Annapolis vs. Iran

Michael Oren sees good coming from Annapolis if you’re not looking for peace in Middle East peace through Anxiety

After arguing that the conditions for peace don’t exist (or aren’t that strong) Oren writes

The inability of the international community either to entice or deter the Iranians from producing nuclear weapons adds urgency to the need to unite those countries threatened by those bombs. That, and not American fiat, brought 49 states and organizations to Annapolis; that, and not the yearning for an Israeli-Arab accord, impelled a Saudi prince to sit alongside an Israeli prime minister.Not unexpectedly, the Iranians reacted ferociously to Annapolis. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad pronounced it a “failure” and the government-controlled press promised to “bring down Islamic wrath” on its participants. But such rage merely betrays the anxiety induced by Annapolis in Tehran. For the first time a coalition of Western and modern Arab leaders has coalesced and declared its commitment to resist “extremism” in the Middle East — a well-known euphemism for Iran.

What’s more, new efforts have begun to confront Iran outside of the United Nations and woo Syria from Iran’s orbit. An international conference may not be the ideal formula for attaining Israeli-Palestinian peace, but it can provide a powerful forum for expressing solidarity in the face of war.

I don’t buy that wooing Syria from Iran’s orbit will be useful. I also can’t believe that with all the lip service given to “peace” that this conference was simply to deter Iran. Maybe Oren’s right, but I’m skeptical.

David Ignatius sees Iran as a focus too in the Road from Annapolis. (or here)

Annapolis was a setback for Iran. That country’s firebrand president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, tried hard to dissuade Syria from attending; his efforts, I am told, included calling his ally, President Bashar al-Assad. He failed, but if the Annapolis process should languish, Iran and its proxies could quickly regain the upper hand. That’s the danger of what Rice has set in motion. Now she has to make it work.

So whereas Oren sees Annapolis strictly as a response to Iran, Ignatius sees the “peace process” as a means of isolating Iran even further.

What needs to be done?

After dragging its feet on security assistance for the Palestinians the past two years, the United States has finally recognized that this is a crucial variable. To beef up the American effort, Rice on Wednesday named retired Marine Gen. James Jones as her “special envoy for Middle East security.” Jones is an adept mediator and has many friends in Congress and in Europe, where he was a popular NATO commander.

America did provide plenty of assistance to the Palestinians in the past, only to see it used against Israel. And if the United States is asking Israel to “absorb terrorism” how is that going to help? Declaring peace when there is none is not very effective.

A happy Annapolis surprise was the positive speech by Syria’s deputy foreign minister, Fayssal Mekdad, which American officials viewed as a break in the ice of U.S.-Syrian relations. Before publicly embracing a Syrian-Israeli track, Rice wants to see Syrian cooperation in electing a new president in Lebanon. But U.S. officials credit Syria for reducing the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq, and they are planning regular security meetings with the Syrians.

But at what cost? The Golan? That will only strengthen Syria, which has shown no reason to be trusted.

Lebanon is one example of how the Middle East logjam is beginning to break. After several months of deadlocked negotiations over a new president, the pro-American parties holding a slender majority in the Lebanese parliament announced last week that they will back the Lebanese army commander, Gen. Michel Suleiman. America’s key Lebanese allies, Sunni leader Saad al-Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, are both said to be comfortable with Suleiman as a compromise candidate. The Lebanese general has managed the trick of being friendly with Damascus, which originally backed his appointment, and also friendly with Washington. This compromise is not a perfect solution, and it leaves unresolved the future of Lebanon’s volatile Shiite militia Hezbollah. But it’s certainly preferable to a return to civil war.

Realistically, how much room does Suleiman have to maneuver? I can’t believe that he can act independently of Syria or Hezbollah without risk.

The big strategic challenge in the Middle East remains Iran. Rice believes that in dealing with such an adversary, it’s important to have some leverage. The Annapolis conference and recent American successes in Iraq have given the United States and its “realignment” allies a bit more of that strategic heft. The key now is deciding how to use the new leverage in a timely way, before it’s lost. Tehran isn’t yet on Rice’s travel itinerary. But someday soon it should be.

The leverage, such as it is, is diplomatic. There’s nothing for Iran to fear. Iran has shown no inclination to change its behavior. And nothing Ignatius has written suggests that it has any reason to do so in the future. So Ahamdinejad is a bit peeved with Assad, there’s really nothing more significant that than that happened at Annapolis.

Crossposted on Soccer Dad.

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