terms of a deal on Tuesday. The agreement was somewhat vague on issues pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, stating that the new government would devise a plan for comprehensive peace in the Middle East; that Israel was committed to all previously signed diplomatic and international agreements; and that the government would work to reach peace accords with all of Israel’s neighbors while preserving Israel’s security and vital interests.

The agreement does not contain any mention of the two-state solution as a goal for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but as Shalom Simhon, Labor’s chief negotiator, noted, neither does it rule that out.

Labor said it wanted a continuation of the peace process with the Palestinians but did not insist on any declaration about the two-state solution in its talks with Likud. Instead, Labor focused on socioeconomic issues in the coalition talks, a priority for much of the party’s constituency.

The Washngton Post:

Led by Defense Minister Ehud Barak, a former prime minister, Labor delegates agreed that their 13 recently elected Knesset members would help Netanyahu form a majority in the Israeli parliament. The deal gives Netanyahu a bloc of at least 66 votes in the 120-member body, but even more importantly, it brings a sense of ideological diversity to a coalition that would otherwise have been narrowly drawn. Barak will remain as defense minister.

Israel Matzav (via memeorandum) points to two likely consequences of Labor joining the government. One is that Netanyahu’s economic program will likely be modified and the other is that Israel is less likely to promote expansion of Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria. He also observes that this a very good deal for Barak and Labor. (Conversely it makes Tzipi Livni look like she’s been outmaneuvered. I can’t imagine that Kadima is happy with this.)

Joe Klein who feels that elections made a terrorist organization legitimate, calls Labor joining the coalition a “fig leaf.” Apparently, for Klein, elections make Palestinians bent on Israel’s destruction legitimate, extends no such understanding for an Israeli party committed to a two state agreement.

Shmuel Rosner, though is impressed.

Netanyahu’s mastery of politics in the last half year has been very impressive. He has outsmarted his arch-rival Tzipi Livni three times. First, in Nov. 2008, when he prevented Foreign Minister Livni from forming a coalition as PM Ehud Olmert announced his resignation – forcing new elections; second, In Feb. 2009, when he convinced Avigdor Lieberman to disappoint Livni and shatter her hopes for a Kadima-led coalition supported by Israel Beiteinu; now, in March 2009, when a last minute deal with Barak made the “right-wing narrow” coalition an unusable slogan for Livni. This is a “unity government.”

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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03/17/2009

When extremism counts and when it doesn’t

Filed under: Israel, Israel Derangement Syndrome, Israeli Double Standard Time, Media Bias — Tags: Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 10:00 am

The Washington Post reported on the murders of two Israeli policemen the other night.

Israeli police spokesman Mickey Rosenfeld said the shooting was being treated as a “nationalistic” attack, the phrase Israeli police occasionally use for political violence carried out by Palestinians. He said that the two officers were shot “at close range” while on patrol near the Israeli settlement of Massua. The small Jewish enclave is in an agricultural area of the Jordan Valley, north of the city of Jericho and near the Jordanian border.

The New York Times adds a detail.

Earlier Sunday, the Israeli military opened the Beit Iba checkpoint, northwest of Nablus, for the first time in eight years. Dozens of checkpoints were erected throughout the West Bank after the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada in 2000.

The military said in a statement that the Beit Iba crossing was being dismantled as part of “good-will measures authorized by the minister of defense, and as a result of the significant decrease in terror attacks originating from Nablus.”

In contrast the Washington Post only mentioned that checkpoints are the source of friction, with no suggestion that they actually may help stop terrorism.

Both articles failed to mention that it was Fatah – the moderate Palestinian faction – that took credit for the murders. Both Elder of Ziyon and Israel Matzav had that crucail information.

The Post also covered the current reconciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas.

The divided government of the Palestinians has been a key stumbling point in the effort to resume peace talks with Israel. Fatah, which leads the Palestinian Authority, and Hamas reportedly took a step toward resolving the impasse Sunday. Wire services reported from Cairo that the rival factions had agreed to hold presidential and legislative elections on Jan. 25 of next year.

Note that the Post report makes it sound like including Hamas makes peace more likely. The Post hasn’t reported on Israel’s coalition negotiations, but I can’t imagine it would differ much from what was reported in the NY Times.

According to the Times:

Israel’s prime minister-designate, Benjamin Netanyahu, forged ahead on Monday with negotiations toward a probable narrow, hawkish government after his conservative Likud Party initialed its first coalition agreement with the nationalist Yisrael Beitenu Party led by Avigdor Lieberman.

If finalized, the agreement, reached late Sunday, could make Mr. Lieberman, an often indelicate and outspoken politician whose threatening language aimed at Arabs arouses suspicion and some trepidation abroad, the next foreign minister.

So even though Lieberman apparently abandoned his loyalty pledge platform he’s described in negative terms. (The headline refers to him as “far-right.”) And Netanyahu’s success in forming a government is presented as an obstacle to peace. There’s no consideration as to whether an agreement over Shalit will lead to peace, just that any agreement, seemingly would be good because it’s an agreement.

Taken together we see a few things:
1) Fatah’s involvement in terror is ignored.
2) Hamas’s participation in government, despite being a terrorist organization, is portrayed as essential to peace.
3) Binyamin Netanyahu becoming Prime Minister will somehow hurt the cause of peace.
4) Netanyahu’s premiership is exacerbated by his bringing Yisrael Beiteinu on board.

The cognitive dissonance that emerges from this is incredible.

In these cases, it appears that extremism in the promotion of a Palestinian state is no vice.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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02/13/2009

Scenes from a premiership

Filed under: Israel, Media Bias — Tags: Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 12:00 pm

From 1996 to 1999, Binyamin “Bibi” Netanyahu was Prime Minister of Israel. During his term in office he was viewed with skepticism, if not hostility by the Clinton administration, much of the American media, the foreign policy establishment and the opposition in Israel.

In January of 1997, Netanyahu and Arafat concluded the Hebron Accords, which called for the withdrawal of Israel from most of Hebron. Additional protocols called on Israel to withdraw from further locations in Judea and Samaria and for the Palestinians to start observing the commitments they had made under Oslo. Netanyahu, got Clinton to guarantee that Israel would determine the scope of the withdrawal on its own. In fact that guarantee was crucial in getting the cabinet to approve the accords.

However shortly after the signing, Arafat declared himself unsatisfied with the scope of the Israeli withdrawals and complained to Clinton. Clinton took Arafat’s side (this contradicts Aaron David Miller’s claim that the United States had always acted as Israel’s lawyer) and demanded that Netanyahu agree to withdraw from more territory. For the next months American and Israeli relations were marked with rancor of Netanyahu’s insistence that the Palestinians start keeping their end of the deal and Clinton, who insisted that Israel expand the scope of its withdrawals to satisfy Arafat.

About a year after the Hebron Accords were signed, in advance of a trip by Netanyahu to Washington, the New York Times reported:

The position adopted by the Cabinet today was that the note — appended by the United States to the agreement signed a year ago on an Israeli withdrawal from most of the West Bank city of Hebron — spoke of ”reciprocity.” The Cabinet said any further Israeli withdrawals were therefore conditional on the Palestinians’ fulfilling what Israel described as their ”commitments” under the American note.

The list put out by the Israelis today included a long series of demands. They range from the adoption of a new Palestinian National Charter that would not include calls for Israel’s destruction, to protection of the environment and extradition of 34 Palestinians wanted by Israel for terrorist acts. The Cabinet set up a team led by Danny Naveh, the Cabinet Secretary, to monitor Palestinian implementation of these demands.

In fact, the ”note for the record” signed by Warren Christopher — who was Secretary of State at the time — included none of these requirements. What it said was, ”We intend to continue our efforts to help ensure that all outstanding commitments are carried out by both parties in a cooperative spirit and on the basis of reciprocity.”

Israeli commentators and opposition politicians depicted the move as an attempt by Mr. Netanyahu to put impossible conditions on the Palestinians, and make them appear to be the cause of the deadlock.

In fact, as Charles Krauthammer pointed out (and noted in a later correction by the Times itself) the Note for the Record, included everything that Netanyahu demanded. HIs conditions were not “stringent” as the Times’s headline declared, but exactly what had been agreed upon. In his column “He negotiates by the rules,” ( Washington Post, January 16, 1998) Krauthammer wrote:

There is no better illustration of the comical one-sidedness of the peace process: Israel’s demand for Palestinian compliance with its own written obligations is deemed a form of sabotage.

What are these demands?

(1) Change the Palestinian National Covenant to remove the clauses that call for Israel’s destruction.

(2) Fight terror and prevent violence. This includes extraditing terrorists; confiscating illegal firearms; and preventing hostile propaganda, like that from Palestinian officials and official media that accuses Israel variously of injecting Palestinians with AIDS, poisoning their food, planning to destroy the Al-Aqsa Mosque (”with the creation of artificial earthquakes”) and propagating the fiction known as the Holocaust.

(3) Reduce the size of the Palestinian police force, now more than 12,000 above the level allowed under the Oslo accords.

(4) Close Palestinian Authority offices in Jerusalem.

These commitments are contained in the official “Note for the Record” drawn up by the United States at the completion of the Hebron accord a year ago.

Sound sensible? Not to Bibi-phobes. Take the New York Times. Its front-page lead story on Wednesday reports that these demands are essentially Netanyahu inventions. “In fact,” writes correspondent Serge Schmemann triumphantly, “the Note for the Record’ signed by Warren Christopher — who was secretary of state at the time — included none of these requirements.”

But there is no “Note for the Record” signed by Christopher. And the official American “Note for the Record” (authored and signed by U.S. Middle East envoy Dennis Ross) contains, under the heading “Palestinian Responsibilities,” every single measure cited above: “The Palestinian side reaffirms its commitments to the following measures. . . . (1) Complete the process of revising the Palestinian National Charter. (2) Fighting terror and preventing violence . . . preventing incitement and hostile propaganda . . . transfer {extradition} of suspects . . . confiscation of illegal firearms. (3) Size of Palestinian Police will be pursuant to the Interim {Oslo} Agreement,” etc.

The Times’ false front-page report (subject of a correction the following day) is typical of its tendentious treatment of Netanyahu. It echoes the PLO line that Netanyahu ’s demand for reciprocity is nothing but a ploy. But how can any fair-minded observer consider reciprocity anything but an unobjectionable, indeed essential, condition for a peace process?

On another front, a few months earlier, the extreme left-wing Israel Policy Forum released a poll claiming that a majority of American Jews favored the Clinton administration putting moderate pressure on both Arafat and Netanyahu to come to an agreement. This result was trumpeted as “proof” that Netanyahu was out of step with American Jewry and ought to be more flexible undermining his position. (Daniel Pipes wrote about that poll and contrasted it with two polls he had commissioned.)

So it was throughout Netanyahu’s three years in office. The Clinton administration, the media and American-Jewish Left all worked to undermine his position, even though Netanyahu’s position was no more extreme than demanding that Arafat and the Palestinians abide by the agreements they signed.

Netanyahu is not yet Prime Minister and we’re starting to see the media “report” that Netanyahu would upset the oh-so-sensible plans of President Obama.

Netanyahu isn’t as extreme as his opponents portray him, but that doesn’t really matter. Even his efforts at demanding accountability from the Palestinian were portrayed as unreasonable. The early indication is that we’ll see more of the same. this time around if Netanyahu succeeds in forming the next government of Israel.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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02/11/2009

Ain’t democracy great? Part II

Filed under: Israel, Israeli Double Standard Time, Media Bias — Tags: Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 12:00 pm

After Hamas won legislative elections three years ago, the Washington Post reported:

“The hope is that there is a government that is really committed to peace with Israel,” said one senior administration official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was discussing another country’s politics. Even if Hamas prevails, the official added somewhat hopefully, “they’ve grown over the years. Getting back to the talks with Israel is really the only solution.”

Actually, with a few strategic changes that’s what the Washington Post reported about the results of the Israeli election yesterday, In Israeli vote results, a setback for Obama.

While the centrist Kadima party appeared to eke out a victory, the right-wing Likud party more than doubled its seats and an ultra-nationalist party made big gains, increasing the prospect that a government uninterested in peace talks will emerge from the post-election efforts to form a governing coalition. Even if Tzipi Livni, the head of Kadima who has vowed to negotiate peace with the Palestinians, manages to cobble together a coalition after weeks of negotiations, many experts predict she will be hamstrung by her coalition partners.

“You are going to have a very wobbly, dysfunctional, survival-minded coalition in Israel,” said Daniel Levy, a former Israeli peace negotiator.

Daniel Levy is currently a left-wing activist. His role with J-Street should have been mentioned, instead of presenting him as some sort of expert.

Well yes perhaps Netanyahu is less interested in peace talks than Livni would be, but is that the result of being “right-wing” as the reporters suggest, or a reasonable approach given history? Netanyahu’s successor, Ehud Barak, tried to negotiate a final status agreement with Arafat and got terror in return. Barak withdrew Israel from southern Lebanon and that led to the strengthening of Hezbollah. Sharon withdrew Israel from Gaza and that led to the strengthening of Hamas. “Peace” moves have a record of backfiring.

Administration officials said yesterday they would not comment pending official returns, but many key players have long and difficult memories of dealing with the Binyamin Netanyahu, the Likud leader, when he was prime minister during the Clinton administration. It is no secret that U.S. officials would prefer to deal with Livni, who as foreign minister spearheaded unsuccessful talks with the Palestinians in the waning days of the Bush administration.

Well, yes the Clinton administration retreads who are part of the current “hope and change” administration might have long memories. But Netanyahu, for all of the scorn heaped on him, did maintain the peace process. He might have done it reluctantly, but he did keep it alive.

“The hope is that there is a government that is really committed to peace with the Palestinians,” said one senior administration official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was discussing another country’s politics. Even if Netanyahu prevails, the official added somewhat hopefully, “he’s grown over the years. Getting back to the talks with the Palestinians is really the only solution.”

Just a reminder, one of the hallmark’s of the Clinton administration (and the Bush 41 administration) was the regular willingness of anonymous “senior administration official’s” to go on record criticizing Netanyahu. There wasn’t as much of that with the administration of Bush 43.

But Aaron David Miller, a former U.S. peace negotiator, offered this succinct appraisal of the election result: “This is like hanging a ‘closed for the season’ sign on any peacemaking for the next year or so.”

Miller said even a broad unity government — one possible outcome — would be unable to agree on peace moves but could reach quick consensus on military strikes against Hamas or Hezbollah, such as the recent invasion of Gaza. “You may get a government good at war-making, not peacemaking,” he said. “It’s really going to create a major headache for the administration.”

This is a great soundbite. Except Miller, it should be remembered, is a Clinton administration official, who was not recycled. It also should be remembered that his critique of American policy is that the United State too often acted as “Israel’s lawyer,” It’s an odd charge coming from someone who was part of an administration that welcomed an unreformed Yasser Arafat to the White House more than any other world leader but openly showed contempt to Israel’s duly elected leader, when Netanyahu was PM.

But the problem with Miller’s soundbite is that there is little “peacemaking” Israel really can do. The main obstacle to peace is the Palestinian unwillingness to recognize Israel’s legitimacy. The problem with concessions of land is that they’re irreversible, so it is reasonable – not the result of weakness – that any Israeli government approach concessions carefully. And when a nation is threatened, it ought to respond. Even at that, it took Israel years to respond forcefully to the Qassams from Gaza. Like I said, Miller’s soundbite is great – especially if you view Israel as the main obstacle to peace – however, it’s divorced from reality.

Netanyahu was critical of the U.S.-backed Annapolis talks last year, and on the campaign trail he expressed deep skepticism that any agreement could be reached.

He has vowed not to divide Jerusalem, in which Palestinians want to establish their capital, and not to return the Golan Heights to Syria. He has also warned of the danger Israel would face if it gave up the West Bank, saying that Palestinians could use the territory to fire rockets at Ben-Gurion Airport.

Still, Netanyahu has deep connections to the United States, and few in Israel expect him to do anything that would jeopardize American support. With U.S. mediation, Netanyahu agreed during his tenure as prime minister to a peace deal under which Palestinians received partial control over the West Bank city of Hebron. Analysts say he could be susceptible to U.S. pressure.

Actually, the PA got control of most of Hebron. And while Netanyahu’s warning about ceding more of Judea and Samaria is presented as campaign rhetoric, surely the Israeli withdrawals from southern Lebanon and Gaza show that this fear has a real basis.

That line about analysts, seem to be less an observation than a suggestion. Perhaps it’s even coming from that “senior administration official.”

Peace isn’t simply about negotations and concessions. The past 15 years also show that ill-conceived concessions lead to more violence. Netanyahu, if he is able to form the next Israeli government, will have to convey the risks involved to the American administration effectively. It’s already clear that a whispering campaign against Netanyahu is starting with the Washington Post playing a willing role in conveying the administration’s dissatisfaction with the Israeli electorate.

And how did the Washington Post report the (anticipated) Hamas victory in 2006?

The administration must also hold together its allies in the peace process, particularly the European Union. Last late year, the sponsors of the “road map” peace plan, known as the Quartet, issued a statement saying that “a future Palestinian Authority cabinet should include no member who has not committed to the principles of Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism.”

But that statement was not categorical, and some European officials have indicated in recent days that instead of the black-and-white view expressed by the United States, perhaps Hamas needed greater encouragement to make a break with its past, much like the Irish Republican Army. One U.S. official sighed that the European Union was like the “International House of Pancakes — there are a ton of waffles there.”

Despite that last comment from a sensible American official, the implicit view of the Post was that the United States (and Israel) would have to deal with Hamas.

So when Palestinians elect terrorists, the world is expected to respect the results, but when Israelis vote, well their leaders better get with the (American) program. Ain’t democracy great?

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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11/03/2008

Israel’s calm, that’s not good

Filed under: Israel, Israel Derangement Syndrome, Israeli Double Standard Time, Media Bias — Tags: Binyamin Netanyahu — Soccerdad @ 9:00 am

Having done all they can to ensure the election of their preferred here, the editors of the Washington Post turn their attention to the next election, Israel’s in A Middle East Vote.

Let’s skip to the end:

Thanks to the construction of a fence along the West Bank border and a cease-fire deal with Hamas, Israel has been more peaceful in recent months than it has been in years. That favors right-wing leader Binyamin Netanyahu, a former prime minister. It is likely that he would seek to put off a settlement with Palestinians indefinitely. Mr. Netanyahu is seen as inflexible and untrustworthy by many in Washington; his election could spell a fractious period in Israeli-U.S. relations.

Israel is quiet and that is a bad thing because it might bring Binyamin Netanyahu to power. Now, I’m not at all confident of this. After all, Hamas agreed to a ceasefire so it could build its fortifications. When the ceasefire ceases being advantageous. And of course the Post doesn’t really acknowledge that ceasefire is broken on a regular basis.

And I love the characterization of Netanyahu as “inflexible and untrustworthy.” Well I guess the Post’s reporters have done their job in portraying his as such. Netanyahu was villified when he was Prime Minister for demanding that the Palestinians keep their end of the bargain. He did withdraw Israel from most of Chevron, something the even Shimon Peres failed to do. That’s not inflexible. (I don’t agree with that flexibility, but at least acknowledge that Netanyahu actually moved the peace process along.)

At the moment, the parties of Ms. Livni and Mr. Netanyahu are tied in the polls. A clear victory by Ms. Livni could energize the peace process, and its pursuit by the new president could strengthen the U.S. position around the region. But more likely is a narrow victory by one side or a coalition government that hamstrings Israel’s negotiating ability. That would perpetuate what at present is the leading obstacle to a deal, which is the political weakness of both the Israelis and Palestinians who seek it. As the Bush administration has discovered, intervention by the United States, even if energetic, cannot easily compensate for that deficit.

Notice how this is all about Israel. There’s nothing about the rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas. Or that a leading Palestinian university still denies historical Jewish ties to the land of Israel. Of even that, in legal proceedings, the PLO still argues that terror against Israel is justified.

To this, the PLO, represented in part by none other than the appalling Ramsey Clark (who in a distant age, 1967-69, was attorney general of the United States), replied that the attacks were acts of war rather than terrorism. As Daniels summarizes the PLO argument: “defendants argue that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking because this action is premised on acts of war, which is barred under the ATA [Antiterrorism Act of 1991], and further is based on conduct which does not meet the statutory definition of ‘international terrorism’.”

This response is noteworthy for two reasons: (1) Fifteen years after Oslo supposedly ended the state of war, four years after Mahmoud Abbas took over and supposedly improved on Arafat’s abysmal record, the PLO publicly maintains it remains at war with Israel. (2) The PLO argues, even in the context of an American law court, that blatant, cruel, inhumane, and atrocious acts of murder constitute legitimate acts of warfare.

This isn’t about the political weakness of those who seek peace. It’s about the lack of commitment of even the “moderate” Palestinian leadership to seek anything that would be considered “peace” by any rational person. If Livni wins decisively, she will still have to satisfy the ever increasing demands of Abbas.

Of course what the Post is doing is promoting the phony bogeyman of Netanyahu who can be blamed for any future failures of the peace process. Effectively, the editors of the Post are excusing the continued failure of the Palestinians to come to terms with Israel. By doing this, they are promoting and excusing conflict, not peace.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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06/12/2008

Stayin’ Alive

Filed under: Hamas, Israel — Tags: Binyamin Netanyahu, Ehud Olmert — Soccerdad @ 9:30 am

The Washington Post reports that Israel’s Olmert Clears Way for Party Primaries.

Under an ethics cloud and facing the possible collapse of his governing coalition, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on Wednesday cleared the way for his party to hold early primaries that could end his political career.The move may temporarily ease dissension within his coalition. But it also could mean that Olmert’s Kadima party will choose a successor later this summer, which would effectively end his premiership.

However the Jerusalem Post reports that the maneuver may not delay elections as Olmert and Kadima hoped:

Olmert’s associates said that one of the goals of his decision was to try to prevent the passage of Likud MK Silvan Shalom’s bill that would disperse the Knesset and set a November 11 election date. But that goal appeared to have backfired, as both Labor and Shas officials said they would still vote for Shalom’s bill unless a date was set for the primary.

Hanegbi said there was no chance of a date being set by the time the bill was expected to be brought to a preliminary vote, on June 28. He said that due to the challenges of changing Kadima’s charter, it was also unlikely a primary date would be set before the cross-examination of American Jewish financier Morris Talansky, the main witness in the investigation that is undermining support for Olmert, on July 17.

Apparently Netanyahu saw this coming (via memeorandum)

Benjamin Netanyahu may hire former White House adviser Karl Rove.

Citing sources close to Netanyahu, Israel’s Channel 10 reported Thursday that Rove’s name has come up on a roster of strategic consultants that the Israeli opposition leader is thinking of hiring as he prepares for a possible leadership challenge against the embattled Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

Well it wouldn’t exactly be a leadership challenge. It would be a general election. This suggests that in this case anyway, Shalom was doing Netanyahu’s bidding.

However the Washington Post also reports:

Israel’s political crisis comes as the government faces tough choices over how to handle daily rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, as well as apparently fruitless U.S.-backed negotiations with the Palestinian Authority over a possible peace deal.

On Wednesday, Israel’s security cabinet, a select group of ministers, announced it would continue to work with Egypt toward a cease-fire with Hamas but would also instruct the military to prepare for major operations if the talks break down.

“We are giving the Egyptian initiative every chance to succeed,” Regev said.

The NYT similarly reports:

Israel carries out frequent air and ground strikes and small-scale incursions into the small coastal territory to try to contain the rocket and mortar fire that has killed four Israeli civilians so far this year. Many here say they believe that a broad military offensive is inevitable; Mr. Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak threatened last week that one was close.

But for now, the preference is for the Egyptians to try to broker a cease-fire that fulfills Israeli conditions. Those include a cessation of all attacks from Gaza, an end to arms smuggling into the territory and some progress toward the release of Gilad Shalit, an Israeli corporal who was captured and taken to Gaza in June 2006.

Hamas has demanded an end to Israeli military operations in Gaza and an easing of the year-long economic blockade of the territory as part of any cease-fire deal. Israeli officials say that some sanctions could be lifted once there is calm.

Haaretz provides some more details:

To date, the Islamic group has agreed to a cease-fire with Israel but has refused to include in the deal the return of abducted IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.

Israeli sources said Monday it was possible that Hamas’ decision to hand Israel a letter apparently written by Shalit was an expression of “goodwill,” in an effort to show that the group was willing to take some steps toward a truce deal.

In recent weeks Israel has demanded that any agreement for calm in the Gaza Strip, and the lifting of its blockade on the Strip, would also include progress on the question of Shalit, who has been held in Gaza since his abduction in June 2006.

Hamas has also rejected Israel’s demand it cease smuggling weapons into Gaza. Egypt has pledged to fight the arms smuggling, but Olmert and Livni have expressed their disapproval of reaching an agreement that would leave Hamas free to continue amassing a weapons stockpile.

Hamas is in a fine position to make demands on Israel as Elder of Ziyon found:

Sources in the Hamas movement say that the movement expects Israel to make a number of assassinations of prominent leaders of the movement at the last minute that precedes approval of the “calming” proposal from Egypt.

The Al-Hayat of London newspaper quoted sources as revealing that “a number of Hamas leaders finally vanished from sight for fear that Israel carried out its threats of military action in the sector before accepting the calm”, in a reference to the statements of Minister Ehud Barak, the Israeli army, which threatened to implement a military operation in the sector before the truce.

It would appear that the Israeli government is working harder to stay in power than it is in trying to remove the threat to the country’s south.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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